Can the parties come back to the table in a meaningful way in this period?

period?Well, yes, they can.

I mean, uh, diplomacy is always something that is available and that, that one should think to resort to, especially when the military tools are of diminishing utility as they are now.

As I say, the Iranians have, as an asymmetrically imbalanced power, then, in other words, the US and US Israel certainly can overmatch the Iranians in conventional military power.

But we've seen the stark limitations of achieving, uh, strategic goals from the air, from standoff strikes.

In fact, the US has not achieved any strategic, uh, goals.

It's had ta-tactical successes.

Barbara, just briefly, the bigger picture, what sort of conversations are happening in places like Washington DC about the reality of asymmetrical conflict? What's been seen between Ukraine and Russia, for example, and now the US facing its own example with the way that Iran has managed to stay in this conflict?

Can the parties come back to the table in a meaningful way in this period?

Well, yes, they can.

I mean, uh, diplomacy is always something that is available and that, that one should think to resort to, especially when the military tools are of diminishing utility as they are now.

As I say, the Iranians have, as an asymmetrically imbalanced power, then in other words, the US and US-Israel certainly can overmatch the Iranians in conventional military power.

But we've seen the stark limitations of achieving, uh, strategic goals from the air, from standoff strikes.

In fact, the US has not achieved any strategic, uh, goals.

It's had ta-tactical successes.

Barbara, just briefly, the bigger picture, what sort of conversations are happening in places like Washington DC about the reality of asymmetrical conflict, what's been seen between Ukraine and Russia, for example, and now the US facing its own example with the way that Iran has managed to stay in this conflict?

We're gonna see the US in a little different way"? Or do you say, "Look, all these states are so joined at the hip with the United States that it's not gonna fundamentally change US-Gulf relations"? Barbara, what do you think?

think?First of all, none of them want to be in the position of having their strategic choices compelled by the attacks of a, of an adversary who is looking to create just such a rift, and arguably was trying to, even as it was targeting, was doing its best to exploit certain preexisting strains within the Gulf family.

So sparing Saudi Arabia seemingly, but really just, just sending withering waves of drones and ballistic missiles towards Abu Dhabi.

I think you may not get the sort of verbiage that from all of them that you hear from the Emiratis doubling down and so forth.

Although the Saudis have as much as said so, doubling down on the relationship with the United States, because they do look at it as larger than the defense relationship.

I think the really tricky part for both the US administration and for these governments is how to do a careful assessment of what post-conflict security in a very technologically different battle space looks like, what the defense structures and presence should look like to reflect that.

These countries over time had a thickening of physical presence of troops, base-like facilities, um, uh, all sorts of defense kit, and offered themselves as such to be the platforms from which the US could range far and wide across different theaters and for different fights.

Barbara, how do you see that?

Some might say concept of a deal here and how it compares to the deal that we had at one point under President Obama.

Well, Antonia, you know, the truth is we there is far more that we don't know about the details of this agreement than what we do know.

And there's a huge narrative war going on between Tehran and Washington.

So you can expect lots of chaff, lots of disinformation, misinformation all the way through to Friday, when presumably we will get a look at the details of this ostensible 14 point plan.

So at this point, it is just a framework.

It is not a JCPOA-like deal on the full set of nuclear issues that fall within Iran's nuclear program.

Iran's program is also at a very different stage than it was in 2015.

Come to Fredericton, stay at Delta Fredericton, and visit Marriott.com to secure your room.

How do you see the pressures, uh, from, uh, the neighboring, uh, countries at the moment, particularly the UAE?

Well, of course, we saw some terrible Iranian attacks on UAE, on their export terminal at Fujairah, and then a, a, you know, a handful of drones, cruise missiles, uh, and ballistic missiles deployed against the UAE, most of which they successfully inter, in, uh, intercepted.

But the, the, the way I look at that, um, the Iranians were sort of laying out for the US to consider that this is what they will do if the US escalates militarily.

And I will say that given the kind of standoff, that is not a, a stable standoff, um, in the, the strait, there's every possibility of an actual military clash and escalation.

But the, the Iranians are expecting, uh, President Trump to take another spin at military pressure.

And so Monday's, um, attacks were a display of what they intend to do in response.

How much has this war affected relations between the Gulf States, in your view?

Well, among the Gulf States, there have been strains evident simply because, um, for the most part, five of the six, uh, Gulf States, um, were subjected to a constant barrage of attacks and, and in the case of the UAE, they received over 60% of those attacks, far more than were directed against Israel, for example.

What about for Lebanese officials? What is the goal for them here?

Well, look, uh, it's true that President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister, uh, uh, Nawaf Salam have been asking since early March, since the onset of the war and the, the devastating campaign, Israeli campaign in Lebanon, they have been asking for direct negotiations or discussions with Israel hosted by the US or, or s- supported by the US.

And Israel had-wave that off.

But given this friction point that Lebani- that the, uh, campaign in Lebanon was providing to the main game, the effort to bring an end to the war, uh, negotiate an end to the war, uh, with Iran, the US did essentially lean on the Israelis for this off-ramp.

And w- you see in the statement that was issued sort of the variance of, of goals, if you will.

Uh, the ambassador, Lebanese ambassador had no room to negotiate.

She simply was there to show up to show the goodwill of the Lebanese government, but she has absolutely no, um, leeway to negotiate over the terms of disarmament.

What is that tension on the ground? Why has it been so difficult for them to contain or control or disarm Hezbollah?

What's, what's your assessment?

Well, I think the, the, the sad truth is that there has not been regime change as such.

There has been a transition in the regime, but it has meant that the IRGC has captured the heights of power, of every element of power.

Um, the supreme leader is, uh, is visible only through statements.

Um, but in any case, uh, doubtful that he will be, uh, less hard line than his father.

Uh, he won't be as powerful as his father was at the end of his life.

Um, and so, uh, as Mike said, it's, it's a very, it's an opaque system and it's very difficult to measure, uh, where it's gonna come out.

How do you see it?