What exactly does this mean for that memorandum of understanding that was signed last month?

The MOU has effectively collapsed, and in this occasion, the Islamic Republic left itself with no plausible deniability.

Usually, they violate the ceasefire through proxies or in the gray area so they can be removed enough from the development, but this time around, they attacked the vessels, uh, n- numerous times.

And the key thing about the MOU was they were getting a sanction waiver and they were, uh, had the ability to repatriate those funds and actually get direct payments in their central bank, which was very significant from a maximum pressure point of view.

There were no sanctions to be reissued and all the regime had to do was not to attack the vessels in the strait, and they were not even able to do that.

So that really mostly signals Tehran's mindset here, thinking it can drag out talks or even the MOU's collapse from Tehran's perspective, uh, does not necessarily threaten them as much as maybe we thought it would.

But that said, the return of the blockade would be significant.

What do you think that does to negotiations?

Anybody want to jump in?

I'll give it a go.

I guess to start with as to why you would hear like Qaraqchi claim that the IRGC, he doesn't have control over it or whatever.

Of course, we know it's a good cop, bad cop scenario.

They used to do it between reformers and hardliners.

And now they shifted up a bit.

Now they're differentiating between political civilian government versus IRGC saying, hey, I cannot contain these guys.

Jonathan, your chance to respond and also your concluding thoughts.

Help us understand, if you had an opportunity to sit with the Trump administration or any administration that was looking at a way to create the best scenario for people inside of Iran to affect any of the change that they wanted to see, being that existential threat, as you put it, what do you mean by that? How would that look like?

So what I mean by that is...

Tehran was very clear that they think they can absorb another external attacks.

It's not the bombs that necessarily are going to bring systemic change, even if they lose most of their missiles, let's say, and they lose all their drones.

As long as they remain in power, that is victory for them.

So all these measures, missiles, nuclear activity, nuclear program, it is all there to preserve the regime as a whole.

There's no, of course, we can agree on that.

Where do you see sanctions fit into this, though, right now?

Do you see maybe the president shifting back to that threat? And if he did target energy infrastructure, what would that mean inside Iran?

That would have the most major existential implications for the regime simply because the Iranian people internally are the main leverage against the regime in Tehran.

They are not afraid of external bombs or bombing campaigns or strikes.

They're afraid of their own people the most.

So however we can somehow tap into that is going to be the best asset we have to somehow, uh, maybe coerce the regime into a better deal or to pursue their collapse.

Now, infrastructure is going to be critical, and you mentioned the bridge, which mind you, was inst- constructed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and used by Iran's ideological paramilitary organization.

So it was inherently a legitimate target, and s- same thing is going to be applicable to other infrastructure.

Are we talking to the people that you mentioned there, the everyday person in Iran who wants to see change?

From your vantage point, is this a temporary breakdown or something deeper?

Two ways of looking at it, and the, whether time is on America's side or on Tehran's side, but the interesting angle here is that we saw the Islamic Republic pro- give a new proposal.And interestingly enough, they have scaled back from their maximalist demands.

So initially they would just send proposals that would be so comprehensive, it would talk about the Strait of Hormuz, it would talk about the nuclear file, proxies and all angles.

All of a sudden they're shifting.

It's saying, "We want to have only one agreement in the short term with the United States so they can remove this blockade." And that's what's been interesting.

It's indicative of a fact that that economic pressure is working, and the regime officials are concerned about that.

So I think the question here is, is Washington going to disaggregate and separate the different talking points, just on one hand, resolve the Strait of Hormuz with Iran, and then postpone the nuclear talks? Or is Washington finally realizing that this economic blockade might give them even more leverage, so why not flip the script even further on Tehran and impose e- some sort of a surrender?

Jonathan, as we wrap up, if this conflict were to end in a deal that stabilizes oil flows or, or even sets the nuclear program way back, but still leaves the regime largely intact, who's the winner?

How are they faring? How are they eating? What about the medical supplies? Do you hear reports of those?

We do.

We-- Um, ultimately they're all exempt from, uh, sanctions or the blockade.

That's what humanitarian stuff is.

But interestingly enough, Iran is deliberately actually, uh, mixing cargo by sanctions good and essential goods, trying to somehow portray itself to be a victim.

We know under the first maximum pressure campaign, there ended up being a drug shortage because the IRGC mafia was hoarding a lot of it, uh, jacking up prices and then selling them for profit.

So they do exploit these situations and that really goes back to the regime officials themselves.

John, are we seeing any evidence that the security forces are, um, reorganizing and regaining strength after headquarters and, and key leaders have been targeted?

Um, how would you assess this, and who do you think actually will blink first here?

I guess the first question I want to answer is, uh, whose side is, uh, time on? Which one can absorb more economic pressure? Uh, I would put it this way.

Trump does not need reelection, even though midterms are coming up.

He is in a quagmire.

That means he needs to somehow resolve this, and going back to a deal is not an option for him.

Uh, I mean, going back to bad deal is not an option to him.

You cannot get concessions from this regime, as we've seen before.

So the question is, what is the connection between Hezbollah and Tehran at this point? Are they going in s- parallel tracks? Are they going in separate tracks, or does Iran insist upon Lebanon and Hezbollah must be part of the final answers?

More of this tonight.

And everyone were instructed to stay home by the president, by the crown prince, by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Nonetheless, people were still out and about because they could not afford to stay at home.

They had to work to make ends meet.

So the situation is certainly dire.

I wouldn't be surprised if that's a challenge and especially in the border areas in the southeast particularly.

But again, Iran is a highly urban environment.

Jonathan Saia.

He has, and as you pointed out, he's done a lot of the dirty work.

And I think that resume speaks for itself internally.

Nothing is more legitimate amongst the guards than a person that was able to carry out all these terror plots.

And as you point out, dating back as far as the 80s, which is Islamic Republic was still quite young and they were still carrying out these operations, which is significant.

And now he oversees the main ideological and military body of the regime, the IRGC.

And of course, the IRGC inherently has two functions, internal and external.

But five weeks of very heavy fighting, very one-sided heavy fighting, do you think that anything has actually been solved, though, at this point?

Solved, no, but postponed, yes.

But I'm not sure if that was Trump's ambitions.

So I would say there are three main pillars that have been greatly implicated in the war.

Number one, nuclear.

Uh, there hasn't been much reporting on it, but Israeli and American strikes actually did go after other nuclear facilities, heavy water reactors, and again, it, it was really building on the successes of Operation Midnight Hammer.

But more important than that were the ballistic missile capabilities.

What about this call from the US to the people of Iran ultimately to rise up? How does that happen, uh, with a deal being worked out with the regime and the people having no representation at the table?

Do we know-- Do we have any idea what that level of support is?

Very fair question.

I've heard estimates ranging from ten to thirty percent of the population, which is quite extensive.

You would still be talking about millions of people, and I think thirty would be a very, very, uh, generous estimate.

I don't think that's the case anymore post-war.

The thirty percent number, it was throughout the years we heard.

Right now, I think it's hovering right around ten to fifteen percent.

My understanding is the IRGC is the state within a state, but the Basij, are they entirely devoted to the IRGC? Do they have their own goals? Are they volunteers on a, on a village level? Who are they right now? I know in Tehran they operate as a police force, but what do they look like in the countryside?

What makes that sufferable? Here's Jonathan.

I think the question then is, should there be a devastating attack against, let's say, Iranian bridges and power plants? Um, so long as that is the price for freedom, I think the average Iranian understands that.

I think the main concern is, um, for these, uh, uh, sites and, uh, key national assets to be destroyed and the regime stays in power, then Iranians are just stuck with an Islamist version of North Korea without bridges, roads, or power, which would be catastrophic.

But ultimately, it comes down to messaging, and I think the president reiterated again through Axios that he's not going to end the war without, um, supporting the Iranian protest movements.

We just have to wait and see.

Mystery.

Nothing, and that in itself speaks volumes.

I am a bit surprised as to why they would deliberately choose a leader that is on the verge of death or is heavily injured, because that would be a really bad look for a regime to lose a supreme leader, then immediately, like a couple of months later, have to re-announce how they actually lost another one.

But that said, maybe having him operate behind the shadows or not operate at all would be better because the IRGC can do whatever it wants and just claim that there's a supreme leader that is backing some of these who's not even in existence.

Are they at this point gloomy about what's happened after nine, ten days of war fighting, or are they encouraged? Good day to you, Janet.

Good day to you.

It's a pleasure to be on.

So talking to folks on the ground, and of course, as you pointed out, Iran is a majority young country, so any change in the long term would be initiated by the majority of Iranian who are, who are really young.

Uh, the momentum still exists on the ground.

So I don't know if they perceive this as an attack against the Iranian national identity.

I think, uh, it is less than ideal to see fighter jets flying over Tehran, but ultimately, by everyone, this is viewed as an attack against the Islamic Republic and not an attack against Iran.

Do you believe he'll be an effective leader for them? Are you surprised about his, uh, his selection?

Are they at this point gloomy about what's happened after nine, ten days of war fighting, or are they encouraged? Good day to you, Janaton.

Good day to you.

It's a pleasure to be on.

So talking to folks on the ground, and of course, as you pointed out, Iran is a majority young country, so any change in the long term would be initiated by the majority of Iranian who are, who are really young.

Uh, the momentum still exists on the ground, so I don't know if they perceive this as an attack against the Iranian national identity.

I think, uh, it is less than ideal to see fighter jets flying over Tehran, but ultimately, by everyone, this is viewed as an attack against the Islamic Republic and not an attack against Iran.

Because if you wanna talk about an occupation, the mindset on the streets right now is that the country has been occupied for at least fifty years.

What is the importance of this? Is-- Do you believe he'll be an effective leader for them? Are you surprised about his, uh, his selection?

Where is the ground game in this operation? Is there an organized Iranian resistance that's going to be able to counter a brutal regime that is going to fight for its survival?

I believe there is.

So of course, this campaign has not only been targeting, uh, the military infrastructure, it's actually going after the repression apparatus, too.

Specifically, what I've noticed is that most of this bombing around Tehran, the more targeted nature, for example, attacks that would destroy a certain building or assassinations of individuals, has been mostly carried out by Israel.

Whereas on the other hand, America's been conducting more large-scale operations, going after bases, silos, naval force of the Islamic Republic.

So that's an interesting division of labor there.

Um, and of course, we saw the state media be hacked by, uh, Americans and Israelis sending messages to Iranians.

The decision-making, does it require the Supreme Leader? In other words, can there be a decision before he or sh-- he is elected, whoever is chosen? And once the Supreme Leader is chosen, in your measure, does that make ceasefire more or less likely given the hard line that comes out of the-- out of Qom?

H- how would that play out exactly, and how long could that, something like that take?

So it's going to be, of course, a extensive campaign, and it, the core to that is having an opposition figure, and that, uh, is the crown prince, Pahlavi, who's been leading this movement.

You know, having been involved in Tehran's protest myself in 2009, we were there on the streets, and we never got external support.

The administration at the time under Obama thought any help to the Iranians by an American public would, uh, somehow, uh, have a negative implications.

We know that no longer continues to be the case.

So as to what Iranians on the ground want, talking to folks is that they are, uh, standing by.

Of course, the president directly noted that they should stay in shelters.

Am I, am I off there? Am I off base?

Is there a third choice?

Perhaps the third one would be a blend of the two.

We have to really focus on what the Supreme Leader said last week and his pivot from historically saying it's about heroic flexibility, quote, unquote, trying to negotiate, trying to make a deal.

That rhetoric has now changed and shifted to martyrdom, meaning his mindset is very much prepared for a potential war, as you pointed out, just to sacrifice his own people again to get into casualties.

Now, from their perspective, they look at the Twelve-Day War as a playbook.

They were able, able to absorb that.

They w-- they moved on.

Is there another voice that is, that is capable of rallying the young people of Iran, or is the, is the mullah confidence based on the idea that they don't have anybody on their side?

John, given the extremely high inflation, what does the regime do to try to mollify the people in order to keep them in line? Because this is an oppressive regime, how can the regime mitigate the effects of such massive inflation?

Well, Bill, you're right to point out that we're talking about a repressive apparatus that's put in place to really keep the people in line.

But no brutal dictator ideally would like to let it go that far, especially a regime like Tehran that is under so much international scrutiny.

So, of course, in addition to, uh, really terrorizing and victimizing the population, they have a carrots and sticks approach in a sense that during times of crisis, whether it's gonna be economic crisis or if there's war at times or if there's civic unrest, the regime allows for limited short-time social freedoms to at least try to appease young people particularly, because we're talking about a population that's majority young under 30.

So what we've seen recently is actually l- very limited a facade of at least lifting part of the restrictions.

We saw, for example, there was a women's- women's marathon in an island of Kish that women were allowed to run without their hijab, but then later on many of the organizers were actually arrested.

So it's kind of, it- it's this false image of, uh, reform and change whereas in reality nothing really changes.

question?Given the extreme inflation going, going on, are we seeing cutbacks in services for the Iranian people in, in the terms of energy or healthcare, or any other services? Or how is the regime propping itself up in the economic sec- sector?

th-... th-... uh, what is, what is he getting at here?

Ultimately, we have to ask ourselves, why is it that the Islamic Republic is actually publishing this stream of information related to nuclear material? And it comes down to one main point, which is to cast doubt in the mind of Western politicians, because this doublespeak of, "We have the capacity, but the Supreme Leader told us not to pursue nuclear weapons.

But we should have pursued nuclear weapons, but at this point, we're not going to, but that might change later on." Again, that is, uh, it's basically conveying two very opposing narratives.

And the idea is, for the average, uh, Western politician that's following Iran, not to exactly know what the calculus is in- inside Tehran.

But what really stood out from that conversation is them backtracking what the Supreme Leader had said, saying that although the Supreme Leader had verbally banned or declared them as, uh, religiously not permissible, that might change.

So, more and more, the point of the article that I wrote was to signal that this time around, their, their ambitions of weaponization is much more overt than covert.

What do we know about Tehran's relations with Beijing? Are they good? Are they solid? Are they unknown?

It's challenging to describe them as an ally the same way we see it, for example, a transatlantic alliance.

Is there evidence that the regime is rearming, can rearm, and is there any indication that Russia's not wholehearted about the rearming? Anything like that?

There are different angles to look at this, and you have to really differentiate between China's relationship with Iran as opposed to Moscow/Belarus relationship with Iran, and then you have North Korea.

And of course, you have to look at the timeline of these things.

If there were to be US sanctions, how would that implicate it? So, to give you a brief overview, what we've seen so far is China provides an economic lifeline for the regime in Tehran.

We haven't seen a very high level military cooperation like we've seen with Russia.

So in the past, of course, Iran has supplied Russia with not only the drones, Shahed drones, to attack Ukrainian, uh, infrastructure, but also the technology for them to build it in-house.

And since Russia has done that, they've been increasingly less reliant on, on Iran because they just have this technology within Russia.

Uh, has Iran been able to rearm its proxies as it's seeking to rearm itself, specifically the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon?

Are they?

They certainly are, John.

So, you know, uh, I think recently k- uh, uh, identifying them as adversaries would be more accurate than d- uh, describing them as enemies necessarily.

They have not fought a direct war in recent years.

They've backed different sides.

But what we've seen this last... throughout 2024 is this reappearing pattern that whomever Tehran backs loses to Turkey.

So one side were the PKK, they were heavily armed by the regime in Tehran, they gave up their arms.

Does that suit the region? Is that more stable?

More of this tonight.

The extent of how fatalist they are, I think it's significant com- compared to last time.

As you pointed out, yes, from a military perspective, they're increasingly more paranoid, not to mention the Mossad penetration of the main apparatus.

So the average regime official's, uh, day-to-day is just constant paranoia as to who, uh, in his office might be a Mossad spy.

So they have that level, but domestically speaking as well, the regime is quite weak.

They're seen as incompetent by the people.

I know we discussed the water scarcity issue and power outages, um, last week with you guys, but th- those issues are persisting.

Do we have any sense in, at this point in time, in how hard Iran's nuclear program has been hit?

The way to assess the damage against the targets is one, you have to figure out what- which site did what.

So (clears throat) we're talking about Natanz and Fordow, and the main difference between the two is the nature of the centrifuges and the numbers.

What we know so far is that enough damage, uh, has been applied to these, uh, to- to these infrastructures that- that will delay it for a foreseeable future.

But that's only one angle.

The other angle is all the nuclear scientists that have- that have been targeted.

So as you can imagine, these people don't grow on trees.

Is that threat still out there, Jon, or is that old news?

What was the damage? What is the damage? What does it mean for reconstituting the suspect nuclear weapons program? Much more of this tonight.

The way to assess the damage against the targets is, one, you have to figure out wha- which site did what.

So (clears throat) we're talking about Natanz and Fordow, and the main difference between the two is the nature of the centrifuges and the numbers.

What we know so far is that enough damage, uh, has been applied to these, uh, to, to these infrastructures that it, that will delay it for a foreseeable future.

But that's only one angle.

The other angle is all the nuclear scientists that ha- that have been targeted.

So as you can imagine, these people don't grow on trees.