Walk us through the pros and, and cons of getting the US directly involved.

Well, the most important thing is how we go back in there.

Look, I think it's important for the audience to know that the forces of the legitimate government of Yemen are making progress on the ground.

If we're going to support, we ought to support, as we used to say, by, with, and through the Yemeni forces.

Do you think this, uh, is an indication to Mohammed bin Salman, if President Trump doesn't get more involved, that he's perhaps over-relied on the United States for security?

Well, I think it's important to understand that the Saudis and the Emiratis fought together against the Houthis about 10 years ago, weren't very successful.

Um, they came out.

The Houthis survived.

We are winning.

I don't believe that that's the right way to communicate actions that put American men and women at risk.

It may make you feel good to have a neat TikTok video of Karg Island blowing up.

One really has to ask if they're taking the communications and information operations role seriously.

And that is exactly what we're seeing the Trump administration do.

The biggest strategic mistake made by the regime in Tehran is believing that The midterms, the economy and the people of America are their communications, targets and opportunities.

Midterms always, always are a tough hit for the incumbent.

And let's be honest, the American people aren't mobilized to protest this war.

As we hear this kind of rhetoric from the administration, and we've heard similar things from President Trump as well, who just within the last week has suggested low-keying it, focusing more on economic measures, is it because our military measures were not and cannot be enough?

Uh, I think that's true.

It's, it's really gotta be a combination of economic, diplomatic, and military.

I don't think you can do any of those in isolation.

Uh, right now, uh, the military doesn't seem to be able to break through the resistance model of patience and, uh, standing back and taking the blows as Iran has been doing.

So I think what they're doing is turning up the knob on the economic sanctions-

I'm a Navy kid.

Yeah, exactly.

up.What do you think it's gonna take for a measurably different outcome this time, and how much does that depend on the Iranian people rising up again?

Well, first of all, I think we've got to understand we're sending two different messages to the Iranians.

We have people that are saying, "I think this is gonna be over quickly," but you heard the president just then basically caution patience.

And patience is what the Iranians are using against us.

They hear about we need to b- we don't like forever wars, we wanna get out of this quickly, we wanna get this done quickly.

But that's not how you defeat the Iranians.

You defeat the Iranians by going patience against patience.

So the White House always reiterates that nothing any state does is going to make a difference in what the US does, but at what point does this sort of stuff mandate a response from the US?

When you've read that report, does that worry you, or is this normal stuff that goes on in any war?

Well, I certainly wouldn't be upset and worried if I was Admiral Cooper in terms of how many Patriots, how many, uh, JDAMs, how many fast-attack, um, Tomahawk missiles we have.

The people that are worried are the, uh, INDOPACOM commander and could well be the EUCOM commander, whose contingency plans all depend on having a certain availability of those, uh, critical materials.

I believe that Admiral Cooper's going to get what he needs from this administration simply because he's in a war.

Uh, but Cooper and the INDOPACOM comm- uh, the INDOPACOM commander and the, and the, uh, European command- commander are probably shaking in their boots.

Look, one thing that wasn't mentioned, and I wanna throw this in here, uh, because there is another dimension and there's another set of actors in all this, and that's the Europeans.

Uh, the fact remains is we ran the Tanker War in 1981 to 1988.

General Kimmitt, I think I detected a slight shake of the head there, or was it an involuntary tick?

So first, where do things stand with the conflict between the US and Iran today?

Well, I think frankly, we're sort of at a, uh, status quo with the fighting going back and forth, somewhat tit for tat.

Uh, I think this can't go on for any length of time.

There seems to be a necessity for some kind of break point, uh, in one way or the other, uh, to this conflict.

I think we might see our bombing campaign take on different, uh, tactics than we've seen up to this point.

We've gone after primarily military targets up to this point.

We're starting to go against dual use targets like infrastructure, bridges that can be used by the military, but also are used by the civilian population as well.

Adding to that, how much will our allies in the region potentially prove the key if we really have to change the nature of the conflict to come to some sort of resolution?

I mean, how concerned are you tonight, given where this is at this moment, about the risks to the tens of thousands of US troops that are in the Middle East now?

Well, I, I think both Brett and I are concerned about that significantly because, again, all we need is one mistake made by an air offense artilleryman who misses a missile coming in.

I mean, we saw that in Al-Asad inside of Iraq, where we luckily did not lose a significant number of troops.

But when you have a large concentration of them, as we do in Kuwait, Al Udeid in U- in Qatar, and some of the other bases in UAE, that could certainly happen.

Uh, listen, I think it's important to go back to Brett's comment.

It is clear that if the United States is the unilateral, uh, protector of the Gulf, uh, of the Strait of Hormuz, that will not work.

The fact is we are a belligerent in this conflict, and for us to try to control it is a war situation.

Yeah.

He gave us his assessment of the situation.

We're in this tit-for-tat dynamic where the Iranians struck a ship.

The United States responded, bombing at Iranian positions.

The Iranians responded by striking another ship in possibly Bahrain.

We've struck them again.

The Iranians always respond, "You're gonna see another strike." Not clear how we get out of this dynamic because the two sides disagree about the strait.

There are two problems with this ceasefire, particularly w- regarding the strait, but also with nuclear weapons.

He goes on to talk about how you can start refunding the proxies again to do more harm to the interests of the United States in the Middle East.

Yeah, well first of all, I agree with General Keane, and not simply because he was my commander at one time, but he's absolutely right.

The Iranians need money the way that a body needs blood, and they're running out of blood right now.

And but if they get a transfusion the way that the last ad- the, the Obama administration kept them alive for a number of years with funds transfers, uh, they'll just keep this up.

What would be their incentive to either, uh, change their nuclear program, or change their proxy program, or change their ballistic missile program? As long as they can keep their head over wa- head above water with new money, they won't stop.

I mean, will it continue to be the red line, General?

Well, I think two red lines.

They're going to want to maintain control over the Strait of Hormuz.

Do threats like that have any significance anymore? Do you think the Iranians care when Trump saber rattles like that? And is, on a practical reality level, is it realistic to think that there could be, say, a pause of a month, two months, 60 days, whatever, and at the end of it, if Trump isn't happy, he starts the military attacks again given what's been going on for the last 16 weeks?

Well, the answer to your question, your last question, is of course they could start the military campaign up again.

Um, now, would it have any effect? Uh, I think we've gotta understand that military success up to this point has not had a strategic effect.

It really hasn't changed the behavior of the Iranian regime.

And part of that is this, the, the resistance model that is being used, which says they win by not losing.

They win by outlasting their opponent.

We've seen that with Hezbollah.

[laughs] Well, actually, I agree, I agree with you about that.

Now, I know it's difficult to ascribe motives to a fanatical regime, but what do you make of this from the Iranian side, just from a tactical perspective? Are they maybe trying to drag out this conflict further, but why would they do this in the middle of peace talks in the first place?

Well, look, because I don't believe they're really interested in peace.

I think they're going to do whatever they can to hang on to their nuclear program.

I have no specific proof, but I've known the Iranians for a long time.

We started a conflict with a very simple message.

Get back to the negotiating table and let's talk about your nuclear program.

What did they do? They diverted our attention for weeks by closing the Strait of Hormuz.

Do you think that we are fully prepared for that new reality?

What more does the United States want to see?

Well, l- let's examine that 2%.

First of all, I think we've got to realize that a significant amount of that money is not going for real f- war fighting capability.

Uh, it is probably a significant amount is going into, as your other guest said-Better personnel costs.

But there's a significant amount of Canadian equipment that needs backlog maintenance repair.

Your, your Leopard tank fleet is quite a bit of shambles, is gonna need a lot of money to bring it back up to operational capability.

Uh, the same thing with your F-18s.

What is this really about, do you think?

How do, how do we make it more realistic when you say, you know, sending those ships in, in order to do what?

Uh, in order to continue to, uh, assist the Iranians in wrecking their economy.

Uh, sooner or later, uh, I think that more combat action will make the Iranians understand that we need to achieve some of our other core objectives.

Look, I don't like putting my airmen at, at risk, uh, every day.

We saw that, uh, when we lost a couple, uh, until they were recovered inside of Iran.

But sometimes, uh, putting the US military at risk is certainly better than putting our allies at risk.

Look, if, if one of the agreed points is that the US reduces its presence in the Middle East, uh, that's gonna make the Middle East allies mad as badgers.

Is it d- a- are you pessimistic that, that you're, what you would like to happen i- is actually possible given the, you know, the, the headwinds from, from trying to continue this?

How do you think the Iranians would interpret that, that movement? Um, what do you think they're there for?

Well, I think the Iranians are gonna look at that as an additional capability for the littoral area, the, the, uh, beach area of Iran, for either Kharg Island capability or for, uh, going down into the, uh, islands that control the straits, like Larak and then the Thumb Islands.

I think what's more significant is the additional 90 aircraft, fighter aircraft, that the H.W. Bush would bring.

Do they have the power to do that? I mean, obviously we have seen strikes at, at a number of ports throughout the region by them.

Yeah, first, I would agree with, uh, uh, Karim.

The fact is, between the pragmatists and those that still believe in the principles of the Ir- of the Iranian revolution, it's clear the IRGC still has a power structure to be behind the scenes, and it could well be increasing in their power.

Uh, I think the thing we don't talk about a lot with regards to the military power is the speedboat capability that's, uh, basically hidden along the beaches, the littoral, uh, of the Persian Gulf.

A speedboat is what knocked out and killed Americans, uh, uh, in the USS Cole attack.

Talk to us about the SEER training that they are putting into place now.

Let's first talk about the SEER training.

That's a very, very specialized course given to pilots and, in some cases, other special operations forces.

They go through a couple of weeks of this exact type of scenario.

You're on the ground.

You're plane has crashed, you're possibly injured, you have nothing more than what you're carrying on yourself, and some communications.

The first and most important thing is to, as they say, learn to live like a bunny.

Is it because these planes are just workhorses, they're around and they do get the job done? Why are we still using these and what are they really good at?

And when you put terms out there like air supremacy, uh, air dominance, it builds an expectation that

thatUh, we're impervious to being shot down.

We're impervious to these types of actions.

Look, General Schwartz and I both know it, war is ugly, it's messy, and bad things happen, and we are not making that clear to the American people as we're engaging this operation, that, that things are going to work out completely the way we want it.

There are casualties, there is equipment loss.

We're seeing that now.

And the very fact that we're talking about this, uh, as something extraordinary means that this administration candidly has not managed the expectations of the American people in terms of what the costs of this war will be.

But when you hear him talking about the oil in the strait, uh, does that give you a sense of what the strategy is?

How seriously do you take these comments by Donald Trump, and do you think there would be support within the United States for the United States to withdraw from NATO?

Well, as a little bit of my background, I was also the senior military assistant to the NATO Military Commander, so I know this quite well, and I've served under NATO command in Bosnia and in Kosovo.

Uh, first of all, you, you were correct.

Uh, the NATO, uh, charter is a treaty of the United States, so the president alone can't revoke the treaty.

Uh, he can suspend the treaty, and I think what we ought to be thinking less about the legalistic and more of the practical, which is the president could certainly hold back on, uh, support for NATO in any future operation.

We used to do what we called force generation conferences for NATO operations, and in that force generation conference, we would be putting spaces to faces and the contributions of the individual countries to the staffs and the units for that particular NATO mission.

The easiest way for the United States to signal its displeasure is just offer no soldiers or equipment or staff officers to that, uh, major operation.

He's not gonna be there in two and a half years' time, so just bide your time"?

So in your opinion, would hitting these facilities that provide millions of civilians with power and fresh water, would hitting them constitute a war crime?

Well, uh, it certainly would be against international law that we don't, uh, that we don't necessarily adhere to.

I think if we take a look at history, uh, going against these kind of facilities is not unusual in American bombing campaigns in the past.

That has changed since the Geneva Conventions have been updated, but even as recently as the bombing of Haiphong Harbor and Hanoi during the Vietnam War, uh, we didn't hold back at all.

So it would not be unprecedented.

It would not be unusual.

Uh, I'll leave it to the lawyers to, to define whether it's a violation of international law or a violet- or a war crime.

I- is that the right amount?

And yet I don't see how he can stop it if the Iranians have worked out that it's the economic part of this war that they're currently winning.

No, I agree with you.

Uh, first of all, I don't think Donald Trump cares about the midterms.

He's already accepted them as lost.

Uh, even if they're won by the Democrats, uh, the fact remains is that nothing is gonna get done, uh, in the United States Congress, whether the Republicans still in charge or whether the Democrats are in charge.

Our legislative body seems to be generally irrelevant.

Uh, but look, I think that Donald Trump now recognizes that the advice he took or the, or the orders that he issued are not achieving the results, uh, he wanted.

Yeah

Yes.

I, I, I think that's the right answer.

Part of it.

But I think we've still gotta remember there are hundreds, if not thousands, of speed boats that are hidden along that coastline in coves, camouflaged in, in open sight as commercial vehicles.

General, do you also agree that this is likely to go on for weeks?

Yeah, especially if we do try to form a coalition.

I- it's important to understand that we don't have nearly the capability to bring up the mines, to escort the tankers, to escort all the equipment that we did in the first Tanker War.

We've got about 50 helicopters that can spot them, but we only have four boats, four entire boats in the Navy that can actually do mine countermeasure.

The stuff in the strait, the, these other strikes, this is a sideshow." Is that accurate, or is the strait and these other things a sign of it's not going as well as the administration would like it?

Well, I think it's important to understand that the air campaign has been going very well.

The naval campaign is a different issue.

What the Iranians are doing is they're going after the economic targets.

It's all about oil at this point.

Obviously, we're talking about Kharg Island.

But as we said last time, very little of this is going to lead to victory, particularly the air component of this, so-

Mm.

To you, what does it signify that, that the US is now hitting Kharg Island?

Well, it, it, it means that we have raised the stakes in this war considerably.

It's gone simply from a, uh, take out the military, take out the regime, but now we're trying to take out the e- economic lifeblood of this country potentially.

I mean, it really is, um, he is holding Kharg Island, in my mind, hostage to ensure that, uh, Iran allows the, uh, ships through the Strait of Hormuz.

But as Jeremy [clears throat] properly said, uh, this could blow out of proportion, because if that oil infrastructure is attacked, uh, it is clear that Iran is going to attack the rest of the infrastructure in the Middle East.

And, uh, at that point, this, this, the prices of oil will just go out of control.

... uh, escort, no?

Although I, I really do believe that, uh, the military is correct when they say they have taken out most of the drones.

What do you think?

Well, look, my feeling, Caitlin, is that we went to war because we were unable to achieve three key issues at the negotiating table.

A continuation of the nuclear program of Iran, a continuation of the ballistic missile and drone program of Iran, and a continuation of the proxy program that Iran has run since 1979.

We couldn't get anything out of the Iranians.

They did their typical delay, deny, dissemble, deceive.

So we took those goals into the battlefield.

I think we ought to do everything we can to compel the Iranians back to the negotiating table, having given up those programs as an entry ticket.

When you see Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz and the danger that potentially poses, what do you see from a military and economic perspective?

Have a listen.

Well, in the middle of a war, it's hard to, uh, get a tape measure out in terms of the US standing.

Uh, most of the countries in the region just want this over.

Uh, they understand the benefits to their countries by the United States' actions if, in fact, Iran, uh, is neutered with its ballistic missiles, with its proxies, and with, with its nuclear program.

I think the greatest fear of the Middle East is if that we stop this war before those three goals are achieved.

And I think at that point, uh, the countries in the region would question why the United States went to war, uh, if it did not achieve its core objectives, uh, in that fight.

Have a listen.

We have given a significant amount of intelligence over the last four years to Ukraine about the targeting of Russian positions, so the fact that the Russians are returning that favor quid pro quo, um-

Um, General Kimmitt, um, what, what, what is your definition of what victory looks like here?

Well, my definition is quite simple.

Uh, we left the negotiating table because the Iranians were unwilling to negotiate on the issues of proxies and ballistic missiles, and they were starting to get into the finest detail about their nuclear program.

Very similar to what you said.

Those are our three core interests, nuclear, ballistic missiles and drones, and proxies.

In, in my mind, anything else than that, and I would agree, uh, with the comment that that would either be mission creep or boots on the ground.

So let's stick to the core issues.

Su- surely, uh, making regime change an objective, which I think most people think was the objective at the beginning, surely there, there is some sense to that.