Topos

Then the question is, like, if you can't brute force mathematics, why would you think you could brute force the empirical world, right? Anyway, so just to get back to the point, right? So Scott's geometric, well,

the Grothendieck topoi and Abramski's logical version of it in geometric logic, that's kind of, as far as I see it, a sort of refinement of this way of thinking about mathematics from the side of computation.

Like what kind of computations

can you perform with the type definitions and everything else you've got? But the key point is it's monotonic,

delightful interpretation.

Part of the problem with this work is that it had to be presented to analytic logicians and analytic logicians just don't fucking study category theory.

So they couldn't say like, oh, this is the internal logic of Grothendieck topoids.

They have to say, oh, no, we're giving semantics in terms of directed sets, which is the same structure