To those who are saying this was really a speech aimed more at the domestic audience in Israel than a global audience, because Prime Minister Netanyahu has those elections coming up, how fair is that? Good morning.

Good morning.

I'd say that there's some relevance to that.

And you could see that the prime minister gave a very passionate speech.

I think it's a pretty strong delivery.

He's a strong orator.

And I think he delivered pretty well on the key topics.

But what is the point, Mr. Connery, because you would want to get out concerning Hamas for my listeners here in the United Kingdom?

If that's true, that's Channel 12

12Yeah, yeah.

There's about 500,000, uh, Israelis who will vote for the first time.

It'll be their first elections.

They are people who either, uh, uh, fought through October 7 and the aftermath of October 7, or saw everything happen and have heard what our neighbors intend for us, what Hamas intends for us, and what Hezbollah and, uh, Shiites in Lebanon, what the Iranians intend for us.

And of course, I would want for young Israelis...

You're, by the way, speaking about the age of my children, and I have two of my kids, they will be voting for the first time in Israel.

What year was that?

Okay.

Uh, what I will say is, uh, not ag- not directed against Muslim, uh, private citizens.

It's more related to the political structure and the core tenets of Islam, um, and the mindset, the very aggressive and imperialistic mindset which we in the Middle East are at the receiving end of when it comes to Islam.

I think that shortly put, this is today the biggest threat to Western civilization.

I think it is much more dangerous than Nazism and communism were at the time, for the main reason that the threat is more dynamic, it is clever and deceptive, and it's not so clear to distinguish, and you really have to pay attention if you want to understand what the threat is.

Uh, in the seventh century when Islam conquered about half of the known word- world or q- or a third of a known world, uh, by force, by the power of the sword, it was jihad and conquest with the power of the sword.

In the 21st century, what's happening in Europe is that it is a slow, relatively peaceful, relatively legal conquest by immigration and then by birth rate.

Mm

It is not achieving it from the American standpoint, though.

Yeah.

So the way I look at it is that there are a lot of people who have a lot of vested interest with the Iranian regime.

Um, and I think that eventually, um, the Iranian regime will run out of money.

They will be toppled by their own people.

Hopefully, they will have help in, uh, doing so.

But the Iranian regime is running out of money, and I think it-- what the US is doing, uh, despite, you know, an international pressure campaign in the media and from various Iranian mouthpieces that is trying to apply pressure on the president.

... is the main one

Noting your criticism of the prime minister, and you're not alone in that, how should the situation have been handled yesterday in your view?

view?Well, I think what Israel is doing, Israel is first and foremost complying with the, with the, the Resolution 280-- uh, twen- 2803.

Israel is in compliance.

Israel is operating on its side of the yellow line, and without political fanfare, Israel has significantly reduced the amount of targeted assassinations of, uh, Hamas terrorists in the Gaza Strip at the request of the Americans.

And that is not because Hamas has become nice and they shouldn't be eliminated, but because the Americans have asked Israel to, uh, operate less, and Israel is, uh, respecting that.

So that's already one side.

But Israel is in this kind of catch-22 situation because from the perspective of an Israeli military or political decision maker, they-- Israelis cannot just venture the future safety of Israelis on international goodwill and what other countries want.

Now, in the first hour of the show, I was joined by former IDF spokesperson, senior fellow of the American think tank, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Conricus, who told me-

Yeah

... to communicate with both sides and to be respected by both sides, and that's pretty rare.

And I think that it's a good thing that he's-- he agreed to take on the probably very Sisyphean and thankless task of, of chaperoning and pushing the board of peace forward.

I think it's, you know-- The problem is, and it's been for many years, that Israel under Prime Minister Netanyahu doesn't present a plan, a strategic plan regarding Gaza, and that creates a void.

That creates a void for others to fill.

And as you said, there are many eager participants, eager players, Qatar and Turkey being two, but they're not the only ones.

The Iranians tried for a long time to do it and succeeded with the Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and had other influences.

And-

And what is your reaction to this agreement from Donald Trump?

Well, I think it's a step in the right direction.

I think a lot of people in Israel, and probably many Gazans, want this s- to succeed desperately.

I think a lot of people would want to see Gaza demilitarized, Hamas' weapons taken away, and a new type of leadership in Gaza strike root, one that isn't about jihad, that isn't about fighting with Israel, but is about, uh, respectful coexistence.

And I think that it'll have, uh, strong support in Israel, um, once Hamas is indeed disarmed.

And here really is the core issue because, you know, we have experience with Hamas.

There's a, a concept in, uh, Islamic teachings called Hudnah, which means basically a pause, a pause in hostilities.

I- is that likely to, to happen or, or, or may Israel do a, a, a similar thing, say that they're going to withdraw and then spring again if, if need be?

Your thoughts.

Yeah, my, obviously, not surprisingly, my thoughts differ.

Uh, I think that it would be very damaging for American standing.

I think it would be damaging for what was referenced as the American Empire.

I think that weakness in one area is quickly, uh, seen and understood by enemies all around the world, and if you're weak in one area, you are deemed to be weak in another area as well.

And, uh, I know this from, you know, from the local microenvironment of the Middle East, where we fight various enemies.

If we are perceived as weak by one of our enemies, then the others will perceive us as weak as well, even if we aren't.

Oh, every day

Jonathan, what do you think of Mamdani's comments and his attempts to arrest Bibi?

First of all, they're based on lies and allegations.

For those who haven't watched and are not aware, the man who issued these indictments, the prosecutor Karim Khan, has been eliminated from his post.

He's been sacked on accounts of sexual misconduct, basically having sex with one of his subordinates against her will.

And those allegations were coming up pretty close to when he made the fatal decision to indict and to use this terrible power that he had at his hands and to accuse the Israeli prime minister of these horrible crimes, which, of course, are categorically false.

And, you know, Mamdani, I just checked, I think it's 32 million views and it hasn't even been 12 hours since he posted that video.

Wow.

That should worry all of us in the West.

So my first question to you, Jonathan, is do you think that is genuinely being considered? And more importantly, should it be considered? What do you recommend Trump should do right now?

Yeah.

Hi again.

So the MOU has failed.

The people who brought the American president, the MOU, have delivered something that's faulty, broken and not serving the interests of the US, which is something that I said the moment the first draft was leaked, that it's a horrible, horrible deal that serves the Iranians.

And I hope it won't last many days.

It has now It's been destroyed by the Iranians.

Fair.

What is your take on this?

Well, it can go many ways, and I think we've reached a bit of a moment of truth for the Iranian regime.

They got an amazingly comfortable MOU from the US administration, which basically gave the Iranian regime everything that they needed and postponed dealing with all of the tough topics that the US needs to deal with, except for opening the Strait of Hormuz.

But then the Iranian regime, what I sensed what happened, they got greedy and they said, we want more.

We want to dictate the terms of the passage of the Hormuz Strait in contradiction to the MOU.

And they started firing at merchant vessels, three of them.

causing some significant damage, and then the U.S. responded to that.

Now, the reaction now, we're seeing huge, vast crowds, you know, chanting death to America, death to Israel for Khamenei's funeral so my question is obviously they're staged but what is the level of the reality of that

Do you think that's a possibility or that Trump just threw Vance in there and said, you know, get the job done, sonny boy?

Yeah, I don't know, but I think that there's definitely merit to that thesis.

And if this deal fails, which I think it will, I think the Iranians will violate it, and I think eventually this MOU will result in failure.

Because it is lopsided, it's rotten from the foundation and upwards, because it is conceived by illegitimate, corrupt Islamist regimes.

And I think it won't have staying power because it's a horrible document that doesn't do the world, the Arab countries in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area, or Israel, or the U.S. any good.

It does a lot of good for the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It bolsters the credibility of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and it puts the Islamists in Qatar back in the global limelight.

even addressing ballistic missiles, which seems to have been totally taken off the agenda.

Jonathan Conricus, is Israel trying to derail this diplomacy?

I think what Israel is trying to do is to defend itself and live in peace in its internationally recognized borders without the attack of Iranian proxies, Hezbollah being the most dangerous and, uh, best-armed one.

Hezbollah is now in trouble, and that's why their masters, the Iranian regime, is they're rushing to defend and trying to save Hezbollah, and that is what this is about.

This is not about the territorial sovereignty of Lebanon.

It's not about the Lebanese people.

The Lebanese people, by the way, are represented by the Lebanese government, and the Lebanese government says very clearly that they don't want Hezbollah as an armed foreign entity in their country and that Hezbollah doesn't have the legitimacy to fight against Israel.

And communications was never a problem.

Jonathan Conricus, you're shaking your head, just in the last minute that we have.

Jonathan Conricus, is Israel trying to derail this diplomacy?

I think what Israel is trying to do is to defend itself and live in peace in its internationally recognized borders without the attack of Iranian proxies, Hezbollah being the most dangerous and, uh, best-armed one.

Hezbollah is now in trouble, and that's why their masters, the Iranian regime, is-- they're rushing to defend and trying to save Hezbollah, and that is what this is about.

This is not about the territorial sovereignty of Lebanon.

It's not about the Lebanese people.

The Lebanese people, by the way, are represented by the Lebanese government, and the Lebanese government says very clearly that they don't want Hezbollah as an armed foreign entity in their country and that Hezbollah doesn't have the legitimacy to fight against Israel.

And communications was never a problem.

Jonathan Conricus, you're shaking your head just in the last minute that we have.

NICK SCHIFRIN Jonathan Kanrikas, is Israel trying to derail this diplomacy?

I think what Israel is trying to do is to defend itself and live in peace in its internationally recognized borders without the attack of the Iranian proxies, Hezbollah being the most dangerous and best armed one.

Hezbollah is now in trouble, and that's why their masters, the Iranian regime, is they're rushing to defend and try to save Hezbollah.

And that is what this is about.

This is not about the territorial sovereignty of Lebanon.

It's not about the Lebanese people.

The Lebanese people, by the way, are represented by the Lebanese government.

Jonathan Karikas, you're shaking your head just in the last minute that we have.

[clears throat]

... important topics, what are the details regarding their nuclear weapons, regarding their, um, proxies in the region.

But the Israeli perspective is different because we, like most other people here, have skin in the game.

We have been at the receiving end of Iranian aggression for the last 35 years.

Israelis have been killed and abducted and burned and murdered by Iranian proxies.

Isra- Israelis have been forced to run for shelter for so many years by rockets that were either made in Iran or paid for by Iran.

And Iran has waged indirect warfare using Arabs as their cannon fodder against Israel for a very long time.

I just, I just know, I just know what I see with my own eyes.

But some of the critique that I've been reading is saying that, well, first of all, it has to be negotiated over 60 days and that the safeguards are less than they were in the Obama deal.

I think we have to acknowledge, and I apologize if this has already been said by one of the esteemed colleagues of the panel here, but I think we have to acknowledge that we are at an information deficit.

Sadly, the side that is communicating more, and I think a bit more convincingly, is the Iranian regime, whereas the U.S. administration isn't really informing not the American public and not its allies and not the world what exactly the terms of the understanding are and that's a bit worrying but we still have to you know I think be patient and recognize the fact that we don't have the details yet and we don't know exactly what Even on the big topics, and the devil really is in the details here, even on the big, very important topic, the primal topic of Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions, what does it exactly mean? Will they be able to continue to enrich on Iranian soil? Will they be forced to let go of the already enriched material? Is there any type of a sunset clause? Is this limited by time? And if so, how much? These are very pertinent questions that really will determine how good or how bad this deal is and what the chances of regional confrontation, a weapons race, and all of the other negative things associated with the nuclear Iran, all of that will be determined by the details, which we still do not have.

he might get the political, I don't know, the political result quickly and then kind of lose interest?

Yeah, I mean, the Iranians, the Iranian regime isn't going to lose interest.

They're in it for the long run.

And so are the Israelis.

And whether or not this corresponds well with the U.S. election cycle or doesn't, us too, we are going to continue to fight it out.

So there's a few questions there from why you think it's interesting Israel was not involved, US not intercepting missiles towards Israel, and your thoughts on that back and forth between Israel and Iran.

Yeah, I think the important context here is the state of play in Lebanon and the level of exposure of Hezbollah, Hezbollah's weakness, and what a concern that is for the Iranian regime.

Hezbollah used to be the coveted crown jewel of the Iranian empire of proxy organizations that they have spent billions and billions of dollars over the years in building, arming, equipping, and sustaining.

Hezbollah is now very exposed to Israeli military pressure.

It is exposed to steps by the Lebanese government which have the potential to really change the balance of power in Lebanon, and the Iranian regime doesn't want that.

What the Iranians tried to achieve last week was to set an equation whereby Israel is limited, restricted from continuing to strike Hezbollah and restricts Israeli freedom of action against significant and strategic targets of Hezbollah, mostly in Beirut, but also in the Bekaa Valley.

And Israel said, no, we're not going to allow that.

If you look at it from a lens as a non-former IDF, so putting your position aside, looking at it, actually if you look at it from an American lens, if you were an American, do you think it's a bit odd? Do you think it's in America's favor or it should be worded differently? What's your stance on it?

Am I getting this right? Uh, how do the Israelis see it right now?

Yeah, so good morning, Jonathan and everybody.

Uh, pleasure to be back here.

Uh, I would add to what you already said, I think two important, uh, data points.

One is that, uh, after Israel was told not to retaliate, and after the Iranians, uh, fired at Israel 30 ballistic missiles, all of whom were either intercepted successfully or were allowed to, uh, explode in, uh, in open areas in various parts of Israel, so no damage.

But the important point is that what's happening now in, uh, southern Lebanon and central Lebanon and in other places is that the IDF continues to target Hezbollah infrastructure, uh, personnel, and, uh, commanders.

And that was kind of really the, the first thing that Israel wanted to achieve, is to continue and to preserve its freedom of action against Hezbollah.

I mean, t-tell us how we're supposed to read this from an Israeli military perspective.

Now, firstly, what do we know of this phone call between the pair? What is true and what's been exaggerated?

Yeah.

Hi, thanks for having me on, Shari.

You know, there's a lot of reports.

Obviously, I wasn't on the call, so I rely on reports.

And I think that the bottom line, having heard and listened to and read a lot of reports, is that it was indeed a heated conversation.

between the two leaders, and it suggests that there is certain strain and differences of opinion between where the U.S. stands and where Israel stands.

So is the sentiment on the ground that Israel should continue to attack Hezbollah and Iran as well?

There's a lot of points there, but I'd love to get your kind of deep analysis of what we're seeing there on the front line.

Yeah.

So really a lot of stuff to, to discuss here.

Let's start with the strategic, uh, US-Iran regional, and then focus on the situation on the ground between Israel and Hezbollah.

Then I think we should speak about the Lebanese Armed Forces, what they're doing and mostly what they're not doing.

And, uh, we'll discuss, you know, w-what-- the, the bottom line of it, uh, what all that means, and what we could anticipate in the coming days and weeks moving forward.

Uh, strategically speaking, I think everybody's waiting for President Trump and the Iranians to either agree or to disagree.

I know you disagree.

I put it to him that although Benjamin Netanyahu says seventy percent of Gaza, is it, as he hinted, a first step towards total occupation of the territory?

I would suggest to look at it through a prism of trying to apply pressure on Hamas as part of negotiations.

As clearly stated before, very generous offers have been made by the Board of Peace and by the Hamas-friendly nations of Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey for Hamas members to disarm, which according to the UN Security Council resolution and the Trump peace plan, they were supposed to do as first step.

Since they're refusing, we're still stuck in very basic mode, and I think what Israel is trying to do and what the prime minister is trying to do is to apply pressure and indicate that if you don't agree to do what you're supposed to do and what the, uh, negotiators and the previous leadership of Hamas said that you will do, then we will apply more pressure.

Pressure in this sense will be to temporarily take and hold on to more territory and as Gershon said before, perhaps allow people in Gaza to filter through into the Israeli-controlled area and then to start rebuilding there outside of the control of Hamas.

But the end-

They may not be able to stay if there is, is-- there's, there's no, no possible chance of existence in what's left of Gaza.

When we look back at the situation in Gaza, when you think of it for a second, and I know that this will be a hugely unpopular thing of-- for listeners to hear, but the only population in modern times that was prevented from leaving an active war zone are Arabs in Gaza.

Army spokesperson Jonathan Conricus was stationed here for a long time.

What you see behind us is really, think of it as a highway, as a smuggling highway for Iran, by which Iran transfers missiles, component, infrastructure, machinery to produce or to convert.

All of that is transported from Iran, Iraq, via Syria, and the very areas that you can see close to the Syrian-Lebanese border.

Based on what we know, Carl Lee's businesses have been instrumental in the development of these very same projectiles.

What Hezbollah will try to use are precision-guided missiles for the most sensitive and high-value targets, like our port, our airport, government facilities, hazardous materials.

How are we to understand the way in which the Israelis are viewing the talk of, um, diplomatic breakthroughs or some kind of a deal that would probably keep the regime in place?

Yes, Jonathan.

Uh, so I'd say that I'll try to reflect, you know, general sentiment and what people in Israel are speaking about and feeling with regards to the situation against, uh, the Islamic Republic.

Um, there's a lot of, uh...

I'd say it's, it's, it's, it's a challenging moment for Israelis because I'd say that a lot of people had, and perhaps many still do, have a lot of faith in the president, in President Trump, and his administration, uh, based on his track record, uh, leading up to this current situation.

But this is a very challenging moment because based on almost everything, uh, that is, uh, leaked or provided to international and Iranian and Israeli media, most of it isn't good from an Israeli perspective in the sense that, you know, it keeps the regime in place.

There's very little or no actual talk about Iran's ballistic missile program, their long-range drones, and very importantly, their continued support of terror organizations in the region, Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Houthis, e-et cetera.

What would a resumption of war look like from Israel's perspective?

[laughing]

And, uh, uh, a-a-and in that sense, let's speak a little bit ab-about where we stand.

And this will be kind of short.

Um, forgive me if it is abrupt and ugly and leaving you with a sense of, "Oh God, is it that bad?" But with, uh, a short time, I'll have to be, uh, focused in, in the, the messages.

Let's go to the front, where I think the biggest challenges lay and where I think we are the furthest away from where we would like to be despite efforts that we have made, and that's Gaza.

Gaza, I wouldn't say that we're at square one, but I would say that despite all the blood, sweat, and tears and sacrifice by young, brave Israelis in Gaza, and despite the fact that we are very happy and, and, and tremendously thankful for having our hostages back, today the situation in Gaza is that Hamas governs a little bit less than half of the, uh, of the terrain and, um, and Israel controls and is operating in what's, uh, in what's left of it.

Uh, basically, there's a rump state of, uh, of Hamas along these lines, including, uh, Gaza City up there.

[audience applauding]