Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals-David Hume

An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals by David Hume Section 1 of The General Principles of Morals disputes with men pertinaciously obstinate in their principles are of all others the most irksome except perhaps those with persons entirely disingenuous who really do not believe the opinions they defend but engage in the controversy from affectation from a spirit of opposition or from a desire of showing wit and ingenuity superior to the rest of mankind the same blind adherence to their own arguments is to be expected in both the same contempt of their antagonists and the same passionate vehemence in enforcing sophistry and falsehood and as reasoning is not the source whence either disputant derives his tenets it is in vain to expect that any logic which speaks not to the affections will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions may be ranked among the disingenuous disputants nor is it conceivable that any human creature could ever seriously believe that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affection and regard of every one the difference which nature has placed between one man and another is so wide and this difference is still so much farther widened by education example and habit that where the opposite extremes come at once under our apprehension there is no scepticism so scrupulous and scarce any assurance so determined as absolutely to deny all distinction between them let a man's insensibility be ever so great he must often be touched with the images of right and wrong and let his prejudices be ever so obstinate he must observe that others are susceptible of like impressions the only way therefore of converting an antagonist of this kind is to leave him to himself for finding that nobody keeps up the controversy with him it is probable he will at last of himself from mere weariness come over to the side of common sense and reason there has been a controversy started of late much better worth examination concerning the general foundation of morals whether they be derived from reason or from sentiment whether we attained the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense whether like all sound judgment of truth and falsehood they should be the same to every rational intelligent being or whether like the perception of beauty and deformity they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the human species the ancient philosophers though they often affirm that virtue is nothing but conformity to reason yet in general seem to consider morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment on the other hand our modern inquirers though they also talk much of the beauty of virtue and deformity of vice yet have commonly endeavoured to account for these distinctions by metaphysical reasonings and by deductions from the most abstract principles of the understanding such confusion reigned in these subjects that an opposition of the greatest consequence could prevail between one system and another and even in the parts of almost each individual system and yet nobody till very lately was ever sensible of it the elegant lord shaftesbury who first gave occasion to remark this distinction and who in general adhered to the principles of the ancients is not himself entirely free from the same confusion it must be acknowledged that both sides of the question are susceptible of specious arguments moral distinctions it may be said are discernible by pure reason else whence the many disputes that reign in common life as well as in philosophy with regard to this subject the long chain of proofs often produced on both sides the examples cited the authorities appealed to the analogies employed the fallacies detected the inferences drawn and the several conclusions adjusted to their proper principles truth is disputable not taste what exists in the nature of things is the standard of our judgment what each man feels within himself is the standard of sentiment propositions in geometry may be proved systems in physics may be controverted but the harmony of verse the tenderness of passion the brilliancy of wit must give immediate pleasure no man reasons concerning another's beauty but frequently concerning the justice or injustice of his actions in every criminal trial the first object of the prisoner is to disprove the facts alleged and deny the actions imputed to him the second to prove that even if these actions were real they might be justified as innocent and lawful it is confessedly by deductions of the understanding that the first point is ascertained how can we suppose that a different faculty of the mind is employed in fixing the other on the other hand those who would resolve all moral determinations into sentiment may endeavour to show that it is impossible for reason ever to draw conclusions of this nature to virtue say they it belongs to be amiable and vice odious this forms their very nature or essence but can reason or argumentation distribute these different epithets to any subjects and pronounce beforehand that this must produce love and that hatred or what other reason can we ever assign for these affections but the original fabric and formation of the human mind which is naturally adapted to receive them the end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty and by proper representations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue beget correspondent habits and engage us to avoid the one and embrace the other but is this ever to be expected from inferences and conclusions of the understanding which of themselves have no hold of the affections or set in motion the active powers of men they discover truths but where the truths which they discover are indifferent and beget no desire or aversion they can have no influence on conduct and behaviour What is honourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is noble, what is generous, takes possession of the heart and animates us to embrace and maintain it.

What is intelligible, what is evident, what is probable, what is true, procures only the cool assent of the understanding, and gratifying a speculative curiosity puts an end to our researches.

extinguish all the warm feelings and prepossessions in favour of virtue and all disgust or aversion to vice render men totally indifferent towards these distinctions and morality is no longer a practical study nor has any tendency to regulate our lives and actions these arguments on each side and many more might be produced are so plausible that i am apt to suspect they may the one as well as the other be solid and satisfactory and that reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions the final sentence it is probable which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious praiseworthy or blameable that which stamps on them the mark of honour or infamy approbation or censure that which renders morality an active principle and constitutes virtue our happiness and vice our misery it is probable i say that this final sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling which nature has made universal in the whole species for what else can have an influence of this nature but in order to pave the way for such a sentiment and give a proper discernment of its object it is often necessary we find that much reasoning should precede that nice distinctions be made just conclusions drawn distant comparisons formed complicated relations examined and general facts fixed and ascertained some species of beauty especially the natural kinds on their first appearance command our affection and approbation and where they fail of this effect it is impossible for any reasoning to redress their influence or adapt them better to our taste and sentiment but in many orders of beauty particularly those of the finer arts it is requisite to employ much reasoning in order to feel the proper sentiment and a false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection there are just grounds to conclude that moral beauty partakes much of this latter species and demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties in order to give it a suitable influence on the human mind but though this question concerning the general principles of morals be curious and important it is needless for us at present to employ farther care in our researches concerning it for if we can be so happy in the course of this inquiry as to discover the true origin of morals it will then easily appear how far either sentiment or reason enters into all determinations of this nature in order to attain this purpose we shall endeavour to follow a very simple method we shall analyse that complication of mental qualities which form what in common life we call personal merit we shall consider every attribute of the mind which renders a man an object either of esteem and affection or of hatred and contempt every habit or sentiment or faculty which if ascribed to any person implies either praise or blame and may enter into any panegyric or satire of his character and manners the quick sensibility which on this head is so universal among mankind gives a philosopher sufficient assurance that he can never be considerably mistaken in framing the catalogue or incur any danger of misplacing the objects of his contemplation he needs only enter into his own breast for a moment and consider whether or not he should desire to have this or that quality ascribed to him and whether such or such an imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy the very nature of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgment of this nature and as every tongue possesses one set of words which are taken in a good sense and another in the opposite the least acquaintance with the idiom suffices without any reasoning to direct us in collecting and arranging the estimable or blameable qualities of men the only object of reasoning is to discover the circumstances on both sides which are common to these qualities to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities agree on the one hand and the blameable on the other and thence to reach the foundation of ethics and find those universal principles from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived as this is a question of fact not of abstract science we can only expect success by following the experimental method and deducing general maxims from a comparison of particular instances the other scientific method where a general abstract principle is first established and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclusions may be more perfect in itself but suits less the imperfection of human nature and is a common source of illusion and mistake in this as well as in other subjects men are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in natural philosophy and will hearken to no arguments but those which are derived from experience it is full time they should attempt a like reformation in all moral disquisitions and reject every system of ethics however subtle or ingenious which is not founded on fact and observation We shall begin our inquiry on this head by the consideration of the social virtues benevolence and justice.

The explication of them will probably give us an opening by which the others may be accounted for.