Looking beyond the immediate question of preventing further Russian aggression, what has the war revealed about the limits of nuclear deterrence in protecting European security? And what lessons should European governments draw from Ukraine when thinking about their own defense planning? I know you just briefly touched on it right now, but can we delve a little bit deeper into it?

Sure.

And I think there are a bunch to imagine that Sweden would join a nuclear alliance and not have any scruples about taking part in the mission.

And then two years later, join specifically forward deterrence that is absolutely fundamentally based on nuclear deterrence, where we know that the country for many years had been quite reluctant about the role of nuclear deterrence.

That's huge in terms of this war and Russia's behavior on that aspect has really changed fundamentally the way Europeans have perceived the role of But nuclear deterrence is still avoiding the conflict to spread over other European countries.

However horrible it is, the situation in Ukraine, it would get worse if it was spreading over to other European countries and that therefore nuclear weapons are still playing a moderating factor to some extent in kind of limiting the conflict in terms of also lessons about the limits of nuclear weapons, which I think are not really necessary.

I mean, we did not need the war in Ukraine to see that or to know that, but maybe to recognize it out loud.

So where do arms control and nuclear risk reduction fit into that agenda?

We'll pivot now to Emmanuel for your thoughts on what the expectations should be on the next cycle after three failed review conferences, just to hammer that home.

Yeah, well, basically, I would agree with Yana that it's quite difficult to have many expectations for the next review cycle.

And what I fear mostly is not so much that countries do not value or price the NPT as much, but really do not feel that they need to invest in the process of those meetings and those preparatory committees, review cycles.

It is actually a cost for many delegations to commit to the people, to send delegations, to write working papers, to try to invest the political capital to negotiate.

And when we have basically failures after failures.

And I would not just say that the failure is in adopting an outcome document.

We knew from the beginning this would be extremely difficult because of very substantial political issues.

We'll now move on to Emmanuelle for the same question again.