Aug 5, 2026 · 22 min · 9 segments
**Opinion:** https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-171\new\3dq3.pdf ## Case background Cox Communications, Inc., is an…
Countless people use the internet for legal activities, but some use it to illegally share copyrighted works, such as songs and movies.
The Copyright Act authorizes copyright owners to sue these copyright infringers, seventeen USC Sections five-oh-one-A, five-oh-four-A.
In this case, however, instead of suing those infringers, the copyright owners sued petitioners, Cox Communications Incorporated and its subsidiary, who provided the internet connections that the infringers used.
They contended that Cox was itself liable for copyright infringement because it continued to provide known infringers with internet access.
Based on this theory of infringement, respondents, Sony Music Entertainment and other major copyright owners, secured a billion-dollar verdict against Cox.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that because Cox provided internet service to known infringers, it was a willful infringer itself.
Under our precedence, a company is not liable as a copyright infringer for merely providing a service to the general public with knowledge that it will be used by some to infringe copyrights.
Accordingly, we reverse.
Under the Copyright Act, copyright owners have the exclusive rights to copy, distribute, and digitally transmit their copyrighted works, Section one-oh-six.
So, for example, if a musician has a copyright for a song recording, others generally cannot copy and share that recording without the musician's permission.
The Copyright Act provides that anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner is an infringer of the copyright.
A willful infringer faces statutory damages of up to one hundred and fifty thousand dollars per work.
This court has also recognized two categories of secondary copyright liability, which means liability for the copyright infringement of another.
Those two categories are contributory liability and vicarious liability.
This case concerns contributory liability.
The provider of a service is contributorily liable for a user's infringement if it intended its service to be used for infringement.
To establish that a provider intended its service to be used for infringement, a copyright owner must show one of two things.
First, it can show that a party affirmatively induced the infringement.
Or second, it can show that the party sold a service tailored to infringement.
Patent law, with which copyright law has a historic kinship, Sony Corporation of America v Universal City Studios Incorporated, decided in nineteen eighty-four, tracks these two requirements.
In nineteen ninety-eight, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, seventeen U.S.C.
Section twelve oh one, and following, which gave service providers a safe harbor defense to secondary copyright liability.
Under the DMCA Safe Harbor defense, service providers cannot be secondarily liable for certain forms of copyright infringement if they have implemented a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders who are repeated infringers.
At the same time, the DMCA specifies that failure to qualify for the safe harbor defense shall not bear adversely upon the consideration of a defense by the service provider that the service provider's conduct is not infringing.
Countless people use the internet for legal activities, but some use it to illegally share copyrighted works, such as songs and movies.
The Copyright Act authorizes copyright owners to sue these copyright infringers, seventeen USC Sections five-oh-one-A, five-oh-four-A.
In this case, however, instead of suing those infringers, the copyright owners sued petitioners, Cox Communications Incorporated and its subsidiary, who provided the internet connections that the infringers used.
They contended that Cox was itself liable for copyright infringement because it continued to provide known infringers with internet access.
Based on this theory of infringement, respondents, Sony Music Entertainment and other major copyright owners, secured a billion-dollar verdict against Cox.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that because Cox provided internet service to known infringers, it was a willful infringer itself.
Under our precedence, a company is not liable as a copyright infringer for merely providing a service to the general public with knowledge that it will be used by some to infringe copyrights.
Accordingly, we reverse.
Under the Copyright Act, copyright owners have the exclusive rights to copy, distribute, and digitally transmit their copyrighted works, Section one-oh-six.
So, for example, if a musician has a copyright for a song recording, others generally cannot copy and share that recording without the musician's permission.
The Copyright Act provides that anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner is an infringer of the copyright.
A willful infringer faces statutory damages of up to one hundred and fifty thousand dollars per work.
This court has also recognized two categories of secondary copyright liability, which means liability for the copyright infringement of another.
Those two categories are contributory liability and vicarious liability.
This case concerns contributory liability.
The provider of a service is contributorily liable for a user's infringement if it intended its service to be used for infringement.
To establish that a provider intended its service to be used for infringement, a copyright owner must show one of two things.
First, it can show that a party affirmatively induced the infringement.
Or second, it can show that the party sold a service tailored to infringement.
Patent law, with which copyright law has a historic kinship, Sony Corporation of America v Universal City Studios Incorporated, decided in nineteen eighty-four, tracks these two requirements.
In nineteen ninety-eight, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, seventeen U.S.C.
Section twelve oh one, and following, which gave service providers a safe harbor defense to secondary copyright liability.
Under the DMCA Safe Harbor defense, service providers cannot be secondarily liable for certain forms of copyright infringement if they have implemented a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders who are repeated infringers.
At the same time, the DMCA specifies that failure to qualify for the safe harbor defense shall not bear adversely upon the consideration of a defense by the service provider that the service provider's conduct is not infringing.
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