And in recent years with the changing geopolitical landscape, if you will, of this part of the world, we've sought ways to enhance the relationship and also to interest other affected states in the region, other like-minded democratic countries to join with us in taking an interest in the well-being and security of the Filipino nation.

You know, I would frame this as maybe kind of three acts of the alliance, and we are now well into the third act.

So if the first was the post-World War II Cold War era alliance represented by the military basing agreement, which expired in 1992, and the MDT, which was basically the U.S. using the Philippines as a staging area, both for counter-Soviet operations and for the war in Vietnam, You know, phase two after kind of a 10 year hiatus was the counterterror mission that really kind of had its root in the 1997 Building Forces Agreement, but took off with Operation Northern Freedom Philippines after 9-11.

And that wholly dominated at least the security relationship during the Bush administration and the start of the Obama administration.

And phase three has been this pivot toward external defense.

where the alliance has been modernized and looks a lot more like, say, the U.S. alliances with Japan or Korea or Australia or even NATO.

And that's been a little slower to eventuate since the Obama administration, but has seen remarkable progress since, I think, particularly the fall of 2021, when the two sides issued It was called the Joint Vision Statement for a 21st Century Partnership.

And I want to talk about China in a second, but Greg, can I ask you about the economic piece as well? How do you

Um, we've, we've sought ways, uh, to enhance the relationship and also to interest other, uh, affected states in the region, other, uh, like-minded democratic countries, uh, to, uh, join with us, uh, in, uh, taking an interest in the well-being and security of the Filipino nation.

You know, I, I would frame this as, um, maybe kind of three acts of, of the alliance, and we are now well into the third act.

So the first was the post, uh, World War II, Cold War era alliance represented by the, the military basing agreement, which expired in nineteen ninety-two, and the MDT, which was basically the U.S. using the Philippines as a, as a staging area both for counter-Soviet operations and for the war in Vietnam.

You know, phase two, after kind of a ten-year hiatus, was the counter-terror mission that, I mean, really kind of had its root in the nineteen ninety-seven Visiting Forces Agreement, but took off with Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines after nine eleven.

And that wholly dominated at least the security relationship during the Bush administration and the start of the Obama's administration.

And phase three has been this pivot toward external defense, where the alliance has been modernized and looks a lot more like, say, the U.S. alliances with Japan or Korea or Australia or even NATO.

And that's been a little slower to eventuate since the Obama administration, but has seen remarkable progress since, I think particularly the fall of twenty twenty-one when, uh, the two sides issued what was called the Joint Vision Statement for a twenty-first century partnership.

Um, how, how do you, how do you see it?

... that would be relevant.

That's right, yeah, and there are political pressures in all the other capitals too that would make de-escalation difficult, I think, in particular in Manila, but also in Vietnam in certain contexts.

The other danger here is I think we have reason to believe that Chinese officers on station, the ones who are actually in charge of these dozens of vessels, or the South Sea Fleet commanders who are in charge of the overall campaigns, are also growing increasingly frustrated.

And I've heard, I think there's reason to believe it's just looking at the activities on the ground, but I've also heard this from Chinese interlocutors, that, that they think they're growing frustrated as well because they're really given an impossible mission.

They have been told, "You must stop all of this activity.

Stop the Philippine resupplies to Second Thomas, stop the Philippine patrols at Scarborough, stop Vietnamese and Malaysian oil and gas exploration." And over the last five years, as I said, the South Asians have actually gotten quite good at ignoring Chinese gray zone coercion and doing what they want to do, which is why the disputes in a sense have plateaued.

But then the flip side of that is the Chinese forces on the ground are being told, "But don't open fire.

I should, should have specified, but without doing the 14