VMF-221

So where the RAF sent their Buffalos to the colonies to get rid of them, the U.S. Navy sent theirs to the Marines.

At Midway Island, Marine Fighter Squadron VMF-221 flew into battle with a mixed roster of 20 Brewster Buffalos and seven Grumman F or F-3 Wildcats.

Originally earmarked for the USS Saratoga as part of a relief expedition bound for Wake Island, the squadron was diverted to Midway when that force was recalled on December 22nd, 1941, just one day before Wake Island fell to the Japanese.

The squadron drew first blood on March 10th, 1942, when Captain James L. Neffus shot down a Kawanishi H8K Emily flying boat near the atoll, marking the Buffalo's very first aerial victory under U.S. colors.

But by mid-1942, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps knew the bulky, underpowered F2-A-3 variant was dangerously outclassed.

Even so, the Marines had no choice but to dance with the one that brung them.

Stationed on the Tani Atoll to defend it from the impending Imperial Japanese Navy onslaught, Marine Fighter Squadron VMF-221 scrambled to meet the first massive wave of Japanese bombers and Zero escorts on the morning of June 4th, 1942.

Major Floyd B.

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he further declared that relief from raids would improve the outlook after recording in a second message the damage inflicted by the japanese on the base on peel the atoll commander noted that since the outbreak of the war the efforts involved in assisting in the defense and salvage operations had fully occupied all of the contractor's men cunningham continued by noting the additional numbers of dead or missing civilians since his earlier dispatch on the subject and described the civilians morale as extremely low he reiterated his request to consider evacuating the civilians since the large number of them who were not contributing to the defensive efforts required sustenance which drew on the stores required by those actively engaged in the defensive operations in the meantime vice-admiral pye had passed on to brown information pointing toward japan's establishment of an air base in the gilberts and the existence of a submarine force at most disturbing of all was the news that sinkpak's intelligence people knew of no definite location of the force which attacked oahu for all anyone knew the japanese carriers whose planes had bombed pearl harbor could be lurking almost anywhere considering the newly established enemy air bases that he would have to pass en route to brown could see that japanese air searches from those places might spot task force eleven before it reached its objective he began fueling his ships on the eighteenth the same day that rear admiral william f halsey juniors task force eight sailed from pearl to support task forces eleven and fourteen and inform the task force of its objective brown completed the fueling operations on the nineteenth that done he detached his oiler the neo a o twenty three to stand out of danger and contemplated what lay ahead fletcher's task force fourteen meanwhile pressed westward at noon on the nineteenth the saratoga and her consorts were one thousand twenty miles east of wake d day had been set for the twenty fourth sidebar admiral frank jack fletcher the commander of task force fourteen is the subject of much historical monday morning quarter-backing all of these commentators have the benefit of something neither pye the overall commander nor fletcher on the scene had hindsight as sock mcmorris admiral kimmel's war plans officer put it we had no more idea'n a billy-goat about what japanese forces lay off the welter of message traffic linking crewdives cardives and batdives with land-based air painted a formidable picture of what might be encountered by a single u s navy carrier task force while the navy pilots may have been well trained saratoga's embarked fighter squadron was under strength having only thirteen operational wildcats nor could the Marines of VMF-221, bound for Wake, have been counted on as an effective adjunct to Saratoga's squadron, since they had not operated from a carrier.

An even more compelling argument for how VMF-221 would have performed in the emergency is that Major General Ross Rowell, commanding the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, knowing of two twenty ones manpower and operational deficiencies lamented having to send major vern mccall's half-baked outfit into that mess rowl knew that maintaining the temperamental brewster f two a three buffalo fighters at a stateside air base with all the conveniences had been a chore let alone having to operate the f two a three at an advanced base especially one that had been so badly cut up as wake had been or at sea on a carrier where the f two a performance especially with landing gear failures was nearly infamous and two the three carriers committed to the relief expedition were all there were in the pacific there were no reserves even though the japanese harbored no ideas of conquest of hawaii at that time they were through with oahu for the time being pai and his advisers had no way of knowing that what intelligence existed pointed toward a potential disaster for an island where the issue was as cunningham correctly perceived very much in doubt when asked in nineteen seventy if the relief expedition's arrival would have made any difference in the outcome at wake retired brigadier general devereux answered i rather doubt that that particular task force with its size and composition could have been very effective I think it was wise to pull back.

End of Chapter 3 Chapter 4 of A Magnificent Fight Marines in the Battle for Wake Island by Robert J. Cressman This LibriVox recording is in the public domain.

All hands have behaved splendidly.