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Yael WexlerPanelist
David OuterbridgePanelist
Andrew BernsteinHost
Jeremy OpolskyPanelist
So, uh, Mr. Drover was appointed, uh, by Elections Canada as the returning officer in the federal electoral riding of Rideau-Carlton, near Ottawa.

At the time, he lived in the town of Stittsville, which is within that riding, and at the time, the Canada Elections Act required that a returning officer had to reside in the riding that they were the returning officer for.

And then a constitutional crisis arose because Mr. Drover moved to Carp.

Uh, so Carp, for those who don't know the Ottawa area, is a few kilometers away-

In case anyone was wondering if David really thinks about the cases [laughs].

I, uh, I, I, I have my doubts about this one, but, uh, if you know Ottawa, you know that Stittsville and Carp are a few kilometers away from each other, but the important fact is that Carp is not in the riding of Rideau-Carlton.

Uh, and so he, Mr. Drover, was no longer eligible under the Canada Elections Act to be the returning officer, and Elections Canada terminated his position as returning officer.

And so as you would, uh, he brought a challenge under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, saying that his right to liberty had been infringed by this statutory requirement, uh, and that he had been deprived of his liberty to move to Carp, uh, in violation of the principles of fundamental justice.

And the applications judge did what I would have done, which is, uh, dismiss the application on the basis that that was not the right analysis.

Uh, two judges ruled that section 7, section of the charter does protect the right of a person to move from Stittsville to Carp, uh, and the dissent ruled in detailed and impassioned reasons that if the right to liberty is so broad that you can't pass a statute creating a, a requirement for a pos- for an employment position or a, a public position, uh, that has some policy basis, that, that, that section 7 is getting out of control and government is being unduly constrained by the charter.

Uh, but in terms of what the majority decided, they, their ruling, uh, was that, uh, section 7 protects, uh, the right to liberty, the right to liberty is all about personal autonom- autonomy and the dignity of the individual, uh, and that personal autonomy includes choices, very personal choices about where you want your house to be and where you want to live.

Uh, and the majority looked at and said, "So liberty interest is engaged.

This person's not free to move if they wanna have this job, and the job is under a statute, so we're, we're under the charter." And then they said, "So the question is, was this restriction in the statute consistent with the principles of fundamental justice?" And they looked at the case law in this area, which is predominantly but not entirely in the criminal law sphere, and in that body of case law, it says that if a statute is vague or overbroad or arbitrary, that those, those types of provisions are contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.

The statute was overbroad because there was another provision in the statute that didn't require the residency requirement for in a similar context, and so they said Parliament recognized that this wasn't actually an important requirement, and therefore it was overbroad and the court should find it to be in violation of section 7 and not reasonably justified under section 1.

So, uh, Mr. Drover was appointed, uh, by Elections Canada as the returning officer in the federal electoral riding of Rideau-Carlton, near Ottawa.

At the time, he lived in the town of Stittsville, which is within that riding, and at the time, the Canada Elections Act required that a returning officer had to reside in the riding that they were the returning officer for.

And then a constitutional crisis arose because Mr. Drover moved to Carp.

Uh, so Carp, for those who don't know the Ottawa area, is a few kilometers away-

In case anyone was wondering if David really thinks about the cases [laughs].

I, uh, I, I, I have my doubts about this one, but, uh, if you know Ottawa, you know that Stittsville and Carp are a few kilometers away from each other, but the important fact is that Carp is not in the riding of Rideau-Carlton.

Uh, and so he, Mr. Drover, was no longer eligible under the Canada Elections Act to be the returning officer, and Elections Canada terminated his position as returning officer.

And so as you would, uh, he brought a challenge under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, saying that his right to liberty had been infringed by this statutory requirement, uh, and that he had been deprived of his liberty to move to Carp, uh, in violation of the principles of fundamental justice.

And the applications judge did what I would have done, which is, uh, dismiss the application on the basis that that was not the right analysis.

Uh, two judges ruled that section 7, section of the charter does protect the right of a person to move from Stittsville to Carp, uh, and the dissent ruled in detailed and impassioned reasons that if the right to liberty is so broad that you can't pass a statute creating a, a requirement for a pos- for an employment position or a, a public position, uh, that has some policy basis, that, that, that section 7 is getting out of control and government is being unduly constrained by the charter.

Uh, but in terms of what the majority decided, they, their ruling, uh, was that, uh, section 7 protects, uh, the right to liberty, the right to liberty is all about personal autonom- autonomy and the dignity of the individual, uh, and that personal autonomy includes choices, very personal choices about where you want your house to be and where you want to live.

Uh, and the majority looked at and said, "So liberty interest is engaged.

This person's not free to move if they wanna have this job, and the job is under a statute, so we're, we're under the charter." And then they said, "So the question is, was this restriction in the statute consistent with the principles of fundamental justice?" And they looked at the case law in this area, which is predominantly but not entirely in the criminal law sphere, and in that body of case law, it says that if a statute is vague or overbroad or arbitrary, that those, those types of provisions are contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.

The statute was overbroad because there was another provision in the statute that didn't require the residency requirement for in a similar context, and so they said Parliament recognized that this wasn't actually an important requirement, and therefore it was overbroad and the court should find it to be in violation of section 7 and not reasonably justified under section 1.
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