What do you make of these developments?

Yeah, I think...

Anybody that thought President Trump was ever seriously going to help Ukraine was naive or allowed themselves to be fooled.

He has never.

really seriously contemplated helping Ukraine defeat Russia or even do anything more than surrender what they demanded.

And if you go back to the opening week of this Trump administration, Secretary Rubio, his opening comment about how they were going to end the war in the first 24 hours, Rubio said Ukraine is going to have to give up some land.

I mean, that was the opening comment.

I feel like we're in a position where the biggest loser out of the Europeans turning on Russia without America's support would be the Europeans that are already in a really bad position economically.

Now tell me what I'm committing my country to." What military outcome would you ask that leader to pursue?

Well, President Zelensky himself said winning equals total restoration of Ukraine sovereignty.

That means no Russian soldiers still inside Ukraine, still occupying Ukrainian territory, still, uh, holding a gun to the heads of Ukrainian civilians, and yes, of course, that includes Crimea.

So that's what winning is.

Now, um, there are other aspects of it that would include, um, holding, uh, Russians accountable for their war crimes, anyone that was responsible for the murder of civilians, for example, uh, or in the, in the chain of command of the people launching missiles against, uh, civilian infrastructure.

It would also mean bringing back the 20,000 Ukrainian children who have been kidnapped and dispersed around Russia, and then it would, it would have to include something about, um, not reparations, but something to help pay for the reconstruction of all the damage in Ukraine.

But that's, that's the end state and, and I think actually those four things almost nobody in Europe, no leader says, "Uh, that's not really important." Um, everybody knows those are important.

Right.

But are we now entering a dangerous new phase of this war or is hitting Russia's energy industry exactly what Ukraine should be doing?

The only thing that Ukraine should do differently is hit it harder.

I mean, this really is the path to victory, I think, for Ukraine.

The problem is scale.

They just don't have enough scale or capacity yet to hammer away at Russia's oil and gas export industry to achieve the decisive effect that's needed.

I think the United States has, we're down real close to zero credibility now in Ukraine, at least this administration is.

They don't do, they haven't delivered hardly anything since the Trump administration came into office and all the pressure is on Ukraine to please stop attacking Russia's diesel.

The U.S. had sanctioned to cut off money from flowing

say right well you fight with what you

have But on the other hand, there clearly is an innovation ethic on the Russian side where they're able to do things.

It's a sort of a technology race with the Ukrainians.

Who can come up with this thing and then who can counter it? And then who can counter the counter? And so there's a little bit of a lag between both sides, but I mean, I think most Ukrainian soldiers would tell you that, okay, wow, the Russians have got this thing that we can't stop.

The Russians have always been better than us at electronic warfare.

And I get that from a Ukrainian friend who highlights that to me.

But I remember even when I was a young officer a very long time ago in West Germany in the Cold War, The Soviets had much, much better electronic warfare capabilities than we did to jam, to intercept and so on.

vastness

Why has the world, and not just the world, why is the Western alliance not mobilized in that same way and why are we not seeing the global character of this war and threat?

Well, I'm afraid that part of the problem is that the President of the United States is much more interested in being dear friends with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un than he is with the Prime Minister of Canada or the leaders of NATO countries.

His administration actively undermines the cohesion of the alliance.

And so this is a problem.

It's a problem for all of us.

And it's embarrassing for me as an American that our government, our administration is taking the approach it is towards this global threat.

Having said that, Europe.

It seems to me month by month, Russia is becoming more of a malignant threat to Europe, to NATO and to our eastern border.

I feel there's a lot of debate in our community about whether or not these attacks are really just about Ukraine and getting Europe to stand down its support for Ukraine, or if Russia has broader ambitions with what it's doing?

Okay.

Well, to start, there's three quick things.

Number one, Russia is at war with the West already.

I mean, this has been going on for a couple of years.

Not war like what they see in Ukraine, but nonetheless, the use of everything except tanks and Iskander missiles against European countries.

You listed some of them.

And so what do you think about what Shawshank said about maybe that's a vulnerability we can put some pressure on?

How severe is this moment?

Well, certainly for the Saudis, uh, it's a very severe moment.

Uh, they don't have a way to export their product.

Uh, and that's gonna affect not only them of course, but the rest of the, the world markets.

But the thing is, the Saudis have an enormous amount of military capability, at least in terms of equipment, that they have bought from the United States.

Um, now is we're gonna find out if they know how to use it, if they have forces that are properly trained and can push back what the Houthis, uh, are doing in Yemen.

[whoosh] General Hodges, what stands out from that, aside from the fact that I know you've never heard a commander say any such thing?

Yeah, I don't know any commander that's never been worried about does he have enough resources.

Was it, in your experience, being used to do missions which were not appropriate for it?

This is a very, very good question, and not one that's easily answered, of course.

I think that the key, and I'm going to sound a little bit like a scratched record, but if you don't get the strategic objective right, it's almost impossible to get the policy right, because the policies are what you do that you implement to achieve the objective.

In Afghanistan...

The objective was very clear, make sure that Afghanistan cannot be a base for training or launching future attacks by al-Qaeda against the United States or our allies.

If we'd have left after the first six, eight months, we would not even be talking about it on this podcast.

It would have been done.

Please share them with us.

So as someone who's based in Germany and has a lot of experience there from a military standpoint, how do you feel about that in the bigger scheme of things right now?

Well, you know, my friends and neighbors are very concerned about what's happened because it feels like a part of Germany is drifting back towards the past.

And so they're worried.

They all... you know, everybody my age and younger grew up in a system during the Cold War and an education system that talked about the bad, the evils of communism and Russian alignment and the good things about a liberal democratic society.

And so what they see now is that that's at risk.

What they can't, and they're trying to understand how did it happen? What caused this? And part of it, of course, was concern over excessive influx of migrants.

But I don't know how valid that is because actually the parts of Germany, the Bundesländer, the states that have the lowest numbers of immigrants are the former East German countries, States like Sachsen-Anhalt.

Why isn't NATO doing that?

Do you think Europe is properly stepping up? And do you think it is coming together from a political perspective, which was always a real difficulty in trying to coordinate things? You must have seen that whenever you were commanding US forces across Europe and the frustration that there would have been in dealing with different European countries and different European leaders and their attitudes to defence and to the military?

Well, there's no doubt that there is a significant increase in defense spending.

That's clear.

In most countries, people have awakened political leadership, awakened to the realization that we're going to have to invest more into defense and all aspects of defense because of what Russia is doing.

And because of the uncertainty of what the U.S. is actually going to do.

What's not so clear to me is that there's a sense of urgency there.

to really get ready to defend yourself.

Can you give us an understanding from your perspective?

Did it seem like any sort of progress was made? Was anything, did anything come from it?

What a colossal waste of time and resources.

We've got – the United States has two negotiators that are – neither of whom are professional diplomats.

They have been completely played by the Russians from the very beginning.

They both come across as naive, with no self-awareness of what's going on.

embarrassing, slobbering praise to Putin whenever they meet.

It's humiliating, frankly, for the United States.

What goes through your mind when you see an American president treating an ally worse than Vladimir Putin?

General Hodges, may I start with you? Do you agree with Senator Tillis, who has come out and obviously speaking so bluntly here, saying that Defense Secretary Hegseth needs to go?

Well, I have to say I'm glad that members of the Congress, people like Senator Tillis, are finally speaking out.

They have constitutional responsibility for oversight, Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution.

And the Senate Armed Services Committee has pretty much stood by while so much damage has been done to our military, to include the hollowing out of Army leadership.

And the picture you showed of all those generals and admirals who have been sent off by the Secretary of Defense, you talk about some of the most tough war fighters, lethal people like C.D. Donahue and Randy George and Jim Bingus.

These people know they are the warrior ethos.

So I don't understand why the secretary sends him away.

General Hodges, how significant is this reporting that Max has?

Is this a step backward or could this be an isolated skirmish and the status quo continue from here?

I don't know if it's like a new phase or if this is isolated.

I am pretty sure, though, that the IRGC still has more launchers and mines and other weapons that are in varying levels of capability that are hidden.

And so this will go on for quite some time as CENTCOM continues to look for these things.

But, of course, this is all happening inside a political context.

And there's pressure on the U.S. government because of our own approaching midterm elections.

And perhaps after November and after we know the results, then maybe the pressure will will seem much less.

How do you interpret that visit and that messaging? General, is this about to be a breaking point for Russia?

But what, what are your thoughts?

Well, you know, there was a, a couple of quotes that came from Lavrov that came out over the weekend where he, he b- he did everything except say, "Yes, of course, that drone in Leipzig was from us," because he talked about we are going to destroy all the things that support Ukraine in this war.

I mean, those are the words of Lavrov, and, and the, the drone that failed to go off there in Leipzig, of course, was very close to one of these big, gigantic Antonovs that was loaded with ammunition going to Ukraine.

So, um, I, I think that the alliance has a role here i, is, in terms of being a, uh, um, framework and, and, um, a platform for discussing how, how do we respond, but the nations still have to respond.

They have to protect their airspace as well.

It can't be a NATO only.

It has to be a national response.

I, I, I don't wanna be, you know, too negative here, but are these lessons being learned? Are they starting to be incorporated? Because we now have ample evidence that the traditional way of doing things, um, is simply not viable in the drone age.

If a ceasefire eventually holds there, what does a battle-hardened military, specifically one with combat experience, look like when it turns its attention north towards the Baltics?

Well, this is a great question because everybody in Europe is speculating about what comes next.

And obviously, a lot of what comes next will depend on how does the war in Ukraine end.

If, in my view, if Ukraine is successful, defeats Russia, Russia is forced to move back to live inside their own borders.

including, of course, Crimea returning to Ukrainian sovereignty, then I think Russia will be so battered and there will be political things happening that would affect any potential situation further Russian aggression, let's say, against Baltic countries.

If Ukraine fails, that will only be because Europe, the U.S. and Canada and others failed to help Ukraine.

And I think that emboldens Russia because then they will look across and see a NATO perhaps or a coalition that is not not together and not ready to defend.

Can you explain this idea to the audience? And does this skepticism hold in the same way in the Baltics, say where Article 5 is supposedly a tripwire? Or do you think the proximity to NATO's actual borders changes Moscow's calculus?

Give me a, first a sense of bottom line, what is the state of the war right now? I don't wanna make it something as simple as who is winning, but what does it look like to you?

Well, Fareed, uh, it's clear that the Russians can no longer, uh, conquer territory.

The Ukrainians have figured out how to stop Russia's ground offenses.

Uh, Russia's navy is no longer a factor in the Black Sea.

Uh, but the one thing the Ukrainians have not been able to stop is Russia's relentless, uh, missile attacks against Ukrainian cities.

Uh, there's just, they don't have enough of the air, air and missile defense capabilities.

And Russia has decided to, to try and put pressure on Ukraine by just attacking cities and destroying the, the power grid.

Uh, they're not in good shape.

What would Egypt getting involved mean for Iran and for the overall war right now?

Well, I think that, uh, Iran realizes that the United States, uh, has reached the limits of what it can achieve with military power alone, and I think Iran has also decided that it's in their interest to have some sort of a controlled confrontation versus a ceasefire.

They have, they have more leverage that way.

And so by striking, uh, if it was Iran that struck Damietta, or one of their proxies, what they're doing, of course, is spreading the potential economic impact of this war, which would raise pressure on the Trump administration.

I mean, where does this go from here?

Well, of course you're, you're asking me to try and provide a logical analysis of, of a strategy that is, uh, makes no sense, of what the administration has been doing thus far.

And I think honestly at this point, uh, the administration is gonna have to seriously consider, uh, a restart.

I mean, to back away from this, maybe even take the temporary loss, uh, or the embarrassment and start over.

What do you think's happening here?

Well, Erin, that's a very strange choice of words to say that we were somehow surprised while we've been at war with Iran now for several months, and certainly all of our air defenders and Air Force have been watching for just this kinda thing.

So to characterize it as a surprise attack is strange.

But it also reminds us that Iran still has a lot of capability despite Secretary Hegseth and others claiming that Iran has been obliterated.

And then it also makes you wonder why the Pentagon is characterizing or categorizing casualties that happened in Jordan before as if that's not connected to the war.

Clearly, the I- Iranians don't see it the same way.

What do you think about the commander in chief's... m- m- how he's handling it and, and, and his understanding frankly of the reality of the war?

Well, uh, obviously what he's saying is disconnected from the reality of what's happening in, in the strait.

General Ben Hodges, so, you know, in the, in the context of what Kevin's reporting, right, Trump talking about opening the, the skies, the gates, I'm sorry, opening the gates of hell, even as he calls the war a, quote, unquote, "skirmish." Okay? And, uh, so, so what do you think is really happening here?

Well, of course, the administration, uh, has lost the narrative here.

They're, they're trying to create a narrative that minimi- that would minimize voter concerns.

But the fact is, because the administration, the president and the secretary of defense specifically, have trouble being truthful and explaining what is going on, and also they cannot articulate why, then you end up with, uh, movie language like, uh, gates of hell versus clearly articulated strategic end state.

What do you think when you hear that?

Well, of course it's ridiculous.

Now, I mean, no serious person listening to that believes that the president heard that from these soldiers.

This is not how soldiers talk [laughs], by the way.

General, what do you make of that announcement from the defense secretary?

Well, first of all, I, I don't think it's a testosterone deficiency that causes, causes us to be stuck, uh, in the Strait of Hormuz right now, why we have not been more successful there.

And I, I think, um, you can see where this is going, this idea of looking or measuring for sufficient testosterone.

Uh, that is not connected to the reality of the modern battlefield.

Uh, the women and men of the US Armed Forces that are so effective at their jobs, um, is- don't need [laughs] testosterone supplements to be better.

Uh, it's just not connected to the reality of the battlefield.

There, there's a lot of reporting on this, that the President of the United States would still be saying maybe this was just AI.

Well, Erin, this is embarrassing.

Why, why do you say it's not gonna happen? You know, why do you say that that fear was over, over-exaggerated?

over-exaggerated?You know, the, uh, the Soviet Union lost a war in Afghanistan despite having thousands of nuclear weapons.

We lost a war in Afghanistan and in Vietnam despite having nuclear weapons.

So you have to think about what kind of nuclear weapons are we talking about? Why would they use a nuclear weapon? What would they expect to achieve for the use of a nuclear weapon? And the fact is, for Russia, the only real benefit of their nuclear weapons is the threat that they might use one, because just like you described your own feelings about it, they know that many people in the West are terrified of the possibility of a nuclear conflict.

So the Russians about every two weeks would send Medvedev out there or somebody to talk about, "We're gonna nuke Warsaw," or, "We're gonna nuke London," or, "We may have to use a nuclear weapon," and that's just to get us, uh, anxious about it.

But when you start thinking about why, I mean, what, what benefit would there be to Russia if they actually used a nuclear weapon? Of course, you have strategic nuclear weapons, the big ones that are aimed at, you know, Washington, DC, New York, uh, major targets across the United States, the intercontinental ballistic missiles.

But they're not gonna use one of those against Ukraine.

What specific decisions would make this summit most consequential for the Ukrainian war, for the battlefield there in Ukraine? What do you think has to happen in terms of air defense, ammunition, long-range strike, you know, industrial production, all this stuff, to change the trajectory of the war rather than keep things on the way they've been, just kind of helping Ukraine endure the war, but actually to change the, the, the trajectory?

I- if Europe had to do a lot more of the heavy lifting, and I think it does include actual heavy lifting, what, what would the big, uh, gaps that Europe would have to fill without America?

So of course, thank goodness you've got Ukraine that's out there providing a, a shield and, and, and time for the rest of Europe, and hopefully, um, Ukraine becomes a part of the alliance.

But at least for now, uh, you've got Ukraine, and you have to factor that into the calculations.

The gaps that are out there, the one that has always worried me the most is, uh, air and missile defense.

I mean, we cannot even scrape together, um, a handful of Patriots to provide to Ukraine.

So you got Russian ballistic missiles slamming into apartment buildings every night in Kyiv and other major cities.

There is not enough integrated air and missile defense to protect all of our critical infrastructure, airports, seaports, and so on.

Indeed

How healthy or otherwise is NATO at this time, General?

Uh, I would, I would tell you, uh, Nick, that the alliance is still the best defensive alliance in the history of the world.

Uh, we have had big debates and arguments between, uh, members of the alliance since its beginning in nineteen forty-nine.

So, uh, I don't, I don't worry about that.

What I do worry about is the fact that the American president continues to undermine the cohesion of the alliance.

This, this Greenland situation has done more damage to, uh, our relationship with our European friends and with Canada than almost any other thing in the last twenty or thirty years, uh, because people are, are really considering, wow, the American president might actually use force to seize territory of an ally.

But if you put that aside, the fact is, um, the, uh, defense spending that's gone up, the readiness levels, the work that's been done by all the members, training exercises, we're in a much better place than we were even five years ago.

Uh, how do you view the Ukraine conflict? How do you view the resilience shown by the Ukrainians? Should NATO be doing more?

Would you mind sharing what is now your sort of big picture view of the war at the moment? How do you see the situation and what are maybe some of the important things happening that people should be aware of?

Okay.

So I think there's probably three or four, uh, major points that, uh, I would want to emphasize.

Number one, it's, it's clear that the momentum has shifted somehow to the advantage of Ukraine.

Um, that doesn't mean Ukraine's about to win or something like that.

Uh, but the, it-- I think it's become increasingly clear that there's no way that Russia can actually defeat Ukraine.

That this is, this momentum has shifted in part because of the enormous casualties that, uh, Ukraine has inflicted on Russia.

What, what's your explanation for what has actually changed that made this possible? What, what is different now maybe compared to a year ago?

Am I wrong in thinking that this feels like we might be getting somewhere at this point after all these years?

It does feel that, uh, the momentum has shifted in favor of Ukraine.

Um, you know, it's, we're not, we're not getting close to the end, uh, but it does feel like, well, in so many different ways that the momentum has, has shifted.

The obvious, uh, things are, of course, in Crimea, uh, the, the way the Ukrainians have isolated the peninsula and they're making that place untenable for Russian forces.

And now you've got, um, thousands of Russians who are down there for their annual summer holiday are trying to get the hell out of there, uh, and partly because there's no gas, but also because it, it's pretty dangerous there now.

Um, so that, that's a indicator, and that's not something that, uh, Putin will be able to ignore.

Uh, the, the increasingly effective long-range precision strikes that the Ukrainians are launching against Russia's oil and gas infrastructure has not only resulted in gasoline shortages and very, very long queues at gas stations, but it also bites into Russia's ability to finance the war if they're not able to export as much oil and gas to China and India and other customers.

Uh, have you seen any indications that they are building up towards another mobilization, or do they seem to be able to, um, maintain their manpower concerns despite the, the, the casualties that they're suffering on a monthly basis?