I didn't know if there was sort of a top-line thing that you thought would be sort of good for people to understand when looking at this.

yeah so consistently uh over the last four cycles and actually over the last six cycles i should correct it my piece focused on four cycles because that's what i had like full data from sure but um actually there was a piece on the erstwhile 538 that i was able to retrieve that did the analysis of august polling going back to like 1990 and so it's literally the last six cycles um starting in 2014 where august polling has been consistently to the left of the final November result.

Now, what does that mean? It can mean a few things, right? But the one thing I will say, this is not this is not to say that there will be a polling error this time because polling error is obviously judged on the basis of the polls in the last three weeks of the election.

We're not in the last three weeks of the election.

It's also not to say that Democrats won't overperform in a lot of these states, right? I mean, the polls are pretty clear and the midterm environment is pretty clear on the fact that they should overperform.

The question is how much? And the question is, you know, kind of looking at past cycles, what's kind of the realistic bound of Democratic performance, if anything? But I think the very, very clear thing that stands out is that you just simply compare August polling to the final November election results and ask, is this a reliable indicator of where it's gonna go? And if it misses, does it kind of tend to miss equally on both sides? The answer is no.

For the last six cycles in a row, it has overestimated Democrats by about four points or about three to four points.

Cause obviously some were pulled more than others, but, but the broad strokes were, were the, were similar.

Patrick, can you please begin with six minutes of opening remarks?

So in 2024, I wrote a book called Party of the People: Inside the Multiracial Populist Coalition Remaking the GOP.

The results of that election, you seem to have a realignment not only of working-class voters, but of non-white voters towards Trump and the GOP.

So now it's been about a year and a half of Trump.

We are about four months away from the midterm election.

You seem to have the normal midterm backlash, particularly against someone like Trump, who has been extremely assertive about the use of executive power.

This has intensified Democratic energy to try and put a check on him, and you see in some respects the groups we saw swinging towards Trump on the basis swinging back.

Do voters in these tight congressional races, are they thinking national party? Do they consider that the candidate is particularly progressive? Will it affect the result of the election in such a tight toss-up race?

[laughs]

Um, but, uh, yeah, no, I, I, I mean, I'm glad you mentioned that because I think that that is, um, uh, you know, that was really kind of the impetus, um, behind me actually writing the book.

Um, in 2016, I was not, you know, r- to say the least, very favorable to Trump.

Uh, and my base case assumption was that he would not win.

I, I didn't fully rule out the case that he would wi- he could win, uh, right? Yeah, just because it being, uh, you know, it, you know, you normally have this pattern in American politics where, you know, a White House after two terms, you know, usually means that the other side wins, but I thought he would be the exception to that.

He was not the exception to that.

Um, but he did well, obviously not just in the Republican primary, which I was very, you know, dispirited and disillusioned by, having been an acolyte of, uh, you know, George H.W. Bush.

So do I read you right on that? And if so, like, what kinda really got your thinking going on that?

If he's not losing the primary voter, what voter is he losing in the, uh, uh, Republican Party, and/or is he losing any support in the Republican Party?

Yeah, so there's been a lot of talk, uh, particularly since the, uh, the action in Iran and the various moves, um, that, uh, Trump has made on the world stage, that Trump, you know...

People thought, "Well, Trump walked away from this campaign promise of no more, uh, you know, no more of these forever wars.

No more, uh, putting other countries first and sending our troops and committing American blood and treasure to these foreign conflicts.

We're gonna focus right here at home." Right? And most people said, "Well, by doing that, um, he's putting at risk his own MAGA base." Right? He's putting at risk the very voter, um, the nationalist voter that, um, you know, is, uh, very invested in this idea of America first.

Um, but that's completely backwards.

The voters he has lost over Iran have not-- is not the MAGA voter, is not the, you know, uh, quote-unquote America first voter.

But, but getting back to Cassidy and to Thomas Massie, what-- And you've sort of mentioned that what's interesting to me is most of that independents-- Or ex-ex-excuse me, incumbents have such a large, um, uh, advantage, but yet that didn't save Cassidy, and it might not save Thomas Massie.