The difference is that the United States then came to the rescue of that country, where now it seems like it's abandoned it.

It's true, but what I mean when I say we need to look at the long game, we need to understand that this is a change in order, as we saw after World War I, World War II and the Cold War.

I mean, you wrote, I think, a really good book, The Post-American World, already in the early 2000s, where you made an argument that we're moving from multilateralism to multipolarity, and I agree with that thesis.

And I still think that the choice stands.

Now, is it a reality that the United States is not leaning into multilateral institutions anymore? Yes, it is a reality in the WHO, with the ICC, with the climate accords, et cetera, et cetera.

Now, how do we salvage the system is the key question.

And the answer that I'm trying to push for is an understanding that the global south or so-called middle powers will have a more important role and get agency in the institutions.

So what are your thoughts about moving science forward and using that as a way to advance your growth? Thank you.

How would you read the battlefront to begin with?

Well, I think there's good news and bad news.

The good news is that Ukraine is doing better politically, militarily, and financially than they have been doing at any time this year.

I'd argue that they've been on top ever since December.

On the battlefield, this means that the killing ratio is about one to five, one Ukrainian for five Russians.

It means that since January, Russia has advanced only 900 square kilometers and Ukraine has taken back 800 square kilometers.

It means that Ukraine is able to hit long range targets in terms of oil refineries and logistical centers.

Do you get the sense that there is any real movement on the negotiation side? Again, when I was in Kiev, the feeling was they were being given the same old offers, that there was no real progress.

What does that look like, and how concerned are you that artificial intelligence will not, as your statement says, "Remain under human direction, oversight, and control"?

Okay.

So what we wanted to do with this initiative was to give the so-called, um, UN wake-up call, and we wanted to do it on three levels.

The first one was to say that in order for us to control this very consequential, uh, technology which has agency, you need, uh- Obviously, uh, control from the companies themselves, uh, and this is what they're talking about.

But secondly, you need governance on a regional and a national level, and thirdly, you need some kind of a global system.

And this is just to kick off the debate and, and perhaps think about, you know, if we have a nuclear agency, should we not have an AI agency? Because I, of course, think that, you know, AI is going to change the economy, the way in which we work.

It changes politics, the way in which we communicate, the war, the way in which we conduct it, and then finally, it changes science and the way in which we are as human beings.

Mm

Is the U.S. coordinating that transition? And is it in a hurry? or are they patient and will manage this transition over years so that Europe can take over conventional? Yeah,

I mean, two answers on this.

Sometimes there seems to be a lot of noise around the transition, and that's kind of, you know, the public discourse about when, what and where.

And of course, you know, politicians usually cause that conversation.

But the other one is then the planning.

And I'm very confident about the planning.

We are in constant conversation with our American friends and the military about our force composure and the way in which we're doing the burden sharing, the planning.

What does that look like, and how concerned are you that artificial intelligence will not, as your statement says, remain under human direction, oversight, and control?

Is the U.S. coordinating that transition? And is it in a hurry? or are they patient and will manage this transition over years so that Europe can take over conventional? Yeah,

I mean, two answers on this.

Sometimes there seems to be a lot of noise around the transition, and that's kind of, you know, the public discourse about when, what and where.

And of course, you know, politicians usually cause that conversation.

But the other one is then the planning.

And I'm very confident about the planning.

We are in constant conversation with our American friends and the military about our force composure and the way in which we're doing the burden sharing, the planning.

What does that look like, and how concerned are you that artificial intelligence will not, as your statement says, remain under human direction, oversight, and control?

It's to read entire texts, and that's something that you did.

Yeah, it takes effort.

And, you know, so two answers.

First of all, I think all of us human beings, you know, we are somehow wired to be out there in the nature.

That's where we find inner peace.

Brent will know because he loves the Norwegian fjords or he loves to go trail running around Paris Mountain.

You're there in relative silence and you're able to rewire and rejig your brain.

losing its moral core.

When it comes to potentially getting to that ceasefire, how much has there been a renewed effort of late because of the very sky-high energy prices?

Part of it, I would argue.

I mean, that's why we see some conversation about Ukraine hitting...

Russian oil refineries, but that's also, of course, linked then to the war in the Middle East.

But I think it's because Ukraine is on top on the battlefield.

So you could say that Ukraine is winning.

I hate to be morbid, but the killing ratio is one to five right now.

How much that dominated the conversations here? It feels like it's been about either conflict or the future of AI.

Glauben Sie, dass Politiker wie Lawrow für diesen Krieg waren oder waren Sie überrascht?

Dazu kann ich Ihnen keine Einschätzung geben.

Das wäre zu spekulativ.

Darüber wird viel nachgedacht, aber unabhängig davon, was die Überlegungen damals waren, glaube ich, dass Russland in drei Punkten einen kolossalen strategischen Fehler gemacht hat.

Erstens hat es das ukrainische Militär und dessen Entschlossenheit unterschätzt.

Zweitens hat es das eigene Militär überschätzt.

Und drittens hat es die westliche Einheit unterschätzt.

Wie ist seine Stimmung in diesen Tagen?

Is that going to be one of the big topics discussed here today? And how do you convince the United States to stay committed to the continent?

Well, I think it's in the interest of both Europe and the United States that we both stay committed.

So what we're trying to do here is to create NATO 3.0, which basically means a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO.

And why are we doing it? Basically in order to salvage the transatlantic relationship.

And what we're now seeing is enormous deals actually on the defense industry in the tens of billions of dollars, both in Europe and in the United States.

So I think we're going in a good direction with all this.

We just need to sort of calm down the language a little bit and make sure that we get things right.

How has it changed for Finland? Two years within the alliance, looking back, was it the right, appropriate move for the country?

there is a lot of concern over sort of the opening of the Pandora's box when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz and what Iran now sees as a tool that they can use to hold the world hostage.

Yeah.

I, I think in the bigger picture, my, my big worry, I mean, what we're now seeing is a world of transaction and deals, and we're also seeing a world in which local conflicts that used to be almost like civil wars have become regional, and then those regional conflicts have global ramifications like the price of oil or the price of food or inflation.

And what does this tell us? I think it tells us that when you don't use multilateral institutions and rules and norms like the United Nations, then you end up having these, it's almost like patchworks of systems which don't last for a long time.

So my argument has been for years already, and especially in a book that I just published, The Triangle of Power: Rebalancing the New World Order, that actually we need to get back to the multilateral track.

We need to rebalance power, give more to the Global South.

We need to reform the United Nations in order to get back to the multilateral track because now we live in a world of disorder, much like they did after World War I, World War II, and as we did after the Cold War.

So do you share the optimism of the other G7 nations, and did President Zelensky share that optimism?

there is a lot of concern over sort of the opening of the Pandora's box when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz and what Iran now sees as a tool that they can use to hold the world hostage.

Yeah, I, I think in the bigger picture, my, my big worry, I mean, what we're now seeing is a world of transaction and deals, and we're also seeing a world in which local conflicts that used to be almost like civil wars have become regional, and then those regional conflicts have global ramifications like the price of oil or the price of food or inflation.

And what does this tell us? I think it tells us that when you don't use multilateral institutions and rules and norms like the United Nations, then you end up having these, it's almost like patchworks of systems which don't last for a long time.

So my argument has been for years already, and especially in a book that I just published, The Triangle of Power: Rebalancing the New World Order, that actually we need to get back to the multilateral track.

We need to rebalance power, give more to the Global South.

We need to reform the United Nations in order to get back to the multilateral track because now we live in a world of disorder, much like they did after World War I, World War II, and as we did after the Cold War.

So it's time to get together because otherwise, uh, things are gonna get out of hand.

So do you share the optimism of the other G7 nations, and did President Zelensky share that optimism?

Or do you hope it will counter? Well, I think

it's almost like there's a natural gravity So I'll give you an example.

When you feel that someone is mistreating you or when you feel there's a security step, say from Russia, what happens in Europe? We kind of huddle together.

Suddenly we become united because we understand that the situation is serious.

And when we see treatment on tariffs, which we feel uncomfortable with coming from the United States, what do we do? We start looking elsewhere.

So we do a trade agreement with Mercosur.

We do a trade agreement with India.

In the context actually, just jumping off that, of Canada and Finland specifically, if you were to describe your best case scenario for the relationship between our two countries in any kind of specific terms, let's say three years from now, five years from now, what would it look like?

What do you think the cause of the change is?

I think there are a few causes to it.

The first one is an assumption that we have that history ended when the Cold War ended in 1989 and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

This classic sort of Fukuyama-esque thought that all 200 nation states of the world will shift towards some kind of liberal democracy, social market economy, and globalization.

So that was a wrong assumption probably because then it made that we became intellectually lazy and refused to change the institutions that basically control the world order like the United Nations or the WTO or the IMF or the World Bank.

The second one is And the argument I make in my book as well is Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, which started in February 2022.

And now the third one is an acceleration of this change with the new American administration.

Do you think that is permanent or do you think it is attached to Trump and the mega movement and could revert back?

Do you see a, a risk stepping right back now for a global, a global war, a, a third sort of world war?

Uh, I wanna tone down the language on that because to talk about a world war is big.

Probably too big for the human mind to understand at this stage in the development of international relations.

What I can say is that after the Cold War, many of the conflicts were local, so they were within the boundaries of a country.

Whereas now we're seeing an escalation to regional wars, Russia, Ukraine, Israel, Palestine, Israel and the US versus Iran, Iran versus the Gulf.

And what we need to do is to work twenty-four/seven to deescalate and make sure that these wars don't spill over further.

The problem is that when you don't have international rules and norms guiding our behavior, conflict is always behind the corner.

I'm interested in whether you think the world, and Europe in particular since that's where we are, needs to face up to the, the very real prospect of a, of a recession coming from the crisis in Iran.

One of the things we've seen in recent days, America lifting some oil sanctions on Russia, which will ultimately put money into Moscow's coffers, which will end up on the battlefields in Ukraine.

That's, again, one of the spillover effects of the war in Iran, is that the oil price goes up, And that, of course, means an oil price going up in the U.S. as well.

Therefore, a lifting of sanctions, with which I disagree, we actually should put more pressure on the Russian economy.

And now, of course, a focus more on Iran than on Ukraine.

So that's why we keep on working with our American friends and, of course, with our Ukrainians to try to bring things back on track.

Because, as a matter of fact, when it comes to the battlefield...

Ukraine is doing much better than it has been in these past four years.

But what does that tell us, I suppose, about President Trump's attitude towards Ukraine and to Russia? Many people, though, look at that and think, well, Donald Trump is siding with the leader of Russia over Ukraine.

Is that a sort of small and, is that a Mark Carney vision of the world?

No, I think Mark Carney and I, we of course speak a lot and, you know, we talk about the changing world order.

The difference that Mark and I have is that he talks about a rupture or destruction of the old order, uh, and I talk about transition because I don't think we should throw the baby out with the bath water.

I sometimes wonder, should I have called it the rectangle of power? [laughs] Because if the US wants to take the Western hemisphere, let's call it the global west, and then call the traditional global west Europe, Japan, Korea, we call it the global north.

But, you know, triangle of power, uh, is what it is.

I think there are two pillars that are in this sort of fight, which are linked to your question.

One is the multipolar one with, uh, Xi Jinping, probably with President Trump, uh, with Putin.

What is your answer to that?

Yeah.

The reason we have one million men and women who've been trained in Arctic conditions, we have-... 62 F-18s.

We just bought 64 F-35s.

We have long-range missiles, air, land, and sea, and we have the biggest artillery in Europe together with Poland.

So I don't wanna hear anyone telling me that we can't defend ourselves.

Um, then as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, I think we still need the US nuclear umbrella.

Uh, NATO is based on three deterrent pillars, and nuclear is one of them.

Hmm.

Yeah.

The reason we have one million men and women who've been trained in Arctic conditions, we have 62 F-18s.

We just bought [exhales] 64 F-35s.

We have long-range missiles, air, land, and sea, and we have the biggest artillery in Europe together with Poland, so I don't wanna hear anyone telling me that we can't defend ourselves.

Then, as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, I think we still need the US nuclear umbrella.

Uh, NATO is based on three deterrent pillars, and nuclear is one of them.

Of course, we have some nuclear weapons in, uh, the UK, obviously in France, but the key umbrella comes from the United States.

Hmm.

How did that play out, and, and how do you see, uh, where we ended up? Has, has the kind of crisis passed, or do you expect further rounds of this?

Well, I mean, i- if we just sort of rewind for the first year of the Trump administration, I think engagement has been the key word, and we've engaged a lot with the US, and I, personally, as president of Finland, have had the, you know, privilege to engage quite often with President Trump, played golf, uh, et cetera, et cetera.

But I by no means want to inflate my role.

Uh, I just have a channel to interpret, say, Zelensky to Trump, Trump to Zelensky, and both of them to European friends.

So I think we've engaged a lot on, uh, defense, NATO, 5% of GDP going to defense.

I, I think part of it is due to circumstance, but part of it is pressure coming from President Trump, and I, I think that was a raving success, what we did in The Hague summit last summer.

We've engaged a lot on peace mediation in, in Ukraine, and, and we've done that.

When you look at Ukraine, how do you see those, those shifting elements, the values, interests, and power, reshaping US policy?

Um, how do you assess, um, where we are in trying to bring this war to a close?

Well, I, I think we're in a good place, and by a good place, I mean that there was sort of a process and a sequence that started, uh, with the national security advisers in Geneva right after the G20 meeting, then moved on to a leaders meeting, uh, in Berlin, and then finally in Paris on the 5th of December.

And I feel that, uh, the US, Ukraine, and Europe, and the coalition of the willing, we're now on the same page.

We have a set of documents, depends on how you count, six or five plus two, [chuckles] I know a different figure, but nevertheless, where, you know, we have security guarantees, we have a 20-point plan, we have a prosperity package, uh, we have sequencing plan, et cetera, et cetera.

And I feel those are in a good place.

And, and from what I hear in the negotiations in, in Miami, um, uh, over the weekend, we've made some progress.

Uh, so I, I think we're in a good place there.

Um, what does NATO need to do to respond? Are they, are they adequately responding to that asymmetric warfare for Russia?

How big of a concern is that? Especially as we just saw Mark Carney go over to Beijing and say they have this new strategic partnership

partnershipYeah, I mean, I, I think, you know, I'm, I'm very pro-European, I'm very pro-American, and I'm a transatlanticist, so it is in my interest and also based on my values that we have a closer relationship with the United States.

That's why I'm also very pragmatic.

I understand that the United States is the number one superpower, and what we need to avoid, of course, is a certain disengagement.

At the same time, I have to say that Europe needs to use this moment as well.

You know, it needs to beef up its defense.

It needs to get stronger economically.

How much longer do you think it will take to get that deal done? Do you think Putin even wants a deal?

Is that how you view this, through that lens?

Well, first of all, the President of the United States has a capacity to deal with a multiplicity of issues at the same time.

I mean, you only look at what's happened this year.

Venezuela, Iran, Greenland, Gaza, the Peace Board, and many other things at the same time.

And of course, add on to that domestic issues.

On the NATO issue, if someone would have told me at the 75th anniversary of NATO in Washington, D.C., in 2024, I think it was, that we are looking at increasing our defense expenditure to 5% next year, I would say, please go and see a doctor or consult the Foreign Affairs magazine, because this is not going to happen.

Now, if at the end of the day after this, what could be called rhetorical escalation, we come up with a stronger Arctic security, then that is good.

How much longer do you think it will take to get that deal done? Do you think Putin even wants a deal?

Russia is really trying to break

Ukraine.

Ukraine, in my mind, is unbreakable, and we've seen that during the four years.

The resolve and what we would say in Finnish, the sisu or perseverance of the Ukrainian people is simply amazing.

From a civilian perspective, it's tragic.

We can never spin it into something positive.

But from a military perspective, keep in mind that in the past 1,000 days, Russia has advanced less than one percentage point of Ukrainian territory.

Can you maintain your optimism in this current situation?

If the US commitment wavers again, how will Finland, how will Europe, uh, insulate Ukraine from that uncertainty?

Well, we work on it together.

Uh, so there are many different elements.

I mean, first we need to continue the financial support, and of course, Europe is doing a lion's share of that, uh, together with the United States.

Secondly, we need to continue the military support in terms of equipment, in terms of co-production, in terms of ammunition.

And then thirdly, we need to continue to keep the financial pressure up, uh, on, uh, on, on Russia, and the EU, the European Union, just issued its 19th sanction package.

So we need to sort of maximize the pressure on Putin, which would then switch his strategic game, because he hasn't changed his strategic game.

Given Finland's position on the border with Russia, how do you balance deterrence with diplomacy?

Do you agree with him?

Well, we have a very strict protocol on how we work in these types of situations.

Obviously we've had many violations of airspace over the years and the protocol that we follow is, is, is very rigid.

Uh, I think you have to look at it, uh, case by case.

I think the basic message right now is that Russia is testing us.

It's testing us with drones, uh, it's testing us with airspace violations, it's testing us with sabotaging underwater cables.

And my message always as a Finn is to first, you know, be calm, cool and collected, uh, look at the situation and then take the decisions.

Do you share that concern and could these... sending his- these drones, uh, into NATO airspace be an indication that that's what he's eyeing?