Wehrmacht

And it is also clear from those war plans.

that these were not defensive plans, so the Soviet troops would not wait, the Red Army would not wait for a German attack and then counter attack, but indeed it was planned that the Red Army should take the initiative and strike into East Prussia, even before the German troops, the Wehrmacht, would be fully concentrated.

So while the Wehrmacht was still in the process of marching up its troops, the Russians would already strike and destroy these troops before they could even attain a battle posture.

And this motif is really found throughout all of these operational plans.

So Schripper dissects a number of operational plans and five of them overall.

So if indeed the Soviet Union had been preparing for a defensive war, the very last thing they would have done is to put their assets this far forward.

And indeed, The initial catastrophe of the Red Army was brought about by this extremely forward deployment of the troops, but also of the Air Force, for example.

I mean, all these assets were lost within a few days of fighting after the Wehrmacht had attacked, right? And then it became very difficult indeed to organize a...

During this period, Chechnya and Ingushetia were lumped together to form the Chechnyo-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and the 1930s saw huge numbers of immigrants arrive in the region from Ukraine during the Holodomor Joseph Stalin's terror famine that took the lives of millions.

Fighting arrived in the Caucasus in July 1942, as the German Wehrmacht surged through the region during Operation Barbarossa.

Despite some fierce and, let's be perfectly honest, pretty hopeless resistance from the local people in the face of a far superior opposition, Soviet leaders blamed the Chechens for the speed at which the Caucasus was overrun.

To such an extent, they were openly dubbed Nazi collaborators.

a couple of things happened to frame this in context as to why, as to why war kind of became inevitable, in my opinion.

Um, like I said, the Polish documents, um, a, uh, a, uh, after the invasion, uh, of Poland by the Wehrmacht, a, uh, an SS battalion seized these documents, um, from, uh, from, uh, I can't remember if it was the foreign ministry or if it was... or if it was somewhere else.

But in any event, the crux of these documents was that there have been diplomatic overtures to Poland, wherein Roosevelt, through William Bullitt, had given Poland a formal guarantee that if they held out against Germany, they would support them in an event of war.

And that, I believe, probably stiffened the resolve even more than Chamberlain's guarantee did.

You sign non-aggression pacts with your enemies.

It should be obvious to anybody.

Like I said, the Reich had approached Stalin and Ribbentrop's ministry and established that the demarcation lines would be in, uh, and the, and the Wehrmacht literally met the red army and, you know, Poland central.

I mean, that's what, that's, that's what the hedge was.

If you did...

I think throughout 1942, the Wehrmacht had something like a 15 to 1 burn rate and major engagement with the Red Army.

Does the greater German Reich exist today? Did it win the war? Did it kill a whole lot of people in Russia? No.

But the issue with public opinion was that it wasn't so much like the court history is two things.

I mean, there are...

But think about this.

Like, imagine in 1943, imagine after, you know, the US Army didn't meet the Wehrmacht in combat until 43, and they got their asses kicked, the Kasserine Pass.

Like, imagine if Walter Winchell had gone on the radio and said, Mr. Roosevelt's a liar, World War II can't be won, you know, victory of the Axis is imminent.

And Kennedy said, well, did Ribbentrop not offer that Germany would not only make no claim on the British Empire, but would all but guarantee its continued existence so long as the British were willing to furnish Germany once again with its colonies, and that the UK would not interfere in Germany's policy in the east.

And including that was a guarantee that the Wehrmacht would not move one inch westward.

It should be noted that Hitler had no interest in the issue of colonies, but Ribbentrop and the foreign ministry did.

But that's kind of a, that deserves a treatment on its own.

As everybody knows, he preempted the ash loose.

He preempted this plebiscite, and he preempted Schussner declaring martial law by... you know, deploying forces across the Austrian frontier.

And the Wehrmacht is welcomed by the people.

And on April 10th, Hitler held a referendum on the same day as, you know, German elections.

a couple of things happened to frame this in context as to why, as to why war kind of became inevitable, in my opinion.

Um, like I said, the Polish documents, um, a, uh, a, uh, after the invasion, uh, of Poland by the Wehrmacht, a, uh, an SS battalion seized these documents, um, from, uh, from, uh, I can't remember if it was the foreign ministry or if it was... or if it was somewhere else.

But in any event, the crux of these documents was that there have been diplomatic overtures to Poland, wherein Roosevelt, through William Bullitt, had given Poland a formal guarantee that if they held out against Germany, they would support them in an event of war.

And that, I believe, probably stiffened the resolve even more than Chamberlain's guarantee did.

You sign non-aggression pacts with your enemies.

It should be obvious to anybody.

Like I said, the Reich had approached Stalin and Ribbentrop's ministry and established that the demarcation lines would be in, uh, and the, and the Wehrmacht literally met the red army and, you know, Poland central.

I mean, that's what, that's, that's what the hedge was.

If you did...

I think throughout 1942, the Wehrmacht had something like a 15 to 1 burn rate and major engagement with the Red Army.

Does the greater German Reich exist today? Did it win the war? Did it kill a whole lot of people in Russia? No.

But the issue with public opinion was that it wasn't so much like the court history is two things.

I mean, there are...

But think about this.

Like, imagine in 1943, imagine after, you know, the US Army didn't meet the Wehrmacht in combat until 43, and they got their asses kicked, the Kasserine Pass.

Like, imagine if Walter Winchell had gone on the radio and said, Mr. Roosevelt's a liar, World War II can't be won, you know, victory of the Axis is imminent.