Yeah.

And then once you start thinking about, "Well, what's equivalent, equivalent for us?" You start real- realizing that incentives are kind of incentives everywhere.

Uh, and, and the...

Yes, Russia is different than, than, than America, but...

So Russia's a young country, 30 years or so, right? 30 years old or so.

Um, and, and so it, it, it's kind of not surprising, I think, that to switch from a, um, from a command economy essentially to a market economy, uh, there, there...

Even if you could have, there hasn't been really a lot of time for things to become institutionalized, and so, uh, corruption feels a lot more like personalized still in Russia, where you're, where you're speaking about y- still about individuals as kind of embodying a specific institution or a specific patronage network in a way that like doesn't make as much sense, uh, in the, in the US because we have such longstanding institutions.

Mm-hmm

So he became close with Putin through his restaurant tours?

Well a- as you'll see kind of as, as we go through the story, he, he, he manages to connect with Putin.

Putin likes him.

But he's never able...

He would always say that he was about one handshake away from Putin.

And so Putin gets to know him.

He, he kind of likes him because he's uncouth.

Mm-hmm.

Are they really surrounded? Is this gonna get even more violent? Is there some way to negotiate this out? And do you think this peace deal is, is predicated upon this, particularly as tr- as, uh, Putin's got guys that are even more nationalists than him, these ultranationalists in Russia serve?

Yeah, thanks for having me on again.

I, I think from what I've been hearing on the ground, uh, the Ukrainians are, uh, retreating.

I, i- in some cases, it's, um, uh, chaotic, but they aren't currently, uh, fully surrounded by the Russians in the, the region of Russia that they, um, went into, which is called Kursk.

But for Putin and, and for the Russians more generally, look, uh, we're going into a peace deal.

Usually, when you go into these negotiations, uh, in, in a war, one side is in a stronger position than the other, and they're gonna look to take as much advantage of that as possible, and that's what the Russians are looking to do.

For Putin, as you mentioned, he, his biggest fear is to, uh, the folks on the right of him, right? That's where, uh, you have the Russian nationalists, uh, the, the right wing, which has a degree of, uh, support within Russia's security services.

... "Well, I guess we're not gonna get a ceasefire." What are your thoughts, sir?

Go ahead.

... we- we can get, we can get into this. I- I think, you know, uh, war can create, uh, can create significance, right? And- and so like you said, Bakhmut itself, it's a small city. It's not, it's not the capital Kiev. But, uh, what- what happened basically was that both, uh, Wagner's founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, promised to deliver this victory to- to Putin, and the Russians hadn't had a lot of major victories, uh, by- by that point. So Bakhmut starts to gain significance for the Russians and- and President Zelensky also decides that- that the Ukrainians are going to defend Bakhmut despite the fact that, again, it's not strategically significant and it's actually in a position that is, uh, geograph- in terms of the terrain, is- is actually, uh, disa- uh, at a disadvantage to the Ukrainians. It's kind of located, uh, at the bottom of some hills on- on either side. And so, uh, it- it- it wasn't a good position for the Ukrainians to be in, but the decision was made that somehow Bakhmut became sort of a bellwether for the war itself at that point. Like you said, everyone was covering it every day. And, you know, whether the Russians or the Ukrainians were pushing forward kind of became a- a- a way to measure how the war was going itself. And- and so it took on, uh, far more significance than- than the city or the position itself actually deserved. And, uh, like you said, it was just a brutal fight of, uh, of the Russians using human wave tactics, uh, throwing guys out of the trenches. You know, eight out of ten could be killed, but- but two jump into the Ukrainian trenches and get one or two guys and just constant, just constant. They call it in Russian, the meat grinder. Um, and I mean, I- I think it's a pretty, uh, apt name for it.

I don't wanna give too much away 'cause I want people to read the book and the book is a wake-up call, I think, to people in the United States to say, "Hey, this is what w- the world's really like," right? And I think it's particularly important for veterans and families of people in the armed services, going in the armed services, uh, to read this and understand what your kids are really signing up for, right? 'Cause this thing is brutal. I wanna go, w- what led these guys to believe they were like the Praetorian Guard? What led to this incident where they actually thought that they've become, you know, the, they were so good or somehow it was miscommunicated what was going on, that eventually they marched on, they actually turned on Putin himself, or looked like they turned on Putin? We don't... I mean, even at the time we didn't know if it was a fake, it was a misdirection play. What's your sense of that? Did they just get ahead of themselves? Did they just think that they were, they were like the Praetorian Guard and they could determine who, who runs Russia, sir?

Yeah. I mean, it's a great question because the other reason why I think this book is important, uh, for, for readers is, is to introduce people to some of the Russians other than Putin, right, who, uh, who are in Russia and show that there are plenty of Russians working within Putin's system who are incredibly ambitious, uh, often act independently, rashly, uh, and, and can sort of fall out of the Kremlin's control. Yevgeny Prigozhin, uh, as he kind of comes out in the book, this is a guy who went from an ex-con himself to a, a contractor for the military to eventual, uh, founder of this mercenary army. And, and his ambition, uh, and his ego were, were essentially limitless. Um, but he was operating, uh, in a system where you can really take some gambles and you can really put your neck out on the line and kind of basically saying, "I'm furthering Russia's national interests." But if those interests shift, uh, or the strategy shifts then, then you're gonna be hung out to dry and it's a dangerous position to be in. And Yevgeny Prigozhin, he made a lot of enemies over the years, uh, especially with his ambition and, and his kind of very un- uncouth and, and brash ways of doing things. Uh, and, and so really the, the, the crisis came when the Ministry of Defense decided they were gonna cut off Yevgeny Prigozhin from these, this prison population, which he needed to deliver Bakhmut as a victory to Prigozhin. And then the, the Ministry of Defense went further and they said, "Actually, all, uh, Russians fighting in Ukraine right now have to sign a new contract with the Ministry of Defense."