Are there facts to back that up, or is that just a friendly reminder of who we're fighting over in the Middle East, General?

So that's a great question.

These are based on remarks that the acting Chief of Staff of the Army made at the Army's annual conference this week.

And I think that I have three top line messages here.

First, what he had to say is not about a new threat.

It's drawing attention to an established threat, not something we newly discovered or even necessarily something that's imminent.

And it's not Iran he's talking about.

What does China do?

Do you see US involvement on the horizon here?

Well, uh, if you mean US involvement against the Houthis, there are some reasons that I would understand that the administration might be reluctant to do that.

One, opening another front on this theater would be a draw on resources, although it, there is a third carrier strike group headed to the region.

Two, you know, there's some question as to whether air strikes alone would be enough to compel the Houthis to change their attacks or alter their methods against the Saudis.

Uh, Saudi Arabia has a tremendous infrastructure that spans from the Red Sea all the way to the Gulf, and then things in the center of the country like Riyadh.

It's a lot to defend.

And I think frankly, there's probably some reluctance to get involved against the Houthis as long as the Houthis are only targeting Saudi-related vessels in the Bab el-Mandeb.

What does it say basically that the international community is accepting what I think a lot of people thought were red lines are no longer red lines? They feel like they're pink.

Do you expect the United States to get involved?

Well, so let's measure what that involvement would look like, and talk about the challenges or the reasons that the US would be reluctant to do that.

One, you know, Tyler just mentioned some 200 personnel in Saudi Arabia who are probably assisting with intelligence and targeting.

That's important, and that will be useful.

But in terms of getting more broadly engaged in actual combat operations, that would draw the kinds of aviation and naval resources that the US is using against Iran over at the Strait of Hormuz.

So it puts an additional strain on those.

Two, if we're going to engage in airstrikes, uh, together with the Saudis, there's some question as to whether or not airstrikes alone are going to be enough to compel the Houthis to change their approach.

Has the US force posture been changed given the fact that you have the Air Force removing all of its bombers from the United Kingdom?

To the point, broadly speaking, though, when it comes to mentoring, helping others, I'm curious, have you found any technical approaches either through your experience or the military that have helped you both be mentored and mentor others?

Yeah.

So I'm going to use two examples here, Jason, or share two techniques.

And the first one is what we call an AAR or an after action review.

And after any kind of event, thinking about what went well and what did not go as well as we wanted and what do we want to do differently going forward? So in terms of the things that went well, it may be just reinforcing, yep, acknowledge that's something we do well it may be something you've never tried before that now you want to institutionalize and make a routine part of how you do business um and it's important sometimes we say three ups and three downs come up with three things that went right three things that we want to do better and then identifying the things that you would like to have done better or differently and what are we going to do together as an organization to address those, whether it's additional funding, additional training, maybe a resource that's required, maybe we're going to organize differently.

And it's really important when you're having these reviews that it be unemotional, kind of forensic, not who shot John, I'm going to find someone to blame or a scapegoat.

It's all about getting better as a team.

It's just this feedback loop that allows for what's going on in your world because we can't discover anything from someone else without hearing their words.

General, this is a massive failure, isn't it? How did this co-pilot get into a fly-to-buy flight with a plane full of Israelis going to Israel?

That's certainly a significant security shortcoming.

And I'm sure FlyDubai and even Israeli aviation authorities will be looking at how this happened, what kind of procedures are in place to ensure that it didn't, or perhaps the procedures didn't exist and need to be put in place.

You know, we have no-fly lists that prevent people from being passengers.

One would assume there is something similar for pilots.

I would say on the positive side, the fact that he had earlier been identified as having been radicalized means investigators aren't going to be starting from scratch.

There's already some information about his contacts or how he became radicalized.

What does that tell you, especially as the president has said this week that there may be more attacks on Iran if there's no deal in place next month?

But what do you make of this?

Well, so certainly I think it's probably one of two options.

It could be, you know, a man who has some significant personal issues.

We've had episodes in the past of a psychotic break, you know, suicidal, various reasons.

If you look back over the last several decades, probably 10 to 12 incidents in which someone in the cockpit does something nefarious, they are typically not terrorist attacks.

It's usually someone who is really having a significant mental issue.

And then the other would be a possibility of a terror attack, whether that's an individual who has self-radicalized and decided on his own, this is something he is going to do, or someone who is more state-sponsored.

Do you think Israeli officials might have shot down the aircraft if they were aware it had been hijacked and weaponized? I mean, I think it did send out distress signals.

I'm a

fan of lean staffs.

Bloat can get in the way.

But we don't have a lot of details where all of them will come from.

And I think it's important, it will be important as those details come out to see whether they affect readiness.

What does it do to the span of control that the remaining generals have? Does it lower oversight for some of the important acquisition initiatives that the Secretary is talking about having? And just really, what does it do to our warfighting capacity? We need to understand where those cuts are coming from to make those assessments.

or of the joints

there.

Does this paint a picture to you of potentially an escalating threat level as this conflict drags on? Well,

that's a great question, Kayleigh.

I think it's a little complicated.

One, when the war first began and Iran began to retaliate, there were a number of things they did that were not unexpected, like, frankly, controlling the Strait of Hormuz.

And then there was a short list of things that many analysts expected to see happen that did not.

such as the Houthis getting involved to affect the Bab al-Mandeb, that has now occurred.

Another would be cyber attacks, significant cyber attacks against critical infrastructure.

What does all of this mean and could we return?

General, when you hear that, what does that tell you about the long run for this conflict?

Yeah.

So I think our US military forces that are deployed there now in the Middle East for these operations against Iran are performing a number of important functions.

One of them is enforcing the blockade that is intended to continue to shrink and diminish Iran's economy.

And I think that is occurring.

It's effective.

But any kind of economic measure, there is quite a lag.

Are those things true, Lieutenant General? And even if they are, does that alone bring the regime to heel?

Now, this reporting comes in part from the Military Times, and the reporter who broke that story is responding to Hegseth.

I think gaslighting our force is disrespectful and at a minimum they deserve transparency and accountability.

I know we're talking about Navy, not Army, but can you give me a sense of long deployments and the consequences in a situation like this?

Certainly.

So I think, [clears throat] a couple of things I'd say, Audie.

One, it is important to differentiate between fatigue, morale, and readiness.

They are separate but related.

And I've been part of very lengthy, very intense deployments where we were frankly exhausted, but had really high morale because we were excited about what we were doing, working for good leaders, seeing success on the battlefield.

I guess from a big picture perspective, what stands out to you about why this happened?

happened?Yeah, so you know, our officials, our elected officials receive thousands of threat reports.

The vast majority of them are bogus, but each one has to be evaluated.

I would look at three criteria.

One, is it feasible? Is this an attack that could actually happen? Two, is the source credible? And better yet, is it corroborated? Do I have multiple things that would back this up? And then the third is the imminence.

And I think the Secret Service, out of an abundance of caution, should a report look at least feasible, are probably gonna take these kinds of actions, particularly in the wake of mistakes like Butler, Pennsylvania or even the time when the gunman was able to come very close to the ballroom where the president was, and other dignitaries, during the White House Correspondence Dinner.

So from a Secret Service law enforcement perspective, I'm less surprised.

but it also, the thing that always sticks out to me is that, like, what does this say about the viability of the threat matrix that was, that they were staring at in that moment? Y- it seems like it was realer than anything else we thought at the time.

If you could zoom out and give us a sense of what has actually changed over the past couple of weeks as people reassessed whether talks were on, or versus now, where it seems like increasingly they're pretty far away.

Yes.

So that's a great question, Lisa.

I think, you know, one, the talks are proceeding on two axes simultaneously.

One is between Oman and Iran, and that's the mechanism by which the strait would be administered, the potential for either voluntary payments or some form of toll to assist with administration.

And then the second tack is the more important one, frankly, the one between the US and Iran, which is not about how it will be administered, but when it will open, with Iran insisting that the strait will not actually open until the United States makes some major concessions.

And as we've just heard from Taylor, and has been widely reported, these are concessions that are simply not acceptable to the United States.

What's your take on why it has been framed so much as Iran versus the US, and how that could be changed?

You shouldn't have to check in a few months down the line and see if anyone's got thoughts.

Yeah.

Well, I mean, this is one email that we have.

It doesn't mean that there haven't been similar conversations going on for some time, just because this is an email that has now come to light.

I think, um, military analysts should always, and are always, assessing how well is this working, what are our adversaries' vulnerabilities, are we actually stressing those? And again, I think, I think it's, uh, some question as to whether just continuing to strike in the way we have is going to do anything different in terms of the way the IRGC is, is looking at this.

... to have other countries.

Yeah, no.

I, I think it, it's, it would be very politically problematic for the Saudi Arabians to enter the Abraham Accords.

Uh, General Gibson, i- if I could begin with you, if the president orders further strikes, uh, e- even if they were to, say, escalate in some sort of broader tend to, to two-week plan series of strikes against Iran, is there any evidence that you have seen that continuing such strikes will change the dynamic on the battlefield and, and bring the US closer either to, to getting Iran to the table or achieving its broader goals in this war?

Well, that's a great question, Jim.

It's really the question of the day, and I think the strikes, while they've been very effective tactically in degrading and destroying much of Iran's military capability, there is not any evidence, as you suggest, that they've moved the needle on Iran's intent or their strategic calculus.

I think all along Iran's strategy has been to survive, to avoid capitulation, and to make the war so politically and economically untenable for us that we call it quits, ease up on our demands, uh, are, are less demanding of Iran.

And they think that time is on their side.

Mm

... to help them hold the line against Russia.

But I think, y- you know, there are certainly times when, whether it's a drone or in this case a missile, Russia's probably testing NATO and seeing how they respond and where their red lines are.

Did Iran, in essence, call his bluff?

Well, it's a good question, John, and, and I'm not sure we'll know exactly how or why the president made the decision he did.

I think he had three options.

One, to stay the course, um, which was returning limited, a return on investment strategically.

At the tactical level, US Central Command is doing a very good job of destroying Iranian military capabilities, but not enough to eliminate the threat to the Strait.

It's a very small area that we're trying to defend, and Iran has a vast geography from which they can attack it with relatively easy to produce, low cost, easy to hide, one-way attack drones.

So entirely eliminating that threat is very, very difficult.

How big of an issue do you think that is?

So when we, uh, when we parse through what we're hearing, right, about these concerns that were raised by General Kane about the military stockpiles in this moment, what does it tell you about the math here?

Well, I think at any time that you're using weapons faster than the industrial base can replenish them, then of course your stockpiles are going to diminish to some point.

The question is, is it dangerous? You know, what kinds of shortages might we encounter? And it's important to remember that it's not just US forces that use these expensive interceptors, but also our Gulf partners.

You know, we provide similar kinds of capacity in the past in the Republic of Korea or to Ukraine.

And so it can become a global supply problem if we are depleting them too rapidly.

And each time that Iran launches missiles or one-way attack drones, it requires the expenditure of these scarce resources.

And, and is it proving to be i- more strong in this moment than you think was anticipated?

Well, I think some people underestimated, um, the willingness, one, of the Islamic Republic or the men who are in charge to absorb pain, and the wellbeing of the Iranian people has never been a top priority.

Do you think Trump officials are pressuring him to not escalate the war? Well,

I think from a military perspective, there are probably three courses of action right now.

One would be to continue with the strikes that have been ongoing for nearly two weeks now at much the same tempo and pace.

A second would be to escalate.

And then a third would be the one that they appear to have chosen, which is to sustain military and economic pressure keep up the blockade, keep all the fighters, all the strike capacity, the naval assets that are there just in case, as well as sustain the economics pressure and see if we are potentially in a different place for negotiations.

Have we budged the needle at all in terms of what Iran is or is not willing to give? I think in terms of escalating, that certainly comes with potential risks.

One would be higher casualties, whether that's for noncombatants or for US service members.

How motivated do you think Iran would be to make a deal right now? What are we hearing from them?

Help that in the context in terms of what Iran has lost but what it's still capable of doing.

doing.Yes.

So I think, um, in terms of the strike a- against Jordan, the range itself of that weapon was not a surprise.

Perhaps the precision and accuracy of the strike, depending on whether the building that they actually struck was the one they intended to, that might be somewhat of a surprise.

But even though the U.S. military has conducted punishing airstrikes for months, and really significantly degraded much of Iran's inventory, there's still m- much that remains, and actually eliminating it entirely is a very high bar, particularly for things like one-way attack drones.

They're cheap, they're plentiful, they're easy to hide, they're hard to find.

There aren't a lot of signatures until they begin to launch one.

Uh, so then, is there, are there milit- new military objectives that might bring that about?

What do you think that means for the next few months?

Well, I think this is very reminiscent, obviously, of the tit-for-tat strikes and counter-strikes that we went through in late June.

In essence, at core, I think it is a difference of opinion, a difference of interpretation between, um, what, how the US and Iran are viewing the rules that we agreed to in the MOU, supposedly, for, um, the, uh, transit of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz.

There are many other areas of potential conflict in the MOU.

This is just one that we'll have to work through.

Uh, the Iranians are insistent that they will control the transit of vessels through the strait, and of course, that's something that we staunchly oppose, and I see very little room for overlap between these differing viewpoints, uh, between Iran and the United States.

I don't see a speedy resolution of this essential difference.

Do you have a sense of what the US's appetite will be to protect non-Iranian crude tankers that are trying to traverse the strait?

Yeah

... long, and painful.

And so I think even if we're, when we're, it may seem like we are really close, there are so many details, as Beth has outlined, you know, sequencing and reciprocity and enforcement mechanisms.

And then what steps will we be prepared to take if we believe that Iran is not abiding by these agreements? Is it gonna include things like funding for proxies? How will we monitor that?

Mm-hmm, yeah

... could be reimposed.

Funds could be frozen again.

Or, you know, uh, in an extreme case, there could be a threat of additional punishing airstrikes.

So how did that, how did diplomacy play into this?

Certainly.

So the time that I was there, and actually throughout, one of the uniqueaspects of the campaign in Afghanistan is we, you know, we had a four-star who was out there.

There's nobody in the Pentagon that technically outranks him, and he is reporting directly to the president, in a sense, and to NATO because he was also the senior NATO commander.

Hmm.

So actually, if you wanna talk politics, that's where it felt like the politics was, is- Huh ... you know, you're, you're trying to, anything you want to do or shift or change, um, in, in the campaign or your strategy, you had to run it through Brussels- Huh ... uh, to get NATO concurrence.

Yeah.

Mm-hmm.

What kind of targets are Shahed drones typically used for, and how does the US establish whether this was a, a down- intentional downing of the aircraft?

Yeah.

So I think they're used against a broad range of targets.

Fixed sites, you know, mobile things, in this case, like a aircraft or perhaps, um, a, a vessel.

They can be used a- a- across a broad range of targets.

Determining or attributing that it was a Shahed drone is probably not that difficult.

It was probably picked up on radar, not only by aircraft in the area, but ship board radar for various ships that are sailing in the area.

I mean, how do you play this kind of tit for tat game of retaliation? It's not a game, but I mean, uh, retaliation, especially if you want there to be a deal.

the ceasefire and then the immediate violation of it,

why? Well, so I would say this is actually not really even a ceasefire, more of a framework to get towards one.

I thought it was a positive development, but it has three real key weaknesses.

One of them, it's a document that would be signed or an agreement between the state of Lebanon and the nation of Israel.

And it doesn't include Hezbollah themselves, who are one of the principal belligerents.

So, you know, it's holding Lebanon, in a sense, responsible for the activities of a third party that they don't control.

That's a key weakness.

And in that context, what is the relevance of this or the significance of this vote in the states where they are trying to curtail Trump's power of war? Or does it have no significance because he can veto it and continue doing what he was doing before?

To what extent does today's new round of attacks compromise the ability for commerce through that area? And to what extent do our own naval assets have the ability to ensure at this point that commerce can continue?

Yeah, those are great questions.

I think first I would point out that Iran really began testing the limits of the ceasefire earlier in the week with their strike on the 3rd of June against strictly civilian infrastructure in Kuwait, the international airport terminal.

And so that, as well as over the weekend, the one-way drone attacks against commercial shipping.

I think what they're trying to say there is this isn't just about the strait.

that any kind of commercial and navigation activity in the broader Gulf region is at risk.

And so while tactically the actual target might be an airport terminal or it might be a commercial vessel, more strategically, they're really trying to influence shippers, insurers, markets, and the Gulf states to show them the risks or what they risk if some kind of deal is not reached that accommodates Iran's desires.

How do you read just the military developments in this war and whether or not Israel is now bogged down in Lebanon with no clear end in sight?

As somebody who's spent a lot of time looking at intelligence and working in intelligence with the military, what do you make of this?

this?Well, I think it's fair to say that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has not fully realized the vision that was laid out after 9/11.

And there could be some legitimate analysis of the positions and how they support that very critical mission.

But if you're gonna take a DOGE-like approach to just indiscriminately cutting folks, I think that's really dangerous.

I mean, there's so much at stake when you consider the responsibilities of this office.

And in terms of bringing in an outsider, I, I can imagine some scenarios in which someone might do well in this position.

They'd have to be incredibly smart.

Now, the-