And it only needs to be for the moment that you open up that window.

That's right.

Obviously, all of this depended on extraordinary accuracy.

And at the time, the F-117 had only recently emerged from the classified world, as was mentioned earlier, and its real capabilities weren't widely understood.

Well, it turns out that Colonel Al Whitley – A commander of the 37th TAC fighter wing who owned the F-117s happened to be visiting General Horner's headquarters next door.

So I asked him, just how accurate is this F-117? So Colonel Whitley told me it was at a 35 live drops at that time.

he'd had shacks on 34.

And how they took the concepts that were pioneered by the Nighthawk and expanded them so much further.

I mean, what was your immediate reaction?

You know, I mentioned that I was working on the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Matter of fact, what we were doing was I was writing up some of the final conclusions for the Air Force proportion of that defense review.

It was a beautiful day in Washington, all up and down the East Coast.

Clear blue sky, not a cloud in sight.

And my deputy, Brigadier General Ron Bass, called me because he had not come in early that day.

He kind of had the late shift.

What would you say are some of the greatest threats facing the United States today in 2026?

I mean, what were the big messages that jumped out?

Well, thanks, Fago.

I would summarize by saying there were four major takeaways from this year's conference.

And the overarching theme was urgency.

And that kind of fit well because the conference theme itself was advancing air and space dominance, an urgent call to build and sustain the forces.

And that was reflected throughout the discussions.

Secretary Mink put it very clearly when he said that the threat is changing faster than our traditional budget and acquisition processes are designed to accommodate.

And everything we're doing is about range.

Mm

... unstable budgets and requirements that increasingly became budget driven rather than strategy driven.

If you don't have enough money to buy the inventory your strategy actually requires, eventually somebody simply reduces the requirement until the numbers appear to work.

Unfortunately, that's exactly backwards.

And underlying all of this was an assumption that future wars would be very intense, yes, but relatively short.

Ukraine should have demolished that assumption once and for all.

Actually, Afghanistan should have, but you know, Ukraine's another example.

Okay, I was being nice

[laughs]

I don't know, but a 67% reduction in the number of Air Force fighters in Europe doesn't seem very modest to me.

The second indicator is readiness.

After more than two decades of nearly continuous deployments, the GAO office, GAO, that's, uh, redundant, uh, concluded that Air Force readiness has been degraded across personnel equipment as well as aircraft.

Maintenance backlogs, shortages of skilled technicians, limited spare parts, and aging platforms mean that airmen have got to work harder just simply to generate the same number of missions.

The tanker force, absolutely essential to projecting American power, failed to meet its availability and capability standards in every year from fiscal 2019 through 2025.

Third is the age and the size of the force itself.

So what's going on here? Why is there so much hate, and why is there so much ignorance about the modern use of force?

Yep

... uh, so that my answer seems a little bit more, uh, makes a little bit more sense.

Uh, but prior to working for the Secretary of the Air Force, I worked for a gentleman whose name was Colonel John Warden.

Uh, and he was the leader of a deputate who was responsible for, uh, um, war fighting concepts development.

And John was a very innovative thinker, and we both tended to, uh, think in the context of how can one optimize the application of air power in the accomplishment of national security objectives.

So when this thing kicked off, we actually got together and talked about, well, y- you know, what could be the optimal use of air power in this particular situation? And I'm talking the very early days.

How do we stop Saddam from moving further south into Saudi Arabia? O- okay, so what happened over the next two weeks is pretty spectacular.

Yeah.

Why isn't it taking off, uh, here in the US, and what can you tell us about the Chinese threat?

Well, China understands the strategic value of infrastructure.

Um, so it, it's built at remarkable speed in railroads, manufacturing, shipbuilding, electronics, nuclear power, you name it.

Now, China's also, um, making data infrastructure a national priority, and so that should get our attention.

Uh, this isn't just about commercial competition between American tech companies and Chinese tech companies.

It's a strategic competition between two systems.

China's trying to build the industrial, digital, and military base to dominate the next era of power.

Are they maps? Is it phone calls?

Why isn't it taking off, uh, here in the U.S.? And what can you tell us about the Chinese threat?

Well, China understands the strategic value of infrastructure.

Um, so it, it's built at remarkable speed in railroads, manufacturing, shipbuilding, electronics, nuclear power, you name it.

Now, China's also, um, making data infrastructure a national priority, and so that should get our attention.

Uh, this isn't just about commercial competition between American tech companies and Chinese tech companies.

It's a strategic competition between two systems.

China's trying to build the industrial, digital, and military base to dominate the next era of power.

Are they maps? Is it phone calls?

And I guess my question to you is, as you read all the coverage and knowing what you know, do you think the public has just been made aware, or more specifically, our enemy, in this case Iran, was just told too much?

Um, it's an interesting question.

Look, we live in a free and open society, uh, and that is always, uh, a concern.

Um, so, uh, quite frankly, that's why you don't hear a lotta speci-specificity or details about the, uh, uh, entire rescue operation, which by the way, and I, and I think you recognize it, most people do, um, it was extraordinarily, uh, uh, uh, successful.

Uh, but the success involved incredible actions on the part of our military personnel.

It was an enormous effort that involved, uh, many, many more aircraft than anyone might think i-in an extremely well-choreographed operation that was put together in a matter of hours.

Now, look, a lot of this is thought out in advance, uh, but specifics really don't do anything, uh, except, uh, a-assist, uh, our adversaries who are watching and reading everything that the U.S. puts out.

MQ-9 Reaper drones also struck suspected fighters as they approached within kilometers of the aviators' hiding site."

Was this an easy op to plan, looking at the challenge that Venezuela posed? Was there anything unusual about it that planners would have had to take into

account? I think it doesn't take a thermonuclear brain surgeon or, counter to that, a defense expert to understand that the complexity of this operation is very much less than...

a desert storm, or which was, let's face it, it was our last major regional contingency that the United States actually was involved in.

But there are some fundamental elements that go along with any combat operation.

And while every one is going to be different, you still have to address the critical centers of gravity that are involved in a particular contingency, and you need to put together a plan to accomplish the particular objectives.

Clearly, objectives in Venezuela were very much different than those involved in Desert Storm, which are different than the ones involved in the Ukraine-Russia war, which are different than, you know, you name your contingency.

So I think that there were three critical elements or interlocking failures that define the outcome of Venezuela.

What are your concerns? And if folks are handing out money, what's the kind of money the US Air Force is going to need?

From your standpoint, what are the lessons from this conflict? And what do they tell us about the future of air power? Is this a more sort of realistic model than all of those folks who are trying to divine a lot of lessons exclusively from the Ukraine circumstance, which is unique with neither side achieving air superiority?

Yeah, well, I think that's one of the lessons, Vago, to jump right in here.

People are learning the wrong lessons from the Ukraine-Russia war, at least some people are, by hopping on this horrible term, which is so ubiquitous that it really doesn't make a whole lot of sense anymore, and that's the term drone, because it doesn't define what you're talking about.

I mean... drones can be anything from a small micro vehicle that's operating inside this room that I can't hear, but it's recording everything I'm saying, up to 80,000 pound vehicles.

So contributing to a lot of the, Curious thoughts that are spuriously running around saying that we've seen the end of air power is ridiculous because misuse of terminology that is an imprecise descriptor that encompasses a wide range of what uninhabited aerial vehicles and munitions with varying capabilities and applications can do.

and its ambiguity obscures the distinctions between small hobbyist drones military aircraft cruise missiles and munitions which leads to misunderstandings and inaccurate perceptions so all of that said there's a lot that can be taken away from what we've seen unfold and that is that fundamentally when applied strategically air power can achieve real measurable results with dramatically reduced risk and cost and provide strategic advantages not otherwise achievable.

And that's what we saw.

but let me

There's a larger question of will Iran's ambitions to be a nuclear state really, uh, be hampered for a longer term, uh, kind of timeframe? What's your take on that given the 400 kilograms of enriched uranium that currently is missing in action?

Um, yeah, Lisa, actually that's a, that's a great question.

Um, at a fundamental level, uh, nuclear capability consists of three essential components.

Um, and Israel and the United States has targeted each of them.

Uh, the first one's human expertise, uh, and that's the knowledge required to design and construct a, uh, nuclear weapons resides in a small cadre of specialized scientists and engineers, and Israel's made a concerted effort to neutralize that capability.

Then, as you mentioned, there's the fissile material.... um, m- most importantly, u- uranium enriched to weapons grade levels.

Right now, there are 400 to 500 kilograms of enriched uranium that still exists in Iran, um, but strikes on the enrichment sites at Fordow and Natanz have s- severely, uh, disrupted the ability to process it further.

What's your sense of whether this, uh, action by the United States acts as a, as a deterrent or not to other states that might be contemplating nuclear status or, uh, incursions into other areas around the world?

part 45 billion dollars a year how is that distributed across modernization readiness personnel

Great question, JJ.

First, let me emphasize that, look, the Air Force and the Space Force leadership have recognized these challenges and they've made the pleas for increased funding.

But remember, they're not the ones that have anything to do other than making the request for the allocation of funds.

That's largely outside their control.

And the Air Force, I would tell you, does have a constructive modernization plan.

Let me kind of run through it just briefly.

And then, you know, there were folks who say, well, look, do you need as many tankers if you're going to buy less manned aircraft? What's this dynamic end up looking like, Dave? And how does the Air Force do this? if it doesn't necessarily have these ready capabilities? And John, we're going to turn to you in just a second, so thanks for being patient.