Process Safety with Trish & Traci
May 26, 2026 · 6 min · 4 segments
The analog timepieces at Melbourne's Flinders Street Station offer a timeless lesson: sometimes the simplest solution is the most elegant — and the most reliable.
Trish KieranHost
Traci PurdumHost
Growing up, the clocks at Flinders Street Station were the perfect meeting point to catch up with friends.
Visually, you can't miss the line of clocks advising the time of the next train services.
Inside the station, there are many digital displays with the platform details and times.
We have a multitude of apps that tell us when trains arrive and depart and which platform they use.
In today's world, we can get caught up in new digital ways that add layers, which can often be quite complex.
In engineering, we strive for the elegant solution, the simple option, the analog clock that does the job.
When we apply this thinking to process safety, we are looking to use inherently safer design options.
Can we eliminate the hazard? Can we substitute it for something less hazardous? Can we moderate the process conditions to reduce the hazard? Can we minimize the quantity or amount of the hazard present? Last but not least, can we simplify the process to remove room for error? I recently worked with a company developing new energy technologies, and their solution is beautifully simple.
The perfect example of an elegant solution, taking established mechanical and electrochemical processes and applying them in novel ways.
Over my career, I have seen the widespread embedding of distributed control systems, DCS, and programmable logic controllers, PLC.
We have real-time monitoring of multiple parameters and can link actions to specific triggers, providing for automated optimization that is not reliant on a human sensing some data, thinking about an option, deciding, and then acting.
These systems have led not only to process improvements, but also to greater safety margins and better outcomes.
So is there a downside to applying multiple levels of technology? I think so when I reflect on one of the inherently safer design principles I mentioned, simplification.
When we add multiple levels of technology, we increase the complexity of the system, and complex systems can fail in multiple complex ways.
One of these multiple layers is the illusion of alarms providing some form of control.
How many times in a risk assessment have you heard someone say, "We can put an alarm on that"? The thought is usually that if we alarm it, we've taken some action, but this is not the case.
An alarm requires additional human intervention, which can fail for any number of reasons, such as misunderstanding the requirements, slow response, or incorrect action taken.
Growing up, the clocks at Flinders Street Station were the perfect meeting point to catch up with friends.
Visually, you can't miss the line of clocks advising the time of the next train services.
Inside the station, there are many digital displays with the platform details and times.
We have a multitude of apps that tell us when trains arrive and depart and which platform they use.
In today's world, we can get caught up in new digital ways that add layers, which can often be quite complex.
In engineering, we strive for the elegant solution, the simple option, the analog clock that does the job.
When we apply this thinking to process safety, we are looking to use inherently safer design options.
Can we eliminate the hazard? Can we substitute it for something less hazardous? Can we moderate the process conditions to reduce the hazard? Can we minimize the quantity or amount of the hazard present? Last but not least, can we simplify the process to remove room for error? I recently worked with a company developing new energy technologies, and their solution is beautifully simple.
The perfect example of an elegant solution, taking established mechanical and electrochemical processes and applying them in novel ways.
Over my career, I have seen the widespread embedding of distributed control systems, DCS, and programmable logic controllers, PLC.
We have real-time monitoring of multiple parameters and can link actions to specific triggers, providing for automated optimization that is not reliant on a human sensing some data, thinking about an option, deciding, and then acting.
These systems have led not only to process improvements, but also to greater safety margins and better outcomes.
So is there a downside to applying multiple levels of technology? I think so when I reflect on one of the inherently safer design principles I mentioned, simplification.
When we add multiple levels of technology, we increase the complexity of the system, and complex systems can fail in multiple complex ways.
One of these multiple layers is the illusion of alarms providing some form of control.
How many times in a risk assessment have you heard someone say, "We can put an alarm on that"? The thought is usually that if we alarm it, we've taken some action, but this is not the case.
An alarm requires additional human intervention, which can fail for any number of reasons, such as misunderstanding the requirements, slow response, or incorrect action taken.
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