Where do you see things heading from here, and specifically for the left? Does, does last year's protest movement make you hopeful that popular movements and a proper political left can be rebuilt in Indonesia? And what sort of left does exist today in Indonesia, both, both on the level of political parties and then also on the level of popular sector organizations and movements?

movements?In question of what Prabowo is doing currently, it seems that he is trying to sort of resurrect the kind of military-based, uh, structures that were present during the New Order period.

But, you know, if the New Order was a tragedy, I think this one is a farce, actually.

It'll really depend on to what extent, um, the kinds of reforms that Prabowo has initiated, which has its roots in Jokowi's, uh, sort of nationalist, uh, state-focused, uh, industrialization project, damages the economy, uh, and whether it sort of damages the legitimacy of, of the current sort of oligarchy and the, the structure of the state.

I think, uh, that actually has the potential to open up spaces for sort of dialogue and sort of for participation, uh, one that we really haven't seen to such, such an extent, uh, after the reform period.

But then again, you know, if, uh, the kind of structure that Prabowo is trying to create, sort of this sort of clamping down on, on society, if it works out, then we are going to see a much more sort of centralized, uh, state similar to the one during the New Order.

So but we, we'll have to see what happens in the next couple of years, to what extent does these kind of reforms damage, uh, the legitimacy.

Thank you.

Where do you see things heading from here, and specifically for the left? Does, does last year's protest movement make you hopeful that popular movements and a proper political left can be rebuilt in Indonesia? And what sort of left does exist today in Indonesia, both, both on the level of political parties and then also on the level of popular sector organizations and movements?

movements?In question of what Prabowo is doing currently, it seems that he is trying to sort of resurrect the kind of military-based, uh, structures that were present during the New Order period.

But, you know, if the New Order was a tragedy, I think this one is a farce, actually.

It'll really depend on to what extent, um, the kinds of reforms that Prabowo has initiated, which has its roots in Jokowi's, uh, sort of nationalist, uh, state-focused, uh, industrialization project, damages the economy, uh, and whether it sort of damages the legitimacy of, of the current sort of oligarchy and the, the structure of the state.

I think, uh, that actually has the potential to open up spaces for sort of dialogue and sort of for participation, uh, one that we really haven't seen to such, such an extent, uh, after the reform period.

But then again, you know, if, uh, the kind of structure that Prabowo is trying to create, sort of this sort of clamping down on, on society, if it works out, then we are going to see a much more sort of centralized, uh, state similar to the one during the New Order.

So but we- we'll have to see what happens in the next couple of years, to what extent does these kind of reforms damage, uh, the legitimacy.

Thank you.

How did Suharto reposition Indonesia within the world capitalist system and in the Cold War-defined geopolitical order? What did it mean geopolitically for the regional and global balance of power for what had been Sukarno's Indonesia to suddenly fall into the US orbit?

Okay, so, you know, Indonesia, Indonesia shifting to the Western fold was not actually automatic.

There was, in '65, '66, there was a lot of, um, bad blood between a lot of Western governments and the capital- the capitalist West towards Indonesia because of their nationalization policy under Sukarno, right, in '57.

And then in the, in the '60s during the Konfrontasi period where American and British, uh, assets were taken over.

So Suharto, uh, and his technocratic teams, they went on full blitz to the West.

They went to Washington, they went to Tokyo, they went to Amsterdam, and they started courting, uh, Western policymakers, uh, but also, uh, Western companies.

Uh, in 1967, there was a, a meeting in Amsterdam which would result in the formation of what's called the Intergovernmental, uh, IGGI.

So what, what generally was the, the, the power and class structure under the New Order in general, and then specifically in terms of Chinese Indonesians?

How did Suharto reposition Indonesia within the world capitalist system and in the Cold War-defined geopolitical order? What did it mean geopolitically for the regional and global balance of power for what had been Sukarno's Indonesia to suddenly fall into the US orbit?

Okay, so, you know, Indonesia, Indonesia shifting to the Western fold was not actually automatic.

There was, in '65, '66, there was a lot of, um, bad blood between a lot of Western governments and the capital- the capitalist West towards Indonesia because of their nationalization policy under Sukarno, right, in '57.

And then in the, in the '60s during the Konfrontasi period, where American and British, uh, assets were taken over.

So Suharto, uh, and his technocratic teams, they went on full blitz to the West.

They went to Washington, they went to Tokyo, they went to Amsterdam, and they started courting, uh, Western policymakers, uh, but also, uh, Western companies.

Uh, in 1967, there was a, a meeting in Amsterdam which would result in the formation of what's called the Intergovernmental, uh, IGGI, I forgot the, the full, uh, term of that.

So what, what generally was the, the, the power and class structure under the New Order in general, and then specifically in terms of Chinese Indonesians?

And how did various domestic elites benefit from that overall economic order, even as it radically underdeveloped the country as a whole? And, and then lastly, how did various nationalist revolutionary radical forces, Sukarno, the PKI, other currents and power blocks, how did they aim to break out of that neocolonial bind to achieve not just political independence from the Dutch, but also true economic sovereignty?

Okay, yeah.

So, uh, the Indonesian economy in the '50s inherited to a large degree the colonial economy because it was, uh, the colonial economy was sort of, uh, sort of recreated during the, the revolutionary period because the Dutch primary aim was to es- reestablish its economic position, uh, in the archipelago.

Uh, so for instance, the operasi produk in 1947.

So for a lot of the major economic operations, it had started to be continued in the late '40s.

So the Indonesian economy in the '50s was primarily an export-driven economy, just like the colonial period.

Uh, and up until the late '50s, it actually maintained a 5% growth rate.

You know, there is a major, major actually, uh, operation by, by the US in involving in this, uh, rebellion.

Describe the shape of, of this underdeveloped, uneven economy that Indonesia inherited at independence, and how did various domestic elites benefit from that overall economic order, even as it radically underdeveloped the country as a whole? And, and then lastly, how did various nationalist revolutionary radical forces, Sukarno, the PKI, other currents and power blocks, how did they aim to break out of that neocolonial bind to achieve not just political independence from the Dutch, but also true economic sovereignty?

Okay.

Yeah.

So, uh, the Indonesian economy in the '50s inherited to a large degree the colonial economy because it was, uh, the colonial economy was sort of, uh, sort of recreated during the, the revolutionary period because the Dutch primary aim was to es- reestablish its economic position, uh, in the archipelago.

Uh, so for instance, the operasi produk in 1947.

So for a lot of the major economic operations, it had started to be continued in the late '40s.

So the Indonesian economy in the '50s was primarily an export-driven economy, just like the colonial period.

You know, there is a major, major actually, uh, operation by, by the US in involving in this, uh, rebellion.

Why in the late 1940s did they instead support Indonesian independence and play, play this critical role in pushing the Dutch to withdraw?

So Indonesia was one of the first, uh, major case of the UN order, uh, in the post-World War II period.

And the UN was already involved in the Indonesian question earlier on, uh, in 1947, uh, through the formation of the, the Good Offices committee.

Uh, the UN was also the one who, who held the Renville conference, and later on after the 1948, uh, military, uh, attack by the Dutch, the military action to- towards the Republican capital of Jogja in 1948, uh, the UN also set up the Round Table Conference which would result in the Round Table Agreement in The Hague.

So the UN, uh, saw Indonesia as a really important case to see how effective this kind of post-World War II, uh, world order, uh, can be.

Uh, and as you said, uh, the US has initially, uh, been tepid looking at the Indonesian, uh, Republic because, primarily it was because the Dutch, uh, sort of broad- broadcasted throughout the world, especially in the Western world, the idea that the Indonesian Republic was communist and leftist.

Uh, now so after, uh, the Madiun rebellion of '48, uh, with Hatta, uh, destroying, uh, the communists and the, the leftist faction, uh, in, in the Indonesian government, uh, then, uh, America saw a shift in the image of Indonesia.

Do we have a, a, a single culture as Indonesia? But, uh, other than that, I think the state is began to be the, the centralizations, uh, and then, uh, uh, especially the military and the bureaucracy, it's, uh, become strengthened and then all of the people then look up to Jakarta for the source of power.

Why in the late 1940s did they instead support Indonesian independence and play, play this critical role in pushing the Dutch to withdraw?

So Indonesia was one of the first, uh, major case of the UN order, uh, in the post-World War II period.

And the UN was already involved in the Indonesian question earlier on, uh, in 1947, uh, through the formation of the, the Good Offices committee.

Uh, the UN was also the one who, who held the Renville, uh, Conference, and later on after the 1948, uh, military, uh, attack by the Dutch, the military action to- towards the Republican capital of Jogja in 1948, uh, the UN also set up the Round Table Conference, which would result in the Round Table Agreement in The Hague.

So the UN, uh, saw Indonesia as a really important case to see how effective this kind of post-World War II, uh, world order, uh, can be.

Uh, and as you said, uh, the US has initially, uh, been tepid looking at the Indonesian, uh, Republic because, primarily it was because the Dutch, uh, sort of broad- broadcasted t- throughout the world, especially in the Western world, the idea that the Indonesian Republic was communist and leftist.

Uh, now, so after, uh, the Madiun rebellion of '48, uh, with Hatta, uh, destroying, uh, the communists and the, the leftist faction, uh, in, in the Indonesian government, uh, then, uh, America saw a shift in the image of Indonesia.

Do we have a, a, a single culture as Indonesia? But, uh, other than that, I think the state is began to be the, the centralizations, uh, and then, uh, uh, especially the military and the bureaucracy, it's, uh, become strengthened and, and then all of the people then look up to Jakarta for the source of power.

[laughs]

...

in a sense.

You know, they, they're now working in offices together.

And so, and, and a very important part in the Japanese period is, is the creation of post-colonial elite because for the first time they had to, they had to work together, and so they had to make a pact, like, what, what kind of elite, uh, because people in the, in the radical nationalist, uh, during the colonial period, they rarely meet anyone from the, from the cleric groups or from the other traditional, uh, sectors society, but now they're, now suddenly they're, they're working together in the office.

So at the elite level, there's a, a, a change in the type of elites and, but then also that the elites of Indonesia isn't from one place.

It's actually an amalgamation of people from the clerical group, people from the, from the traditional, uh, aristocracy, people from the traditional, uh, the European bu- bureaucracy, Indonesian, uh, bureaucrats, and people from the, from the, uh, the, the radical nationalists.

Mm.

[laughs]

...

in a sense.

You know, they, they're now working in offices together.

And so a, and a very important part in the Japanese period is, is the creation of post-colonial elite because for the first time, they had to, they had to work together, and so they had to make a pact, like what, what kind of elite.

Uh, because people in the, in the radical nationalists, uh, during the colonial period, they rarely meet anyone from the, from the cleric groups or from the other traditional, uh, sectors of society, but now they're, now suddenly they're, they're working together in the office.

So at the elite level, there's a, a, a change in the type of elites and, but then also that the elites of Indonesia isn't from one place.

Mm-hmm.

How do you all see the sort of politics of Parindra? Do you, do you agree with this analysis in NLR that it really kind of creates this, this model of family-state organicism that will be so influential throughout the rest of Indonesian history? And how should we think about this upper layer of the elite from the kind of lower elite that populate the nationalist, communist, and Islamic movements?

So I, I think that's, uh...

So Parindra i-is an interesting point.

I don't think its roots are in the '30s.

It's actually rooted much deeper in the 1910s, uh, you know, the emergence of Budi Utomo.

Because if you-- In the early periods of the rise of Budi Utomo, because they were not exposed to Marxist analysis, uh, a lot of the sort of, uh, discussions surrounding, uh, nationalism, and this wasn't Indonesian nationalism, but sort of in emerging Javanese nationalism, stems from the need to sort of reinvigorate Javanese culture, right? So the idea is that colonialism has destroyed, sort of, not destroyed, but sort of weakened the Javanese, uh, identity and the Javanese.

So it w- it, it was a cultural rejuvenation.

Why the Indos?