M
Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar
Associate professor of international affairs at Texas A&M's Bush School and Baker Institute fellow, expert on U.S.–Iran relations and author of "Religious Statecraft: The Politics of Islam in Iran."
2
APPEARANCES
2
PODCASTS
012
DEC 30
JAN 6
JAN 13
JAN 20
JAN 27
FEB 3
FEB 10
FEB 17
FEB 24
MAR 3
MAR 10
MAR 17
MAR 24
MAR 31
APR 7
APR 14
APR 21
APR 28
MAY 5
MAY 12
MAY 19
MAY 26
JUN 2
JUN 9
JUN 16
JUN 23
JUN 30
JUL 7
JUL 14
JUL 21
JUL 28
AUG 4
AUG 11
AUG 18
AUG 25
SEP 1
SEP 8
SEP 15
SEP 22
SEP 29
OCT 6
OCT 13
OCT 20
OCT 27
NOV 3
NOV 10
NOV 17
NOV 24
DEC 1
DEC 8
DEC 15
DEC 22
DEC 29
JAN 5
JAN 12
JAN 19
JAN 26
FEB 2
FEB 9
FEB 16
FEB 23
MAR 2
MAR 9
MAR 16
MAR 23
MAR 30
APR 6
APR 13
APR 20
APR 27
MAY 4
MAY 11
MAY 18
MAY 25
JUN 1
JUN 8
JUN 15
JUN 22
JUN 29
JUL 6
JUL 13
JUL 20
JUL 27
AUG 3
AUG 10
AUG 17
AUG 24
AUG 31
SEP 7
SEP 14
SEP 21
SEP 28
OCT 5
OCT 12
OCT 19
OCT 26
Oct 15, 2026
Iran’s Long War: A Conversation With Ali Vaez and Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar
23:37
7:17
It might be actually, uh, two may complement each other in the sense that precisely because the US has no credibility as far as Iran is concerned, because, as Ali said, the US keeps, uh, changing the goalpost, that's how Iran perceives the situation.
7:33
The Iranian side seems to believe that, uh, no deal can survive.
7:39
And I think it's partly because there is a perception gap between the two sides when it comes to their capabilities and to their, uh, basically resolve.
16 MINS LATER

Dan Kurtz-PhelanHOST
Mohammad, when you look at the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, do you see this as a potential example, per what Ali was saying, of Iran and its partners going too far and alienating their neighbors? Or do you see it as a successful example perhaps of them showing their neighbors that Iran's security is their security, and that they therefore need to be more accommodating of Iran's interests?
42: A New Iranian Era Emerges, Cloaked in Red
2:01
What do those images mean for you? The banners, the sloganeering? Is it a surprise? Is it something different? And does it have an implication or is it an indicator of changes within the regime?
2:17
The funeral was organized more than four months after Khamenei's death, as you mentioned, Masador.
2:23
So he was killed on the very first day of the war on February 28th.
2:27
And because of the wartime conditions, the Islamic Republic decided to wait until the war was over or there was a ceasefire so they could hold the funeral.
2:37
What we saw... was basically a highly choreographed state-sponsored processions that started in Tehran, and then they moved the body to the holy city of Qom, and then from Qom, they took the coffin to Iraq, to the holy city of Najaf, and then holy city of Karbala, and then from there to the holy city of Mashhad in Tehran, And before eventually he was buried.
3:11
So in a way, it was not surprising that the regime was planning, you know, such a massive funeral for him because they wanted to show that they were not as unpopular as the Western media projects.
17 MINS LATER
19:59
Why and who is the they in the regime who did this? Can we speak now of a single coherent reason decision-taking body entity collective, or are there