And so then, Professor Nielson, you have Seila Law, which is a direct attack on Humphrey's Executor, but the chief certainly stops short of overturning Humphrey's. Or does he?

Or, or does he? So, in SEILA law, that is about the CFPB, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Uh, it's not a direct attack on Humphrey's Executor. Humphrey's Executor is the Federal Trade Commission, so it was a multi-member commission. What you had with the CFPB was, uh, an agency that had almost the same power as the Federal Trade Commission, maybe, maybe more. Um, but rather than having a multi-member commission, it was a single person who the president could not fire and served a term that could be beyond any president's term. So, in theory, a president could run on, "Hey, I want to change the, um, you know, enforcement priorities for the consumer financial protection in- industry area," and never get the chance to do so because the person sitting in that position the entire time was appointed on by somebody else. Um, that was challenged as unconstitutional, um, first in the DC Circuit, um, and in a panel decision written by then-Judge Kavanaugh, found to be unconstitutional. Um, the DC Circuit went en banc on that and said, "No, no, no, this isn't, this is constitutional."Um, now Kavanaugh is elevated. A case is brought in the Ninth Circuit, same theory. The Ninth Circuit says, "We agree with the en banc court." The Supreme Court grants review, uh, and then the court says, actually, essentially, Kavanaugh was right all along. Um, this is unconstitutional. Um, and they do it in a way that's pretty significant because their defense of Humphrey's Executor as part of their analysis was essentially no defense at all. Um, they define the case of Humphrey's Executor in such a way that even the FTC today, and probably even in 1935, would not satisfy the test as they articulate it, um, and then they say, "Well, obviously, the CFPB doesn't satisfy that either." Um, but he did say, um, the chief, he wrote this. He also wrote peekaboo. He said, "But there has to at least be significant executive power, um, before the president's removal kicks in." Um, fast-forward to Collins the next year, um, this is, um... I know Collins very well. I was court-appointed amicus in Collins. Um, so Department of Justice did not defend the constitutionality of the Federal Housing Finance Agency. When that happens, the Supreme Court appoints somebody to do that. I was the one appointed to defend the agency, so I was sitting at home in Utah, and I got an email, um, "Would you like to defend this agency?" "Sure." Um, y- what do you do? Uh, you don't go zealous very often in this world. Um, so I put together a team of students. Um, Professor Chris Walker was my co-pilot on that one, um, uh, here from Michigan, and we had two months to put together a merits brief, um, to defend, um, FHFA, and we took all of the stuff that the chief had left in Seila law, all the ways to distinguish, um, other agencies, like the Social Security Administration, um, the Office of Special Counsel, and the FHFA, um, which he said are much less executive power than the F... than the CFPB. We used all of that. We put it all in, and we went to the court, and Justice Alito writes, um, and he essentially says, "You know, all those limitations that the chief put in, Seila law, they are not actually limitations." Um, so, you know, the chief suggested significant executive power in, in Seila law, and Justice Alito said, "That's not, not the test. That's not workable, any executive power." Um, and we said, "Well, wait a minute. Unlike the CFPB director, the head of the FHFA, the president can fire for a cause. And that's it, just for a cause. So if the president doesn't think a- anything this person is doing isn't very good, including insubordination to the president, the president can fire that person." And the court says, "That's probably what for cause means, but even so, it's not at will, so that's unconstitutional too." Um, so then we said, "Well, if this is unconstitutional, what are you gonna do about agencies that have a... multi-member agencies, but the head, you know, the chair is separately appointed and has his or her own statutory powers?" In other words, essentially its own little agency within an agency. Um, and the court says, "That's not in front of us." Uh, and that was the extent of the defense of any of it. So, you know, when we say d- did they overrule Humphrey's Executor, not in so many words, but that's where we are.

I mean, shockingly took a pro-executive authority view.

You know, in our country, there's few people with more accomplishment than Taft. Um, Taft had been solicitor general of the United States. Um, he had been a circuit judge. He had been president. And he wrote a very scholarly opinion, um, and the Court just tossed it aside. Um, so that's the first line. Like, just say stare decisis. There we go. Now let's go back to, well, wait a minute, if there never would have been a Myers, um, w- was this right or wrong? And it's actually, I think, pretty difficult because the Constitution has a hole in it of, what are you supposed to do with this? So, very early on, you had the decision sent in '89, and you had a big debate, and you had four different camps. One camp was your camp. Maybe you're even more extreme than that camp. But one was Professor Chaffis's camp, which is essentially Congress has to decide all of this. Uh, the other view, Madison's camp, was, hey, removal is an executive power. That is executive. What does it do to say, "You're no longer worked here"? That's executive. So, that's surely within his power. And then you add the take care clause. You put those two together, you end up with something like what we have today, what Taft recognizes in Myers. The other theory then floating out there was the Constitution speaks to this. It's called impeachment. Um, so the only way you can get rid of somebody who's confirmed is to impeach. Um, and then the other would be if it's the president nominates and the Senate confirms and the president nominates... essentially de-nominates and the Senate de-confirms would be the other way of doing it. You had a big debate about it, and the ch- and- and, you know, Madison, who knows a little bit about the Constitution says, "It's this. It's executive power, and you take that with the take care clause, and you end up with something like that." And then we end up with what I call, you know... It's a, it's a law professor term, liquidation. Um, what did people do after that decision? Um, and that is, you know, how did people understand that debate? And the takeaway was Madison was right. Was Madison right? People fight about that.... but Madison, like, he had a lot of people who said that he was correct. And for me, when I was preparing for Collins, um, I looked in nine- in 1860 when they created the Comptroller of the Currency, and they have a debate in Congress. And it's worth reading. Um, it's all in Aditya Bamzai's article, but it's worth reading. And they essentially say what I just said, which was, "Hey, we're trying to put limits on this comptroller, but didn't we decide we couldn't do that?" And they go back and they have a discussion of what happened in 1789, and they said essentially Madison was right. Um, Myers, um, that's what Taft relies on. So you put all that together, I say it's a tough question. I think Madison was right as in terms of constitutional analysis, but I hear other arguments because the Constitution could have done better. But you put that with liquidation and Myers, uh, I think is a pretty open-and-shut case.

Thank you, Counsel.

Mr. Nielsen? Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

I hope to make several additional points, but I want to start with three quick ones.

First, Justice Kavanaugh was right in PDR Network that the Hobbs Act covers a wide variety of orders.

Under Clark v. Martinez, where one provision has multiple applications, the Court applies a lowest common denominator interpretation to all of them.

Even in the D.C.

I wish I could remember it.

Ms. Nielsen?

Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, petitioners don't dispute that their websites are not meant for children, that they harm children, and that children are watching.

The Court faced the same situation with brick-and-mortar stores and applied rational basis to a law limiting adult content to adults.

This case is the digital version of Ginsburg.

Three cases prove the point.

Ginsburg itself applies rational basis where a store can only avoid liability by making, quote, a reasonable, bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of customers.

How does Texas's law fare given those three concerns? Are those genuine concerns? Do you pass them or fail them?