Mm.

It's, it's not clear that you can persuade someone quite very easily of your theory of love 'cause it's all very abstract.

And so I'm thinking, yeah, probably there's just no reason for a non-Christian to be persuaded, uh, a non-Christian like me.

And so, uh, I think that's an important point 'cause the incarnation argument was supposed to work for non-Christians, and I think this one doesn't, or it can't, like in principle.

Uh, a-and so on the, on the disposition account of love, yeah, so I, I, I don't say that, um-It's a consensus that love is, is a disposition of a certain type.

I, I, I do say at least on, on the reliable testimony of a, a philosopher of love who I've talked to, who I've reason to think has read nearly everything in the contemporary analytic philosophical literature on love, Jack Miller, grad student at Oxford, a great guy, um, the, this, uh, the, the view that love is an act of the will is a minority position.

So i-it could be that, you know, I'm giving a minority position and Josh is.

But I wonder, do you have a similar objection that if we follow this logic, then, you know, where does the buck stop? A kind of an argument that, uh, why does it have to be three? If we've, if we've started going, uh, why do we stop at three?