And so you see them, uh, in the absence of, of strong US support, looking for other ways just to provide themselves with some respite from Iranian or Houthi attacks.

attacks.Yeah, I think the, the current spike in violence and, and i- is, I think, largely op-opportunistic on behalf of the Houthis.

You know, th-these are grievances that go back at least a hundred years between Saudi and the Zaidi, which is essentially the, the Shia semi-majority in northern Yemen.

And the, you know, th-these are flare-ups and, and conflicts that have, have literally been going on ever since, ever since Nasser, uh, turned Yemen into his own Vietnam back in the 1960s.

And the sort of, the brokered stability that Saudi has tried to maintain on its southern border historically has been, has historically relied upon either, uh, backing strongmen, uh, like Abdullah Saleh after the reunification of Yemen in the early 1990s, or just bribing [chuckles] northern, the, the, uh, uh, the Shia population in northern Yemen, which is, at least in certain regions, you know, allied, like, quite distinct, but also very much allied with Shia populations in Saudi Arabia's own southern provinces, which have been part of essentially contested Yemen territory for, you know, since the, since the 1930s.

And so I think the Houthis, you know, as a, you know, a revolutionary movement, basically have, have grown over the past two decades and, you know, were beaten back pretty severely in twenty-- in the war that Saudi Arabia waged in 2015 through just raw air power, and that in part is due to the geography of y- of, of Yemen, right? Yemen is essentially a plateau state, if you want to think about it that way, where you have highlands in the middle that are controlled historically, the, uh, where, where the capital, Sanaa, is, and have historically been controlled by the Zaidi Shia sort of, again, not quite a minority, but sort of a population, uh, plurality basically of, of Yemen.

And with sort of the, the more Saudi-aligned, uh, Sunni tribes operating all along the lower coastline and really centered as a power center in Aden, and the Saudis were able to use their vastly superior air power to basically push the Zaidis back into the highlands, um, over the course of the, you know, previous bloody war that went on from about 2015 to 2022 and with a, with a sort of calm peace.

A- and more, more importantly, when is it you get to the point where you might see pushback, whether from Congress, uh, or some other constraint that might restrain some of that delegation authority that, for however the Trump administration might be using it in, in ways people question, is pretty fundamental to what the executive branch has come to do for national security reasons for the last 20 or 30 years? It is its most used, most commonly relied upon tool.

And so you see them, uh, in the absence of, of strong US support, looking for other ways just to provide themselves with some respite from Iranian or Houthi attacks.

attacks.Yeah, I think the, the current spike in violence and, and i- is, I think, largely op-opportunistic on behalf of the Houthis.

You know, the- these are grievances that go back at least 100 years between Saudi and the Zaidi, which is essentially the, the Shia semi-majority in northern Yemen.

And the, you know, th- these are flare-ups and, and conflicts that have, have literally been going on ever since, ever since Nasser, uh, turned Yemen into his own Vietnam back in the 1960s.

And the sort of the brokered stability that Saudi has tried to maintain on its southern border historically has been, has historically relied upon either, uh, backing strongmen, uh, like Abdullah Saleh after the reunification of Yemen in the early 1990s, or just bribing [chuckles] northern, the, the, uh, uh, the Shia population in northern Yemen, which is, at least in certain regions, you know, allied, like quite distinct, but also very much allied with Shia populations in Saudi Arabia's own southern provinces, which have been part of essentially contested Yemen territory for, you know, since the, since the 1930s.

And so I think the Houthis, you know, as a, you know, a revolutionary movement, basically have, have grown over the past two decades and, you know, were beaten back pretty severely in 20-- in the war that Saudi Arabia waged in 2015 through just raw air power, and that in part is due to the geography of y- of, of Yemen, right? Yemen is essentially a plateau state, if you want to think about it that way, where you have highlands in the middle that are controlled historically, the, uh, where, where the capital, Sanaa, is, and have historically been controlled by the Zaidi Shia sort of, again, not quite a minority, but sort of a population, uh, plurality basically of, of Yemen.

And with sort of the, the more Saudi-aligned, uh, Sunni tribes operating all along the lower coastline and really centered as a power center in Aden, and the Saudis were able to use their vastly superior air power to basically push the Zaidis back into the highlands, um, over the course of the, you know, previous bloody war that went on from about 2015 to 2022, and with a, with a sort of calm peace.

A- and more, more importantly, when is it you get to the point where you might see pushback, whether from Congress, uh, or some other constraint that might restrain some of that delegation of authority that for however the Trump administration might be using it in, in ways people question, is pretty fundamental to what the executive branch has come to do for national security reasons for the last twenty or thirty years? It is its most used, most commonly relied upon tool.

And so you see them, uh, in the absence of, of strong US support, looking for other ways just to provide themselves with some respite from Iranian or Houthi attacks.

Yeah, I think the, the current spike in violence and, and i- is, I think, largely op-opportunistic on behalf of the Houthis.

You know, the-these are grievances that go back at least a hundred years between Saudi and the Zaidi, which is essentially the, the Shia semi-majority in northern Yemen.

And the, you know, the-these are flare-ups and, and conflicts that have, have literally been going on ever since, ever since Nasser, uh, turned Yemen into his own Vietnam back in the 1960s.

And the sort of the brokered stability that Saudi has tried to maintain on its southern border historically has been-- has historically relied upon either, uh, backing strongmen, uh, like Abdullah Saleh after the reunification of Yemen in the early 1990s, or just bribing [chuckles] northern-- the, the, uh, uh, the Shia population in northern Yemen, which is, at least in certain regions, you know, allied, like quite distinct, but also very much allied with Shia populations in Saudi Arabia's own southern provinces, which have been part of essentially contested Yemen territory for, you know, since the, since the 1930s.

And so I think the Houthis, you know, as a, you know, a revolutionary movement, basically have, have grown over the past two decades and, you know, were beaten back pretty severely in twenty-- in the war that Saudi Arabia waged in 2015 through just raw air power.

And that in part is due to the geography of y- of, of Yemen, right? Yemen is essentially a plateau state, if you want to think about it that way, where you have highlands in the middle that are controlled historically, the, uh, where, where the capital Sanaa is, and have historically been controlled by the Zaidi Shia, sort of, again, not quite a minority, but sort of a population, uh, plurality, basically, of, of Yemen.

A-and more, more importantly, when is it you get to the point where you might see pushback, whether from Congress, uh, or some other constraint that might restrain some of that delegation of authority that, for however the Trump administration might be using it in, in ways people question, is pretty fundamental to what the executive branch has come to do for national security reasons for the last 20 or 30 years? It is its most used, most commonly relied upon tool.

Stalin emerges from the Second World War with astonishing, almost religious prestige in the Soviet Union.

Stalin and the United States had made an alliance that ultimately brings Hitler and then Japan to its knees.

The spirit of cooperation is so high that Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Command in Europe, probably one of the future staunchest anti-communists in American history, stands right next to Stalin.

[triumphant music]

Out of the fires of war, they wanted for there to be an organization where we don't have 1939 again.

The United Nations combines two ideas.

The first is the General Assembly, where equal states can meet and confer and make resolutions.

There is also the wartime military alliance between the Soviets, the British, France, and the United States, as well as China, and that's the Security Council.

That's a Republican appointed panel, but an ideologically quite eclectic one.

Sure.

I would even say the same thing about Judge Rao.

I didn't find Judge Rao, but I argued that case, full disclosure.

And I didn't find Judge Rao, who ultimately wrote the opinion, dismissive at all.

In fact, some of the arguments we made under the Appointments Clause she took quite seriously, but ruled that they were foreclosed by DC Circuit precedent, specifically the case Quinta mentioned a moment ago in Ray Grand Jury investigation.

So why do I go through all that long and arduous history? I think one of the issues that this case presents and how you feel about it is going to come down to what is your attitude about the government acting in the absence of very specific congressional direction.

So I'm curious whether to what extent you think that those kinds of structural distinctions should or shouldn't play into the analysis here.

They start again the next day and is the weather changing? What does Stagg tell them in the mo- the first meeting?

meeting?Sure.

Well, by now, by now, Stagg's prediction, uh, has come true and, and the clouds have picked up, the wind has picked up.

It's beginning to pour rain and it is looking like they're gonna have to delay the invasion another month.

Um, and so they go to Southwick House yet again for a briefing, uh, from Stagg on the weather.

And Stagg says, just as improbably as he did, you know, the previous day, "There's going to be a gap in the weather.

Uh, our measurements deep out into the Atlantic, uh, show that the storms that are currently whipping through the channel will briefly be pulled out into the Atlantic for a window of, you know, 24 to 48 hours from June 6th to June 7th, um, in which, uh, you'll have the conditions that you need to launch the invasion."

What does Eisenhower do? What does he say, Michel?

Who is he, Michel?

James Martin Stagg is a Scottish meteorologist that Eisenhower, um, basically plucks from the meteorological staff, uh, and stuffed into a general's uniform in January of 1944 to be, in essence, his commander of the weather.... a prior to that, all the meteorologists worked for their own command, so you had the Navy's weather predictions, the Army's, the British, et cetera.

Um, and Eisenhower understood, not only from, you know, his own experience in the Mediterranean, but also from history that, you know, weather is its own terrain.

Uh, you have to have clear, confident predictions about the weather because that could, uh, you know, that could turn an operation on a dime.

And so, he wanted someone, uh, to not only be singularly responsible for organizing and, and coordinating all the different weather predictions, um, but he actually brings him into the weekly s- commander's meetings.

Um, and makes him present, uh, not only, uh, you know, the various meteorological issues that week, but actually predict the weather (laughs) for the upcoming week, which in England in, even today, is very, very (laughs) difficult.

Uh, and given the technology of 1944, it, you know, is almost unimaginable.

Uh, do we have an opinion by the King of Eisenhower? Did he ever write down his notes?

What happens with those E-boats?

Sure.

So- so that night, Exercise Tiger is, uh, scheduled to go over a number of days and, as you said, the first day is just an utter disappointment, um, and seems to confirm everybody's worst fears about how the landings on Utah Beach are expected to go.

Um, and, but that night, as Eisenhower is returning to London on his train, uh, German E-boats, uh, Schellen boats, these little fast boats that operate like gorillas in the English Channel, uh, stumble upon some of the American LSTs, um, and sink too.

Um, you know, h- five- 500 to 800 men, depending on how you- how you count them, uh, end up losing their lives in these just, in this just catastrophic, um, and deeply unlucky, (clears throat) um, y- uh, uh, sort of Ger- uh, German attack, um, on the, um, Americans as they are, um, sailing at night.

The- the descriptions that I was able to find, um, the firsthand accounts of- of this attack are just horrifying.

Uh, you have, you know, these LSTs, which, you know, if- if you've never seen one, they basically look like a giant trash barge, um, being essentially cut in half, uh, with massive fires, uh, spewing out.

Go ahead.

What is the argument about the air?

Sure.

So, um, you know, the British are probably the first country, cer- certainly first major military power to really separate out air power as its own domain of warfare.

And that comes right, in, in the British context, right after the First World War.

And over the course of the intervening decades, a lot of thought, a lot of theory had been put into the future of warfare, with, um, the idea, particularly among what was, what is sometimes called the bomber mafia, uh, being that the use of bomb power, the ability to fly an airplane over a foreign country's or an enemy's cities, uh, and reduce their cities to rubble, to destroy their, um, not only, uh, um, sort of military capability, but their industrial capacity, can win wars entirely by the air, right? It's the, it's a new theory of how do you win wars.

You don't have to go get dirty in the ground and occupy countries anymore.

You can simply bomb your enemy into submission so they cannot, uh, resist you any, any longer, and they just have to quit, uh, or risk annihilation.

Sure.

What was it and why, why did it bedevil Eisenhower? What were the British thinking?

Sure.

So, you know, the original plan, uh, was not just to invade France from the north across Normandy, um, as we know, but to actually do a, uh, uh, essentially, a continental pincer maneuver with an invasion of Normandy in the north and then an invasion of the French Riviera in the south.

And Roosevelt, uh, loved this idea for a lot of important reasons that I get, that i- that are easy to overlook in hindsight, um, not the least being Roosevelt needed to or felt he needed to impress the Russians.

Um, you know, the United States was very much an unproven world power, um, really up until D-Day.

And when, you know, Roosevelt meets Stalin for the first time, uh, at, in ni- early ni- at the end of 1943, right around the Chi- with, in the middle of the Cairo Conference, uh, they all fly to Tehran for the first big meeting between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin.

Um, you know, Roosevelt is very keen to present the United States as not just the second fiddle, uh, to the British Empire, but really a, you know, a power unto itself.

(laughs)

Please tell this story, because it tells us everything about their relationship.

Yeah.

It's a, it's a, it's a wonderful moment.

Um, so Eisenhower, as you mentioned, returns after a, um, a sojourn briefly in the United States where he's, you know, just bombarded, and then has to take what in... turns out to be a, I think a well over a 24-hour journey back to the United Kingdom.

Um, because of the notorious English fog, uh, or smog really, uh, being even worse, uh, than it normally is, he ends up having to land in Scotland and take a train all through the night, uh, which doesn't get him into London until about 12, 12 o'clock in the morning.

Uh, and there waiting for him is Kay Summersby, um, as you mentioned, um, the... hi- his driver since he arrived in 1942, and probably one of the closest people to him, uh, in the war.

I would actually say, you know, I mean, there's al- there's a lot of speculation and there's a lot of practically prurient interest, not the least from people like FDR, um, in the sort of romantic character of the relationship, and there's been all sorts of, you know, writing and speculation primarily about that ever since.

Um, just quickly, what is his job right now? What was he given, Michel?

in North Africa was notable, but still, Marshall commands the globe?

Oh, for sure.

Um, and in some ways, Eisenhower was probably as surprised as, uh, anybody else that Roosevelt made that choice.

Um, I, I think it came down to a few things.

Um, and one is, you know, what you said, is Marshall really was the indispensable man of the Second World War, and FDR knew that.

And having Marshall out of Washington, um, you know, focusing on the war in Europe meant, you know, instability at a time when the tide was turning in the Allies' favor, right? This is the start of 1944.

Um, but the war was by no means won, uh, and particularly in the Pacific.

Go ahead, 30 seconds.

Why is George Marshall, uh, requesting Eisenhower? What can Eisenhower do for him? What can he do for Eisenhower at this moment? Good evening to you.

Good evening.

Um, a real pleasure to be on, and- and very much looking forward to talking about it.

Yeah, George Marshall is, you know, obviously one of the lions of the 20th century.

Um, you know, some would say that he was even more powerful, certainly in matters of war and peace, than even FDR.

Um, there was a joke, and it was only kind of a joke, that, um, when Marshall would go to Capitol Hill asking for, uh, funding for a new military program, they would ask if this is what he wanted or as w- w- is it what Roosevelt wanted, and if he said it was what Roosevelt wanted, he- he could kill an entire initiative just, uh, just with those few words.

So, you know, George Marshall is the center of the, you know, at that point, global war, um, in the Pacific, in Europe, and, you know, fighting at a scale, and with sophistication and complexity that no one could've even imagined two years before that, um, and it's difficult to even get your head around today.

What does Eisenhower think of Bernard Baruch? What does Baruch make of Ike?

More of this later tonight.

Oh, yeah.

The, the, King George VI, uh, loved Dwight Eisenhower, um.

He, he called him, uh, a soldier of the empire.

He almost treated Eisenhower...

And this, and this just shows, um, you know, Eisenhower's great success in doing the thing that, certainly Roosevelt understood, was, was the most important thing for Eisenhower to do, is keeping the Anglo-American alliance not only together, uh, but fighting, uh, cohesively.

Um, you know, Eisenhower is, um...