Looking back now, what do you think that movement genuinely changed about the nuclear debate and why did it fail to change?

Well, what is the theory of change of the TPNW, right? The theory of change is to change the conversation on nuclear weapons and to change the security assumptions around nuclear weapons by making this debate much, much more global and by focusing, rather than projecting and assuming the deterrence security benefit of nuclear weapons, actually asking the question of what would happen if something goes wrong and how big are the risks that are going wrong.

So I would say it has had a profound impact on the nuclear debate.

It has had an absolute huge effect in terms of democratization of the nuclear debate and giving agency in the global conversation about nuclear weapons.

I always make the point in TPNW meetings to listen to the statements of the so-called small country, those who are structurally disenfranchised in the nuclear weapons debate because it's sort of the developing countries, it's not their issue.

Since the humanitarian consequences focus and the recognition that even though they may have done absolutely everything right on the nuclear weapons issue, they have signed all the treaties, they are part of nuclear weapon free zones, it still doesn't help.

they would still be impacted by nuclear weapons in the most serious way.

How serious do you think that divide has become?

And Alexander, sitting in a non-nuclear weapons state, what is your assessment of the state of play within the P5?

First of all, I agree with what Tom said earlier, that what we saw at the review conference is a reflection of where we are.

And I think that is from the non-nuclear weapons state's perspective, that is a very depressing and disconcerting state of affairs.

And of course, the P5 process is also a reflection of that.

Because you are specifically from the non-nuclear weapon states perspective, we look at the P5 process as an indicator of what might be able to be agreed upon.

It was initially started to coordinate positions with respect to nuclear disarmament.

It was the P5 agreeing what they would be able to agree to, in particular with respect to Article 6.

That's what I hope changes between now and the next review conference.