What were you thinking as that play was unfolding? A- and when you're walking into that kind of exchange, what is going through your mind as far as this is setting me up for, you know, I, I, as I'm-- as you're in the moment, are you prepping for a memorable comment, or is just the, this just happening in the flow?

Absolutely not.

Absolutely not.

No, there's no way, 'cause again, anytime you attempt humor, it's a disaster.

It just, it falls flat.

It's not-- It's so, such a bad idea, and also, especially if you're not an experienced advocate, you just, you just don't ever wanna be funny, really.

No, I think I was just staring at them, and it was more talking out loud.

Here was an interesting nugget"? Anything?

Thank you, Counsel.

Ms. Platt? Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

Petitioner agrees that under Rooker-Feldman, district courts cannot review state court judgments if the state appellate process is over.

But petitioner submits that they can review them if the state appellate process is ongoing.

Well, that's backwards.

The failure to exhaust the state appellate process makes federal intervention worse, not better.

We

So there is a, a motive to get out of that state court appeal and come here instead, correct?

Right.

Well, let me just say a couple things about preclusion.

I, I find it highly ironic that pet- petitioner wants to rely on preclusion in a case where it's conceded preclusion doesn't apply.

Preclusion only applies, as, uh, my friend said, when the issue has been litigated or could have been litigated.

Here, there's a directed challenge to the consent decree, um, that could not have been litigated.

It's seeking to void and invalidate it.

So if we're trying to characterize what's going on here, how do we know whether she's right, that we should call this collateral attack, or you're right, that this is really an appellate, uh, exercise of appellate jurisdiction of the nature that Rooker is concerned about?

So there is a, a motive to get out of that state court appeal and come here instead, correct?

Right.

Well, let me just say a couple things about preclusion.

I, I find it highly ironic that P- Petitioner wants to rely on preclusion in a case where it's conceded preclusion doesn't apply.

Preclusion only applies, as, uh, my friend said, when the issue has been litigated or could have been litigated.

Here, there's a directed challenge to the consent decree, um, that could not have been litigated.

It's seeking to void and invalidate it.

No, but Ms, Ms. Preggolar says, "Look, we have this whole other, uh, uh, notion of collateral attacks on a judgment that are allowable and that appellate review is something different." So if we're trying to characterize what's going on here, how do we know whether she's right, that we should call this collateral attack, or you're right, that this is really an appellate, uh, exercise of appellate jurisdiction of the nature that Rooker is concerned about?

Black.

Mr.

Chief Justice, it may please the Court.

All contracts are subject to defenses, so appeal waivers are also subject to defenses and can be excused in more circumstances than the two recognized below.

The government argues that no contract defense can apply to knowing and voluntary appeal waivers.

No exceptions.

But if appeal waivers bind defendants under contract principles, they can be excused under contract principles.

Rebuttal, Ms. Black?