You see that continuing in that direction.

I see that continuing and it's really coming from both sides.

On the one hand, the remarkable success of South Korea in its economic achievements.

You know, by the way, the 1997 so-called IMF crisis was responsible for SK Hynix and Hynix ending up in SK.

You know, the Daewoo Shipbuilding end up in Hanwha Ocean and the Kia ending up in Hyundai.

So there was a remarkable change then.

And I do think we're seeing more at a strategic level, the changes that we will experience next decades.

So what do you think Washington's objectives are here? And what is its strategy for achieving those objectives? We're in such a different place from when you were envoy 2016 to 2018.

How are they interpreting what appears to be some sort of concession for the US when a- at least formal talks aren't even happening?

So from North Korean point of view, this should not be a surprise.

It's not a secret that President Trump has been wanting to re-engage with the North Koreans.

This, he believes, is a largely, very large unfinished business from his first term.

So he's made it clear from the beginning, even, you know, when he was elected, after inauguration, that he wants to engage with North Korea.

Of course, it takes two to tango, and so far there has not been any substantive response from the North Koreans.

From their point of view, you know, they have seen what happens to Iran.

Um, nonetheless, uh, could the same, uh, could the same policy or thought process be applied from South Korea that you just said perhaps i- is what's being applied from North Korea, meaning they just don't wanna anger President Trump or the White House, so they're trying to go along with what the president has said?

But what do you think about the possibility that Victor is trying to create with his proposal?

Well, thank you, Sid.

I think Victor has done a real service to our policy formulation, framing essentially what I think is a complete reality, which is past approaches have failed.

they are not going to denuclearize anytime soon.

And insisting that they do is not going to get there anywhere.

And, you know, for past few months, we've all gone through the Iran experience, of course.

And that brings back the nightmares, you know, for me, bad dreams in any case, which is that there is, to me, Our policymaking, and we're seeing this again in Iran, you know, is conflicted.

What can we give North Korea that it needs if we lay CVID aside? What is it that North Korea would be looking for if it otherwise accepted the spirit of what Victor's laid out here?