But after everything you've seen in the past 24 hours, what are your kind of top line takeaways? Have you learned anything about Israeli society or democracy or the direction it's going?

I think, yeah, I think I've learned a couple of things that I was aware of before, but it's become much more stark.

The Arab turnout is astounding, unprecedented.

And the message should be that the Arabs valued their vote.

For those who think, who want to say Israel is an apartheid state, the Arabs obviously don't think that.

They thought their vote mattered and they turned out 80%.

80% versus the last election, which was 54%.

So what does Netanyahu do in that scenario? And what does that pretend for the Iran policy?

Do I have it right?

You do have it right.

Let me break it down for you.

First of all, no Israeli government has ever been formed without a coalition, meaning there has never been one party that wins so much that on its own, it can establish a majority.

So you're always going to have a coalition.

Now, coalitions sometimes have been national unity coalitions.

You used to have two big parties, Labor and Likud, and sometimes they would get in the neighborhood of over 40 coalitions.

Your thoughts?

uh strangulation of iran's economy and someone like you that fully understands that the irgc which has been the non-negotiating partner in all of this yeah eventually won't have any money you know they control some 40 plus percent of iran's economy but at some point 40 of nothing is going to be nothing what's your read on where things stand and where this heads

a really good question uh and I would say, first, you're right about the Revolutionary Guard in terms of how they see things.

The first point I would make is this is a group, the leadership, Rezaei, Vahidi, they have been together since the 1980s in the Iran-Iraq war.

And they remember that, correctly so, as life was dramatically worse for Iranians then than it is today.

So that's their frame of reference.

And their view is they can endure much more.

Now, of course, they're not the ones suffering.

But the fact that you've got this guy, Ahmad Vahidi, and you look at the history, you wonder, Ambassador Russ, is there any deal that this guy's ever going to even do?

uh strangulation of iran's economy and someone like you that fully understands that the irgc which has been the non-negotiating partner in all of this yeah eventually won't have any money you know they control some 40 plus percent of iran's economy but at some point 40 of nothing is going to be nothing what's your read on where things stand and where this heads

a really good question uh and I would say, first, you're right about the Revolutionary Guard in terms of how they see things.

The first point I would make is this is a group, the leadership, Rezaei, Vahidi, they have been together since the 1980s in the Iran-Iraq war.

And they remember that, correctly so, as life was dramatically worse for Iranians then than it is today.

So that's their frame of reference.

And their view is they can endure much more.

Now, of course, they're not the ones suffering.

But the fact that you've got this guy, Ahmad Vahidi, and you look at the history, you wonder, Ambassador Russ, is there any deal that this guy's ever going to even do?

I'm curious as to how you're racking and stacking where we sit right now vis-à-vis Iran in the Gulf.

I think we're still in a situation where we're basically trapped.

Uh, on the one hand, the president may threaten that he's prepared to, quote, "annihilate them." I-- to be honest, I don't know exactly what that means.

Or he's prepared to do a deal, and the deal would allow them to be greater than they've ever been.

They, for their part, clearly seem to wanna be able to say, "We control the straits," and that's a point of leverage.

And even if you're going to build alternative infrastructure to get around the straits, which I think is something that will happen o-over the next couple of years, there's no guarantee that they won't threaten that alternative infrastructure.

So you're still basically, I think, in a stalemate.

So h- how does that all square together?

So do you think Kushner and Trump can get Israel on board for this agreement?

Well, Pamela, there's a paradox, because Bibi is saying publicly there will be no withdrawal until after Hamas is disarmed, and yet the 15 points which publicly he said he hasn't accepted or that Israel won't accept doesn't ask Israel to withdraw from Gaza until after Hamas has been fully disarmed.

He creates, I think, frequently an image that he is not saying yes to the U.S., so that this has a kind of domestic political consumption that's good for him, even at the same time when he actually goes along with many of the things that are being asked.

For example, what is being asked in the 15 points was that he would stop, Israel would stop the targeted killings.

For a week or so they did that.

They resumed with a couple, but that was in the aftermath of Hamas actually not doing anything with regard to the decommissioning.

He also actually withdrew Israeli forces from what had become known as the orange line back to the yellow line, which is what they were asked to do in the context of the 15 points.

But why threaten to bomb an ally like this? This is actually the second time he has done this since the war started.

There you go

... go ahead and do that because you're reducing the character of the threat to something we no longer have to fear.

That should've, as you know, Brian, I've said this from the beginning, that should've been our priority from the very beginning.

You know, we had a, we had two different kinds of objectives.

The most important objective was to make it increasingly impossible for the Iranians to threaten their neighbors with military force.

Had that been our exclusive focus, had that been what we and the Israelis were both doing so that we were weakening their ability to use missiles, drones, cruise missiles, we would've put ourselves in a position where fundamentally the Iranian ability to threaten others would've been, would've been dissipated to the point where others didn't need to fear it.

What you're describing about the phone call from, uh, from, from MBS and from others from the Gulf was, "We can't afford to lose desalinization plants.

Number one, do you think they will, and, and do you think Israel will?

Uh, where do you see the president's challenge and leverage, uh, when, as mentioned, few believe him on, on either side of the border when it comes to a, a lot of the Iran claims?

You know, I think it matters less what you and I may believe.

What matters is what do the Iranians believe.

The Iranians have been objectively set back in terms of their military capability, but not enough so that they're not in a position where they can hit all their neighbors, especially against vulnerable soft targets.

Uh, they clearly think that they have won.

They are-- They now have a lever, a, a chokehold over an important global chokehold, meaning the Strait of Hormuz.

On February seventh, they, they did not have that chokehold.

And Trump doesn't seem to have a, a move for that because there is no appetite, and I don't even think he could physically do it for very long to have a, a full ground invasion of Iran.

So to start off the conversation, as someone who served as a Middle East negotiator, what do you first make of what was included in this agreement?

Well, I'm not surprised by those terms because A, this was a topic that was discussed at great length during the Biden administration with the Saudis.

At that time, it was conditioned.

It was linked explicitly to normalization with Israel.

So the basic terms of what might be possible in terms of developing a nuclear industry in Saudi Arabia, which has been part of Vision 2030, from the time the Vision 2030 in Saudi Arabia was formulated by the Crown Prince, it was very clear that nuclear industry played a big part in it because what he wanted to do was ensure that nuclear energy, civilian nuclear energy, would generate power, would take the place of oil.

That the Saudis would use their oil and export it, but they would develop their domestic energy would come largely from nuclear power and that would free up oil for export.

So that's point one.

What do you make of the timing here and what impact do you think it's going to have on the war against Iran?

Your thoughts about what Mike Waltz just said.

Well, I think there's kind of an objective reality which he captured for real.

There is no doubt, if you measure this in objective terms, Iran has probably never been weaker internally.

Uh, and subjectively is the problem because they think they're winning.

Uh, and so long as they think they're winning and they're controlling the straits, we have a problem.

What's interesting when you look at this, what I'm describing and what Mike Waltz is describing, if you can get beyond this war, then the inner contradictions within Iran are gonna come to the fore, number one.

And number two, if we can really succeed in producing an Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement based on the framework, meaning the Lebanese army will have to act against Hezbollah, it will need help from us.

Do you believe we gotta do more? Not sell me, tell me about what you're doing and what the plan is.

Do you expect there will be larger fallout from the deaths of these US service members? Is this war with Iran now going to dramatically escalate?

I don't know that it's gonna dramatically escalate, although it's clear the US is moving F-15s and F-35s to the region.

It is also moving additional aerial refueling tankers, so that suggests we're probably going to increase the scope and intensity of the attacks we're gonna carry out.

Uh, the Iranians, as you just noted, have hit seven different states in the region.

So there is a dynamic here that seems to be an escalatory one, but it's also noteworthy that, A, the Iranians are not hitting Israel, which suggests they know that Israel would hit back in a big way.

B, the United States is still not hitting certain kinds of targets, meaning we're not hitting power plants, we're not going after energy facilities.

And I think the reason for that is we're seeing that the Iranians have the ability to hit similar kinds of targets in, in the Gulf states.

Iranian officials say, uh, they were also open to it, but how does diplomacy even restart at this point with this war escalating?

It was a way to get to the table, perhaps, in the best scenario, but now it seems to be gone, right?

It seems to be gone.

I mean, look, it's, it, it's always a, a challenge, I'm saying that deliberately, to negotiate with the Iranians because the Iranians have a certain DNA when it comes to negotiations, which is buy time.

Stretch it, always focus on their needs, never on supposedly what they're prepared to agree to in terms of giving things up.

And the MOU, I will just say from a negotiator's perspective, I never quite said it this way to you.

Y- you said my chagrin was right.

When I read it, I knew it was an Iranian paper.

We could blockade the blockade, but right now we're letting them, uh, letting them threaten all these vessels.

I'm not saying it doesn't matter.

All right.

So, so let me, let me make two points, one related to it, and, and one that just sort of raises a, a possibility.

Um, on the straits, the language in the MOU says no tolls for 60 days, and then after the 60 days, uh, Iran will be talking with Oman, uh, the Gulf literal states, about administration and managerial services.

So it's already...

It establishes a basis for them to have a role, and that's where I think some of these discussions are already beginning, beginning.

But the second point, here's a larger question: Let's say the Iranians are willing to reach some kind of an agreement with us on the nuclear issue and nothing else.

If you don't do what we tell you to do, they're gonna go back on.

I asked him what he thought of Washington's current ability to shape that international order.

Well, it does feel a little bit different right now.

On the one hand, you still have the use of American power, and clearly, the whole world is kind of watching, waiting, holding their breath.

Uh, but we also clearly can't seem to shape things quite the way we want.

Uh, and part of that is a, a Trump administration that pretty much goes it alone and isn't, doesn't shape an environment, doesn't mobilize those who might share its objectives to be supportive and actually to help exert leverage in support of those objectives.

And I think so much going it alone then s- oftentimes leaves the United States alone.

In this particular case, it's interesting we're working with Qatar and Pakistan to be the go-betweens, to be mediators.

Um, on a specific point, uh, how do Israeli-American relations look to you just now, and where do they go potentially from here?

Um, Dennis Ross, on that question about Washington's ability to shape the international order, how does that look to you now?

Well, it does feel a little bit different right now.

On the one hand, you still have the use of American power, and clearly the whole world is kind of watching, waiting, holding their breath.

Uh, but we also clearly can't seem to shape things quite the way we want.

Uh, and part of that is a, a Trump administration that pretty much goes it alone and isn't-- doesn't shape an environment, doesn't mobilize those who might share its objectives to be supportive and actually to help exert leverage in support of those objectives.

And I think so much going it alone then s- oftentimes leaves the United States alone.

In this particular case, it's interesting, we're working with Qatar and Pakistan to be the go-betweens, to be mediators.

Um, on a specific point, uh, how do Israeli-American relations look to you just now, and where do they go potentially from here?

Uh, lastly, I think, you know, the, the Strait of Hormuz was open before February 28th, so the fact that we're reopening it is getting us back to the, I would like to say February 27th, but if you, again, you read the language here, it doesn't do that

thatIran is committing an MOU to allow the volume of ship traffic to go back to what it was on February 27th.

But it says nothing about Iran not managing the Strait of Hormuz, along with Oman, which is what they, they're saying they're going to be doing.

Yeah, there's no reference to tolls, but there's also, Iran, in this document, doesn't concede anything other than, okay, the US is going to lift its blockade, which was hurting them, and they will allow the ships to go back to what they were doing, those same volume ships that was going on.

Which, look, I understand th- this was...

The Iranians discovered during this war that they were able to have huge leverage over the global economy and over oil prices.

The one thing, Brian, to bear in mind, from 1987, 1988, uh, until, uh, this war, the Iranians never sought to, to control the straits because Ali Khamenei understood that would mean a war and that could threaten the survivability of the regime.

The markets will rise again, and oil will drop again." But I think he's realizing now how bad this deal is.

How do you work out a nuclear deal, which is very complicated, in two months that actually took years to negotiate the last time when President Obama was in office?

Well, a lot will depend upon how detailed it will actually be.

The JCPOA was a document of well over 100 pages.

I don't think we're looking at anything like that, but the key issues themselves have been, A, known for a long time, And B, the question is, what, if anything, has already been agreed at a level of principle? And even if there is an agreement of principle, what does it mean to dispose of the highly enriched uranium? Is all enriched uranium included here? The Iranians are likely to interpret the word dispose as meaning they can dilute or down blend but not destroy.

The president seems to be talking about destroying, but then he seemed to back off and say, well, You know, maybe there's an alternative there.

So I think there's a big question mark on that.

There's a big question mark on what happens to their nuclear facilities, most of which have been largely destroyed.

So Dennis, do you think the US will be any further ahead with Iran after this deal is worked out than it was before the start of this current war?

Critics say, as of now, it's a failure.

I think it's too soon to judge whether it's a failure.

I think it's not too soon to judge the application of statecraft.

The essence of good statecraft is you marry objectives and means.

The problem here was a confusion of objectives.

If the aim of this war was to weaken Iran to the point where it could not militarily be threatening its neighbors, that should have been the focus of the objectives.

If the aim was regime change, It was probably a folly to begin with because regime change from the air is never going to be necessarily the result.

And maybe it's not even a great idea to announce your objectives if you have a clear set.

What do you make of that action, especially because Iran has said that a peace deal with the United States is contingent on peace in Lebanon and Lebanon being included?

Look, what it comes down to is the Lebanese presidency, the Lebanese government and prime minister have said that there can only be one authorized set of military capabilities in the state and that Hezbollah has to disarm.

And Hezbollah is saying, no, we're not going to disarm.

disagreement that was worked out in ceasefire they they have started they were trying to create a process where there's Designated zones in in the southern part of Lebanon where the Lebanese army would go in be responsible for clearing it out and as they do that and these really see that they do that then Israel will withdraw from places and That was accepted by the Lebanese government, but it was rejected by Hezbollah so know one of the things that we should be doing is making it clear to the iranians if the if hezbollah blocks the ability to end a war there then the idea that there's going to be a ceasefire that is imposed on the israelis but acceptable to hezbollah is not acceptable to us i mean we will back the lebanese government what we should be doing is in these talks we should be finding out okay what is it that you need from the Israelis or from us, the US, for you to have the Lebanese military do what it needs to do against Hezbollah? Are there things that Israel can do militarily to weaken Hezbollah further that is acceptable to you or that from your standpoint puts you in a stronger position? Are there things the Israelis are doing militarily that actually undermines you because it builds the credibility or legitimacy of Hezbollah and undermines yours? We should be coordinating among the three to say, okay, what is it that limits the Lebanese military right now from taking the steps that the Lebanese government says is in Lebanon's interest? And if it's because Hezbollah is too strong in some places, Israel has the means to weaken them.

If that's the key inhibitor, I mean, we need to find out what it is.

This process that has been created, I think is a smart process, a step-by-step approach where the Lebanese army doesn't have to do everything at once.

But there are things that can be done simultaneously, and whether it's Israel committing more openly that they will withdraw as Lebanon proceeds, the Lebanese military, and or if there are certain capabilities Hezbollah has that Israel could weaken, the Lebanese government doesn't have to ask the Israelis per se, but they can say to us.

Is that something President Trump is ever going to do? I

What am I missing?

You're not missing anything.

May- uh, A, we start with the fact that those who are making the decision, dominated by the IRGC, Ahmad Vahidi, who by the way, is on a red notice, uh, because he's, you know, he was responsible for the blowing up the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1994.

This is a guy who's a lead decision-maker, along with the Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, who is obviously wounded, but is, is clearly leading through some kind of consensus.

They're ideologically driven, number one.

They don't care about the consequences to their public, number two.

They are convinced that they can outlast the United States and President Trump.

Your thoughts.

Do you think, how long do you think it'll take until we find out if this is gonna be effective or not?

Um, look, as you, you put it well, Brian, it's only effective if the, if the ship owners are prepared to feel confident enough to go ahead and, and send their ships.

Right now, the vast majority don't feel confident enough.

I think you're gonna have to see at least close to a week where ships could go through without being, uh, uh, b- basically being unscathed, being safe, uh, with some certainty that, that we can block all the attacks.

Now, the problem, of course, is each ship is, like, $100 million.

And let's say we can stop 90% of the cruise missiles or drones, or 95%, but if you're a ship owner, you're prepared to run that risk, and if you're providing insurance, are you prepared to provide the insurance? So I think it takes some sustained period of time for there to be a level of confidence, okay, either the Iranians have stopped shooting, uh, or the, the US has proven itself so effective, uh, in preventing and, and blocking any attacks that the level of confidence goes up to the point where the ship owners and those providing, the Lloyds of London and others who provide the insurance, you know, are, are doing it at not charging such a premium that it becomes impossible for the ship's owners to say, "Gee, we don't really wanna afford that cost." It's gonna take some demonstration, I would say at least a week, uh, where you feel like, okay, uh, the Iranians have decided it's too costly to them to do this.

Uh, you said it's true.

I wonder how much longer are we going to not look for the origin of these rocket, of the rocket fire? And what, uh, does Iran have any reservations knowing that their armaments are finite and what America has actually bulked up in the region?

So you're saying that we should go in there with our destroyers and our ships and open it up, and then provide an escort for the other ships? Yeah, do you have like mine, mine clearances as well?

Well, the way...

Look, the way you s- you do this is first you create a channel.

It's not...

When people say...

You know, there was a report out, uh, last week about the Pentagon saying it would take six months to clear the Straits of mines.

It doesn't take six months if what you're doing is you're opening a narrow channel to begin with.

What would be the result if you blew up Kharg Island?

Uh, some say as many as 15, including a, uh, Iranian vessels and China can't get through.

Right.

This puts enormous amount of pressure on China.

Fifty percent of all their oil comes from the Gulf, so this is not something they can withstand for a long time.

It is true, just so to be fair, they have built up an enormous reserve.

Uh, they have a reserve of at least four months, so they could tolerate this for a while, but the truth is they don't, they don't have a reserve because they wanna use it.

They want the reserve there always as a kind of insurance policy.

So do you think once this, once the deal is reached, uh, Iran is still in trouble?

It would seem that-- do you believe that we're, uh, uh, basically on the back heel despite the military, uh, progress that, that the Pentagon says they've made?

Yeah, look, I, I think we have to divide what has been extraordinary operational progress and operational success by both the U.S. military and the Israeli military.

We have to divide that from what are the political objectives and the-- and whatever political process we're now talking about.

What emerges on day one of this is that there are clearly very different understandings of what has been agreed to.

The result of that has been actually eleven ships today made it through, uh, the Straits of Hormuz.

That's not normal.

The normal shipping is a hundred and fifty ships a day.

Uh, and I'm just curious, given the, the policy of it all, uh, what it means, do you think, if the United States, for all of its military power, um, doesn't necessarily have a long runway where the president and his party wanna stay deeply enmeshed in this going into the election?

Ambassador?

Well, I think, look, uh, General McCaffrey put his finger on what is the most strategically important element in this war, which is who controls the Strait of Hormuz.

We can weaken Iran dramatically, which we have.

Uh, as General McCaffrey said, the military campaign by the US and the Israelis, by any measure, is extraordinary in terms of its success.

The only measure in which it's not a success is that you create a political measure for it as opposed to a military measure for it.

The-- Clausewitz said, "War is the extension of politics by other means," meaning war is an instrument, a tool, a means.

It is not an end.

Ambassador, you've, you've warned that with the president now floating timelines like two to three weeks, if they don't get the strait back in two to three weeks, and that were real, meaning if you took the president's word, and we left in this condition, then you warn that could be a geostrategic benefit for Iran? That after all this and, and the great military operations that the general described, they would hypothetically have a benefit? Explain that.