But also you, Tom, mentioned this, uh, process then has been dragging forever, so maybe you have again something to add here.

Yeah, so the core of the problem is not only that official creditor coordination remains difficult as, as Zam- as the case of Zambia has shown, where it took, uh, three years until an agreement, um, of official creditors, uh, was reached, but only after, after that, um, the negotiations with the private creditors, uh, were started.

Um, and this, this sequencing, um, really creates, uh, problems, um, because you need the...

So private creditors, when they come in, they, it is expected that they, um, treat the debtor country as least, at least as favorable as the official creditors.

So you, in the, in the current process, you need this sequencing.

Um, and this sequencing, um, then also leads to private creditors, um, receiving the information on comparability of treatment a bit too late so that they can only start negotiating after the agreement, um, with the official creditors has re- uh, has been reached.

Um, and then also the, the official creditors, uh, worry that the private creditors, um, only benefit from public concessions and do not grant, um, equal, equal concessions.

Uh, do you think it would be an easy sell for, uh, the G20?