Mr. Fagan?

Thank you, Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

Our position is really the only one that's faithful to this Court's precedents.

Stinson interpreted the Sentencing Reform Act to incorporate the same measure of deference for guidelines commentary that Seminal Rock gives to an agency's interpretation of its own rules.

Kisor then clarified what Seminal Rock deference means.

Add those two decisions together, and you get that Kisor applies to guidelines commentary.

Do you have an estimate of how many of those sentences relied on commentary and would have to be done over?

Mr. Fagan.

Thank you, Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, as I think Justice Jackson was just getting at, Petitioner here is asking for an unprecedented transformation of the Fourth Amendment into an impregnable fortress around records of his public movements that he affirmatively consented to allow Google to create, maintain, and use.

In doing so, he would make that fortress so impregnable that not even a judge's warrant for even a moment of the public location of someone who, again, affirmatively opted to allow Google to have those records and to access them would be available to law enforcement.

That's a debilitating and counterintuitive reading of the Fourth Amendment that would impede the investigation of kidnappings, robberies, shootings, and other crimes and would implicate any number of practices that I think opposing counsel kind of just waved his hands about, like tower dumps.

Frankly, Mr.

Chief Justice, I don't know how he concedes exigent circumstances, because under this Court's recent decision just this term in case against Montana, we need reasonable, uh, cause to believe that the, there's a necessary search, and under his view, the, this would be a search of everyone who has location history stored with Google, and I think he would have to say that we don't have reasonable cause as to each one of those people.

Okay, so what is the difference in your view?