Open Talks on EU Enlargement: Irakli Samkharadze and Sara Poli on the Acession Process of Georgia

Sure.

So if I understand well, you think that the current crisis should be understood as a temporary setback and not as a fundamental reshape of Georgia's long-term relationship with the European Union.

Is my understanding right?

Your understanding is absolutely correct, which I fully take and agree.

Short answer, legally, it's still changeable.

Legally, it's still reversible.

But politically, it's actually starting to look incredibly structural.

And I think maintaining kind of both parts of this side is important.

Because from legal perspective, nothing makes the current situation unchangeable.

Georgia remains very deeply connected to the EU through a network of legal commitments.

And let me go back to this later because we obviously have the association agreement with DCFDA.

in place.

So even Article 49 TEU remains available.

There is no treaty provision under which a temporary loss of political momentum would actually end Georgia's European perspective.

Certainly not, but the longer the accession process remains frozen, the greater the risk that the institutional practices diverge from each other is actually real.

So enlargement works not simply because Brussels produces legislation and then government believes that complying with this legislation all the conditions will generally create or generate credible political reward.

It's not the case obviously.

What is important is the procedure and the process and unfortunately the development since 2024 suggest that it is no longer simply a short interruption.

It is continuing even now, because in its enlargement communication in 2025, the Commission spoke again of backsliding across the fundamentals of enlargement, as I've described in the beginning.

saying that Georgia's accession process effectively came to the stagnation point.

It doesn't mean that it will not revive, obviously not, but for the moment we have the situation as described by the Commission.

What is more to mention here is that this trend is continuing even in 2026 lately, and new legislation on foreign funding and political activity adopted in March 2026 by Georgian authorities, which was heavily criticized by the EU, especially by the High Representative, And also, quite recently in May, the EU public message remained that the opportunity for membership still exists, which is obviously great to hear, but the current governmental trajectory is moving Georgia away from it.

This is important to note.

I believe I would not say that Georgia has permanently lost its European future, but I would rather say it is not the case.

But I would equally resist also saying that nothing fundamental has changed.