Is that a correct analysis?

Well, they certainly haven't strengthened it.

I think what the Saudis wanted to do after removing the UAE effectively... from Yemen is sort of consolidate their command and control over all of those multiple fighting groups, bring them under a single chain of command and create a more unified military force that was capable of taking on the Houthis.

But that clearly hasn't happened.

Arguably, that would have been very difficult to achieve in the space of six months, given the state of those divisions, the longstanding grievances between a lot of those fighting groups, that there is clearly a huge lack of coordination between the different groups that are fighting on the ground and on the West Coast that will kind of three main sort of units that are all fighting for different reasons and had been largely sort of on the umbrella, or certainly two of them had been of the UAE previously.

But yes, I think Mohammed bin Zayed in Abu Dhabi is perhaps getting the last laugh on this because you know, there's a little bit of deja vu about all of this, that it feels very much like 2015 and 2016 in the rapid sort of speed, the rapid way the Houthis have taken this territory.

But the UAE was really crucial in 2015, in particular in pushing the Houthis out in Aden, for sure.

So perhaps you could tell my listeners a little bit about this recent reporting you've done and what we've learned from it.

So explain the relationship with Iran and whether or not it is that these moves have been reshaping the balance of power in the Gulf.

Well, the Houthis and Iran have been long-term allies now, and Iran has supported the Houthis very strongly, both politically but particularly militarily, really, over the last decade in the war in Yemen.

And the Houthis have risen from what were known as a kind of ragtag militia from the mountains of the north of the very northern part of Yemen to this now very capable fighting force, that is able to push its leverage and be recognized internationally now as this credible sort of fighting group that has now has control of not just the most densely populated part of Yemen, but also the Bab al-Mandab.

And this is the most crucial thing, really.

This sort of takeover, physical takeover of the Bab al-Mandab, if you like, the Houthis effectively had been controlling it many times over the last three years, sort of remotely with missiles and drones.

But really, that falls into the interest of both Iran and the Houthis.

And the Houthis now are really probably the...

And with oil prices this morning, we're seeing it's having quite an immediate impact.

How significant, uh, are these advances, do you think?

Um, well, they're very significant for, for kind of two reasons, really.

Internally in, in Yemen's wars, this is the most significant shift in territorial control, um, since probably twenty twenty-one really, um, in the country's long-running civil war.

But more broadly than that, than that, of course, it's about the control of the Bab el Mandeb.

The Houthis have been for several years now, um, affecting and impacting shipping in the Red Sea on and off since Israel's war on Gaza was launched.

Um, but they've been doing that more remotely with, um, missiles and drones and even waves of drones.

But now this gives them direct control from the small little island of Perim or also known as Mayun, that is right in the middle of the Bab el Mandeb now.

Is Iran behind this? Is it using the Houthis to, to flex its muscles in this way?

How dangerous is this moment for the country?

I think it's very dangerous at the moment.

We haven't seen anything like this since twenty twenty-two when the truce was arranged between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia.

The airstrikes that began in response from Saudi Arabia on the thirteenth of July that targeted Sana'a Airport and then again on the twenty-fourth of July were the first airstrikes by Saudi Arabia against the Houthis since twenty twenty-two.

And now we have this scaling up of fighting on the ground in Yemen, which has been very extensive over recent days and even the last forty-eight hours in Marib, on the eastern front line, in Hadramawt, in Hodeidah, on the west coast, and that is very concerning.

So we've got multi sort of layers of what's going on at the moment, and all of them are indicating further escalation certainly, but as you mentioned at the beginning, a, a slip back into where we were between twenty fifteen and twenty twenty-two.

And given that, who do you think it is who thinks that maybe now is a good time to inflict some damage militarily?

There's a lot about the timing here, obviously.

Um, what's your assessment of how dangerous this moment is for Yemen?

Yemen?Um, good afternoon.

I, I think it's very dangerous at the moment.

We haven't seen anything like this since twenty twenty-two when the truce was arranged between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia.

Um, the airstrikes that we saw that began b- in r- in response from, from Saudi Arabia on the thirteenth of July that targeted, uh, Sana'a Airport, which you were just hearing about, and then again on the twenty-fourth of July, were the first airstrikes by Saudi Arabia, uh, against the Houthis since twenty twenty-two.

And now we have this, this, uh, scaling up of fighting on the ground in Yemen, which has been very extensive over the, over recent days and even the last forty-eight hours in, in Marib, on the eastern front line, in Hadramawt, in Hudaydah, on the west coast, and that is very concerning.

So we've got multi sort of layers of what's going on at the moment, uh, and all of them are indicating f- uh, further escalation certainly, but as you mentioned at the beginning, a, a slip back into where we were between twenty fifteen and twenty twenty-two.

And given that, who do you think it is who thinks that maybe now is, is a, a good time to try and push and, and inflict some damage militarily?