Nuclear Submarines and the Limits of the 123 Agreement | Eye on Korea Ep. 41

Absolutely.

The first, just to set the stage, I think a lot of the discussion is around, this is specifically focused on the nuclear portfolio.

And in 2015, when we concluded the 123, the so-called 123 Peaceful Cooperation Agreement with China, South Korea, the world was very different than it is today and is ever changing.

And so because of that and because of the internal politics, both in the United States and in South Korea, and the global situation, I do believe that the issues are moving faster and we're having a harder time as governments on both sides to adapt to that changing situation.

And a good example of that is when, you know, The top level governments meet and they put out a joint statement.

A lot of times that joint statement catches both of the bureaucracies by surprise and they have to catch up and build the bureaucracies behind it.

And I know that we're going to get into those discussions as it pertains to the bureaucracy.

One, two, three agreement and fuel cycle, nuclear submarines and the like.

But I think that's that's a good example of how how things are emerging and they're not the same as they were certainly 10 years ago with the politics in each of the countries and then the international pressures surrounding those issues.

Okay, well, I'm glad you raised the joint fact sheet because I do have a lot of questions about that.

And I think that in the nuclear area, the fact sheet that came out following the summit in Gyeongju drew a lot of attention.

And even President Trump's tweets drew a lot of attention related both to enrichment and reprocessing and the possibility of South Korea building a nuclear submarine, I think the president said in Philadelphia.

So, following that statement, what were the main issues? How do you think that that set the agenda for the governments? And where do you think we are in terms of addressing those two elements of the joint fact sheet?

So I think context is king in this area.

That summit took place in October.

There was a meeting prior to that in August where you didn't see a lot of information coming out of it.

There were a lot of MOUs between corporations and a lot of conversations around tariffs.

And I think both sides were a little dissatisfied if I were to read the tea leaves as to how both countries were interpreting that meeting.

The second meeting took place in October.

And interestingly, the fact sheet came out.

Weeks later, right, it came out in November.

And the question is why it came out as a joint statement.

It wasn't a joint declaration.

I think in the terms of diplomacy, you know, that's kind of a downgraded, a factually downgraded issue.

But I think the main focus of those of those statements.