I imagine it sees the islands as an extension as well.

Yes, I think we need to be very clear that when the United Kingdom launched its task force in 1982, there was a very commonly held view in Argentina at the time that the reason why the task force was being launched was because Britain knew that there were substantial oil and gas reserves in and around the islands, and that it was nothing to do with responding to the direct threat to the residents of the said islands.

And when, of course, Margaret Thatcher at the time was very clear that these were British citizens in distress that needed saving, that was something, as I say, that was treated with a great deal of scepticism.

It can't possibly be that you would go to all this effort, cost.

And we shouldn't forget, nearly a thousand people died on both sides.

just for 2,500 people.

Now, the truth of the matter is, Argentina was right that in the 1970s, there was the famous Shackleton Report that did indeed speculate about oil and gas resources.

What I'm getting at here, Klaus, is what kind of predictions can you lay down here, October 2026, going into the next 12 months? So I think in the next 12

And I'm wondering where you see the direction of travel in terms of who controls the rare earths and what that means.

Well, again, I think I'd make a distinction, as you have to, between where rare earths reside, where they found, how do they get extracted, and then crucially, how do they get processed and put to use? And of course, you're right.

China does have a stranglehold because it's not just about the extracting.

It is about, in the end, how you process and put to use, I suppose.

So the question for me would be is how do other countries break that stranglehold? And the short-term proposition is it's going to be difficult.

China controls something like 60% of extraction of memory serbs.

90% of refining.

And so with the idea that pioneers often get slaughtered and settlers prosper, is there one investment or business takeaway you would look at today where perhaps it's not too early that someone could benefit from in predicting what's going to happen in the Arctic? So in the Arctic,

So the recent Antarctic Treaty where emperor penguins were brought up as being an endangered species and China vetoed that protection because it might have led to the creation of a marine protected area, which would have limited their ability to extract oil or precious minerals from that area why can't the other actors in that body call out that contradiction and why is their veto valid if it's like these states were kind of created on the idea that they were you know for the environmental good of the continent

The answer to that is partly rooted in this tricky issue about ownership of the Antarctic.

So the ownership of the Antarctic is unsettled, even disputed.

You've got the United States and Russia who reserve the right to make a claim.

You've got this growing body of countries who are becoming ever more interested in the Antarctic, but very hostile to anybody who thinks they can make a claim to the Antarctic, including the waters around the Antarctic.

You've got a treaty that in the last 30 years has said, look, we're not just interested in Antarctic science as a force for good.

We're now committing ourselves to environmental protection.

What is your take on Trump's handling of that situation? I

How does that factor in this collaboration between the U.S. and Argentina in the geopolitics of the Antarctic, the Falklands, and the Southern Ocean in general?

So I think there are different aspects to this.

There's no question at all that...

Stanley, Ushuaia, Punta Arenas are all Antarctic gateways.

And some of that is utterly benign in the sense of they are gateways for, for example, Antarctic tourism.

You know, anyone who's been to Ushuaia will know, as I know firsthand, there's plenty of traffic in the summer season that is going back and forwards towards the Antarctic peninsula.

The integrated or the joint naval base is a work in progress, but in itself is significant because it, in essence, it underscores this closeness between Argentina and the United States, which is both personal and strategic.

Is there something you can say about China's interest in this region?

How does that factor in this collaboration between the U.S. and Argentina in the geopolitics of the Antarctic, the Falklands, and the Southern Ocean in general?

So I think there are different aspects to this.

There's no question at all that...

Stanley, Ushuaia, Punta Arenas are all Antarctic gateways.

And some of that is utterly benign in the sense of they are gateways for, for example, Antarctic tourism.

You know, anyone who's been to Ushuaia will know, as I know firsthand, there's plenty of traffic in the summer season that is going back and forwards towards the Antarctic peninsula.

The integrated or the joint naval base is a work in progress, but in itself is significant because it, in essence, it underscores this closeness between Argentina and the United States, which is both personal and strategic.

Is there something you can say about China's interest in this region?

And I wanted to ask then what developments concern you the most, but at the same time, where do you see possibilities for collaboration?

Thank you.

I think it's a great question, Anna.

In terms of the future of Arctic geopolitics and governance, let me sort of frame it like that.

I I have said publicly, and I stand by my comments, I do worry about the political future of intergovernmental forums like the Art2Council.

Not because, by the way, I don't think they were incredibly worthy, important, powerful interventions in the mid to late 1990s.

Far from it.

So my question would be, how do you see this current growing importance of green digital and military infrastructures and the ways they reshape the region?

But seriously, is anything threatening? Should Russia have any reason for concern?

Well, again, I think you have to put yourself in the Russian mindset or the Putin mindset.

There's two things you need to understand about Putin's Russia.

First of all, lying... is a form of statecraft for the Russian Federation.

And it's industrial and very, very well developed.

So whatever Russia says, you need to have a healthy dosage of skepticism as you listen in to the commentary.

The second thing is, is that from Russia's point of view, there's a story to be told.

I mean, can it remain a zone of peace of some sort?

Perhaps tell a bit about what ideas could help maybe bring a wider view of Arctic governance beyond the Arctic Council.

Yeah, I mean, I think the tough reality is that we do have a sort of very fractured Arctic geopolitically.

So I think the point is well heard that there are working groups, there are people-to-people relationships, there are civil societies that can, of course, and do crisscross borders.

But I think at a sort of more meta level of geopolitics, what we have is now is we have a Russian-Asian Middle Eastern Arctic.

We have a European Arctic.

We have a North American Arctic that is fractured along, clearly, a boundary between the United States and Canada.

And really, my observation this morning was to say, look, are we going to have to think of different lines of connection and solidarities and allegiances? that in a sense further complicate a suite of geographies and alliances and memberships that come in and out of the Arctic.

Do you see this as a sort of a structural, leading to some sort of structural changes in Arctic governance, or is this a passing crisis that maybe will have some acceptable resolution that will be forgotten in a couple of years?

And how have these councils of indigenous populations managed to interact with the nation state or the Arctic? Have they found adequate recognition or managed to negotiate equitable relationships with those nations?

Yeah, I mean, I think it is a really important question, Leah, because the history of indigenous activism, certainly in the modern period, really dates from the 1970s, when across the circumpolar Arctic, notably outside the Soviet Arctic, as opposed to the European and North American Arctic, indigenous peoples increasingly formed national and indeed transnational organizations that were designed, I think, to actively either contest the very worst excesses of settler colonialism, assimilationist politics, Cold War militarism, But at the same time, as well as contesting, also demanding.

So demanding greater autonomy, greater land rights, for example, resource rights.

And a lot of that was remarkably successful over time.

So, of course, in the case of the Nordic part of the Arctic region, you see, for example, Sami parliaments, in Norway, Sweden, Finland.

In Canada, you had really extensive land claims, treaties and agreements.

Notably in Alaska, you had native corporations, for example, being created in the 1970s.

And that, of course, has all sorts of geopolitical and economic ramifications.