A
Alberto Mora
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Jun 12, 2026
From Torture to Trump: How the Expansion of Executive Power after 9/11 Eroded Accountability and the Rule of Law
4:00
4:14
4:25
M
3:47Madhav KhoslaHOST
When did you realize that that framing was inadequate? And what did that reveal about how lawyers inside government understand the institutional role?

Alberto MoraGUEST
The interrogation and really detainee management and handling activities were classified as operational activities during the war, meaning that it was handled through military channels, really not through the Department of the Navy channels.

Alberto MoraGUEST
The departments, all the military departments, are entrusted with training, equipping, and then providing combat-ready forces to the combatant commanders who actually deploy the military.

Alberto MoraGUEST
So I, as Navy General Counsel, had no involvement whatsoever, wasn't even copied on correspondence or memoranda concerning anything dealing with the detainees.
12 MINS LATER
M
16:13Madhav KhoslaHOST
And how do you understand the relationship between the strategic case and the moral case? And what's your sense about which one perhaps proved more effective within government?