decision.

Now, what we have now is a very problematic situation for the Saudis, because I don't think that the Houthis will be willing to stop the war unless there will be lifting of blockade by the Saudis.

So that leaves the Saudis with two problematic options.

One is to capitulate to the Houthis and actually accept the control on most of areas in Yemen, and of course lifting the blockade in a way that will allow the Iranians to strengthen them dramatically.

all continuing the war itself.

Now, definitely they have the support of the Pakistanis and the Turks, many on the defense, and now we have also the Brits and the French and the Greeks helping them.

But the problem is that they have so much to lose because at the end of the day, as we see, the Houthis with their strategic abilities are able to hit strategic sites in Saudi Arabia.

Danny, what do you think? Is he going to do that? I mean, they keep denying it, but what will happen?

But is yours the consensus view?

That is a good question.

Again, I have to say that I don't know.

I know that it's not a consensus within the Israeli Republic.

I think after the 7th of October, people are moving to the right.

Our leadership keeps telling them we cannot trust the Arabs in general, so we cannot reach an agreement with them, so no agreement with Al-Sharaa or Aoun or whatever.

So that, I think, definitely is a consensus, and it is very unfortunate.

And so your country has suffered a lot of damage reputationally.

Can we talk about why Israel still considers that there is a threat emanating from Syria, given that the regime that it once considered threatening has fallen? Why this very offensive approach when the Assad regime, which is no longer there, and when the current Syrian government has indicated that it wants a diplomatic solution with Israel? What's the real motive for Israel for conducting a military campaign in Syria post-Assad?

Bashar al-Assad, he wasn't the favorite leader in the eyes of Israel, but Israel supports him because Assad served the Israeli interest.

He didn't reply against our attacks in the short of our campaign against Iran and Syria.

And he was weak, so he couldn't threaten the state of Israel.

So Israel actually preferred Assad.

People tend to forget that even before Assad was toppled, Israel tried with the Russians to reach an agreement with Bashar al-Assad to help him but in one condition, that it will disconnect its connection with the axis of resistance.

So obviously Israel was in favor of Bashar al-Assad staying in power.

Is it possible for Israel, do you think, to press on its military offensive in Syria without U.S. support?

second question is, if Mr. Eisenkot or another opposition figure comes to power, can we see a reversal of this escalation trend?

Again, two important questions.

First, for the first question, according to polls in Israel, the majority of people in Israel suspect that Netanyahu is embedding political considerations in his security policy.

So the question is, yes, there is a possibility that in order to change or to improve its situation in Nepal, that Netanyahu would prefer to do...

I don't want to start a war, but he can make actions to increase the tension in the region that might help him politically, because thus it will strengthen his military or security posture, like happening now in Turkey.

Like you said, I told Erdogan, I'm going to do this, I'm going to do that, we're going to allow you, whatever.

So it allows him also to play the security card.

How do you evaluate this development of this Mecca Pact, and how does it sit with the UAE-Israel-Greece-Cyprus so-called

The American position is, "No, it has to be complete, open, free, unimpeded access." Who is going to give in here?

[laughs] Uh, Fareed, thank you for inviting me.

And yeah, like you said, there is an impasse.

Uh, but eventually, I don't think that the Iranians will forgo the control over the Hormuz straits, even if the US would escalate.

So the ball is in the administration court and mainly in Trump's, President Trump's decision-making process, saying that eventually it can escalate, but no one is securing the fact that Iran will capitulate.

Or it can ca- eventually allow Iran some sort of a control over the straits.

Definitely, Iran, uh, is allowing to control at least the entrance to the straits, and this is something that Iran is aspiring to.

The UAE is backing a kind of Israel-American hard line against Iran, and the Saudis seem to be, uh, trying to make, you know, a, a, have at least good talks with Iran, and at the same time banding with countries like Turkey, Pakistan, and even Qatar, wh- their once enemy, for this more balanced approach where they're saying, "We're talking to all sides."

Is there any way the Americans avoid this?

Well, again, um, I think what you describe is what is happening in behind the scene.

I think that they...

From the Iranian side, it's important to reach agreement with Oman because it give them some sort of, uh, legal structure they can use.

They don't want to perceived as a country that actually are, are working against international laws, but of course, they're demanding the control over the strait.

So for them, the, uh, agreement with Oman is a good getaway, uh, to explain, "Look, that we and Oman are controlling the strait.

This is what we agreed upon.

Um, I, I, I've spoken to kind of Iranians who know, who I think kind of know stuff, who say, "Well, this guy, I don't know." Um, who i- who is Mohammad Bagher Qa- Qalibaf? Um, is he a reliable source? Um, and, and what does this say about, about stability inside the regime?

But what can they offer next? What can they do vis-a-vis the American administration? Obviously, they cannot do nothing vis-a-vis Iran.

Yeah, again, you're right.

And I want to say something about, you know, the two elements that really lost during this war.

One is the Iranian public, that actually no help is on its way, on the contrary.

And the second are the Gulf states.

It's a loser situation for them.

Nothing good will come out from this war, if any.

But also what proactively can be done and not in a military way in order to change perceptions, in order to strategically plan for a better future.

What's your assessment on this? How has this war changed the relationship between Washington and Jerusalem or Tel Aviv? Uh, and is it long-term, this change?

Well, definitely until the war, the relationship were very good.

I think Netanyahu actually was, uh, highly dependent on, on Trump because he's actually the last, I think, foreign leader that he can actually speak to.

And, um, and definitely when it's a US president, it has a lot of benefit from the US side and also from the Israeli side.

And also, uh, Netanyahu depending on Trump personally because of everything related to the, uh, the pardon, um, uh, discussion, uh, regarding his trial.

But the problem is for Netanyahu is that he forgot one thing.

Trump likes quick wins.

You know, how many times have they lied to or evaded inspections? So how do you construct a nuclear oversight program that the rest of the world can have confidence in?

What exactly, regime change in the war from Khamenei to the folks who were running the country, what Who are they really? And are they really harder line? Is that a relevant

term? It's a very good question because actually we're seeing what happened in the last couple of days.

That's actually highlighting for us the fact that Iran has changed.

you know, attacking Israel for attacking Beirut.

This is, again, another dramatic change.

It's actually another indication for what I claim in the article.

Basically, I'm not saying that Ali Khamenei was a good guy or a pragmatic guy.

Exactly what do you mean? Because it prompts the issue of Lebanon, and I want to spend a minute or two on that before we move to the end.

How big, how big a rift is there now? Is there a real division between Israel and the US' goals? Does Israel want an agreement, or does it just wa- just want kind of chaos in Iran?

Iran?Definitely the alignment now between the US administration and Israel.

Israel is hoping for no agreement.

For Israel, no deal is, uh, better than a bad deal, and I'm sure that Israel is trying to pressure the president not to reach a deal because a deal will block Israel path to an, to an attack, continuous attack in Iran.

But even worse than that, Netanyahu cannot challenge President Trump out in the open like he did to President Obama.

So the problem that Netanyahu has, that if Trump will reach an agreement, then nobody will challenge this agreement in the future regarding the US political, uh, sphere.

So Netanyahu has problem in that regard, so he's trying to do his utmost to prevent any deal.

Uh, outline why you think that.

Explain what you mean by that.

Yeah, again, thank you very much for having me.

I'll try to explain that, I'll try to really, uh, highlight what I meant with this, uh, tweet, uh, or in, in X.

Uh, actually, we have to remember what was the purpose, uh, of, uh, of this campaign.

First and foremost, to topple the regime

regimeUh, this is why for the first time in history, Israel decapitated a leader of another country.

Now, where we're standing right now is an agreement that if it will be signed, actually will strengthen the same regime that we wanted to topple.

How is that viewed within the regime?

I- if the United States holds firm, do you think there's an opportunity for not only China, but other countries, including India, who have been able to get their vessels through and their oil through and delivered, for them to now put more pressure on Iran with this blockade, preventing them from receiving the oil they so desperately need?

Well, in, just in terms of the Iranian strategy, and it's so important to say, to, uh, say the fact that they are...

They know they're gonna suffer, but they believe that the world will suffer more, and quickly.

Because we should remember that Iran has, uh, the upper hand in the way that in the last 40 daysTheir, uh, tankers sold oil and, uh, they got the waivers from the, uh, American administration.

And of course, the price of oil was high, so they earned a lot of money.

So they had this kind of cushion until they would feel actually the blockade.

And they, they actually, uh, think that, uh, time works for them and not against them, in, against them in a way that until they would feel the pressure, at the end of the day, uh, the, uh, implication, the s- the first, second and third order implications on e- every one of us in terms of what's happening in the Hormuz Straits will actually pressure the US to stop this blockade.

So is this the president i- in your opinion trying to justify, um, the regime change that he, whether, you know, depends on the day you ask him, whether he initially sought for in the launch of this war or not? And why is Ghalibaf not the Delcy Rodriguez of Iran?

Am I wrong?

No, no, you're absolutely right.

And I think it highlight the fact that, again, this campaign was based on the flawed understanding regarding Iran.

President Trump thought that it's like Venezuela.

You can threat, you can kill Khamenei, you can find a Delcy Rodriguez, Iranian Delcy Rodriguez.

But at the end of the day, Iran is not Venezuela.

And they reta-retaliate.

Why do you think they'll now make a dash for it?

Yeah.

Because, actually, I know the American Intel community.

I was a liaison officer for the DIA for three years in Washington.

I know CENCO very well.

They are amazing in their professionality.

But the thing is that it's not trickling down to what I see from illustration, but don't go far away.

I don't think that also in Israel.

Zooming out to the region as a whole, can you tell us where you expect things to land after this war ends in terms of Israel's relationships with the other players, with the countries in the Gulf, and how they, those countries, are likely to react to the changed circumstances on the other side of this war, however it ends?