Mm-hmm

... as opposed to running it ourself.

So our investors, we are, are freeing up capital that they have t-traditionally tied up in poor diversifiers by creating explicit risk mitigation breaks so that they can go out and put that capital to work participating in the positive drift or long-term trend of asset price inflation and compounding assets.

So the positively correlated side, we're allowing them to carry more of on their own books while we focus only on the negatively correlated convexity asymmetry that we need to constantly work to maintain sensitivity and attachment as their assets grow in, in, in size, compounding, and price moves through time, through this drift and appreciation, asset appreciation through time.

So we need to then actively manage the negative correlation.

So, so one, we're trying to create very much what you guys are doing, but the combination of what they do for themselves and what we then provide them creates the long gamma, if you will, on their combined portfolio, as opposed to us running both the positive and negative correlation in our books as you guys would as more of a standalone strategy.

Mm

... product vol supply that is itself mispriced relative to its own distribution.

Give us a little bit of background.

We've only got an hour, so I'll try to keep that short.

Somewhat famously, it's part of my story.

I'm a simple kid from Salt Lake City, Utah.

Went to the University of Utah and managed to slide my way into The master's MBA program at University of California, Berkeley.

Came out of there and turned down some job opportunities in New York.

to take one with Bank of America in San Francisco because I wanted to stay close to home, stay close to Salt Lake City.

who know

So for all those years during QE, during the expansion of

balance sheet usage through BIS regulatory capital guidelines and solvency tune, all the regulations post GFC that allowed the absorption of all this government debt at ridiculous prices onto regulated institutions, there was no competition for bond issuance.

Every government in the world could issue right through 100% of debt to GDP, all the bonds they wanted at the cheapest cost ever in all of history.

And then in 2020, late 21 through 22, that stopped.

And now there's an enormous competition to issue bonds, which I dubbed the hunger games of bond issuance.

Now, everybody is your competitor in bond issuance.

In the old days, nobody was your competitor.

And so I don't know if you have any, if you have any thoughts on this.

That's a great question.

Very broad, but let me see if I can kind of build a path into that.

We don't know the future.

In fact, we very explicitly define the future in a two sort of states.

There's state number one, things that we know, really things that we think we know.

And then there's state number two, things we don't know.

And there you focus on these type of things and then also bring in the risk management afterwards or like what's the sort of combination there, you know?

So like I said, we're only the brakes.

Christ.

Japan, the Nikkei was only down fifteen percent.

It was the best performing index in the world that day because it was the only one at that time that had a circuit breaker.

After that, everybody introduced circuit breakers.

So I've been out here in Asia.

I worked for a long time in the banking industry.

Most particularly, I... after learning some things at Bank of America, traveling around the emerging markets in the late '80s when everybody was deregulating.

Mm.