Sophistical Refutations

You, my readers or hearers of my lectures, if you think I have done as much as can fairly be required for an initiatory start, compared with other more advanced departments of theory, will acknowledge what I have achieved, and pardon what I have left for others to accomplish.

De Sophisticis Elenchis, 34, as rendered by Grote, 2, 133 So far, the comparison has been between Aristotle and his successors in modern times.

For it is only in contrast with their achievements that we can speak of his results as failures.

Such a comparison might serve in estimating their claims, but not in estimating his.

Any door, the right support.

dialectic is at the same time a mode of examination as well for neither is the art of examination an accomplishment of the same kind as geometry but one which a man may possess even though he has not knowledge for it is possible even for one without knowledge to hold an examination of one who is without knowledge if also the latter grants him points taken not from things that he knows or from the special principles of the subject under discussion but from all that range of consequences attaching to the subject which a man may indeed know without knowing the theory of the subject but which if he do not know he is bound to be ignorant of the theory so then clearly the art of examining does not consist in knowledge of any definite subject for this reason too it deals with everything for every theory of anything employs also certain common principles hence everybody including even amateurs makes use in a way of dialectic and the practice of examining for all undertake to some extent a rough trial of those who profess to know things what serves them here is the general principles for they know these of themselves just as well as the scientist even if in what they say they seem to the latter to go wildly astray from them all then are engaged in refutation for they take a hand as amateurs in the same task with which dialectic is concerned professionally and he is a dialectician who examines by the help of a theory of reasoning now there are many identical principles which are true of everything though they are not such as to constitute a particular nature i e a particular kind of being but are like negative terms while other principles are not of this kind but are special to particular subjects accordingly it is possible from these general principles to hold an examination on everything and that there should be a definite art of so doing and moreover an art which is not of the same kind as those which demonstrate this is why the contentious reasoner does not stand in the same condition in all respects as the drawer of a false diagram for the contentious reasoner will not be given to misreasoning from any definite class of principles but will deal with every class these then are the types of sophistical refutations and that it belongs to the dialectician to study these and to be able to effect them is not difficult to see for the investigation of premises comprises the whole of this study chapter so much then for apparent refutations as for showing that the answerer is committing some fallacy and drawing his argument into paradox for this was the second item of the sophist's programme in the first place then this is best brought about by a certain manner of questioning and through the question for to put the question without framing it with reference to any definite subject is a good bait for these purposes for people are more inclined to make mistakes when they talk at large and they talk at large when they have no definite subject before them also the putting of several questions even though the position against which one is arguing be quite definite and the claim that he shall say only what he thinks create abundant opportunity for drawing him into paradox or fallacy and also whether to any of these questions he replies yes or replies no of leading him on to statements against which one is well off for a line of attack nowadays however men are less able to play foul by these means than they were formerly for people rejoin with the question what has that to do with the original subject it is too an elementary rule for eliciting some fallacy or paradox that one should never put a controversial question straight away but say that one puts it from the wish for information for the process of inquiry thus invited gives room for an attack a rule specially appropriate for showing up a fallacy is the sophistic rule that one should draw the answerer on to the kind of statements against which one is well supplied with arguments this can be done both properly and improperly as was said before again to draw a paradoxical statement look and see to what school of philosophers the person arguing with you belongs and then question him as to some point wherein their doctrine is paradoxical to most people for with every school there is some point of that kind it is an elementary rule in these matters to have a collection of the special theses of the various schools among your propositions the solution recommended as appropriate here too is to point out that the paradox does not come about because of the argument whereas this is what his opponent always really wants moreover argue from men's wishes and their professed opinions for people do not wish the same things as they say they wish they say what will look best whereas they wish what appears to be to their interest e g they say that a man ought to die nobly rather than to live in pleasure and to live in honest poverty rather than in dishonourable riches but they wish the opposite accordingly a man who speaks according to his wishes must be led into stating the professed opinions of people while he who speaks according to these must be led into admitting those that people keep hidden away for in either case they are bound to introduce a paradox for they will speak contrary either to men's professed or to their hidden opinions the widest range of commonplace argument for leading men into paradoxical statement is that which depends on the standards of nature and of the law it is so that both callicles is drawn as arguing in the gorgias and that all the men of old supposed the result to come about for nature they said and law are opposites and justice is a fine thing by a legal standard but not by that of nature accordingly they said the man whose statement agrees with the standard of nature you should meet by the standard of the law but the man who agrees with the law by leading him to the facts of nature for in both ways paradoxical statements may be committed in their view the standard of nature was the truth while that of the law was the opinion held by the majority so that it is clear that they too used to try either to refute the answerer or to make him make paradoxical statements just as the men of to-day do as well some questions are such that in both forms the answer is paradoxical e g ought one to obey the wise or one's father and ought one to do what is expedient or what is just and is it preferable to suffer injustice or to do an injury you should lead people then into views opposite to the majority and to the philosophers if any one speaks as to the expert reasoners lead him into opposition to the majority while if he speaks as to the majority then into opposition to the reasoners for some say that of necessity the happy man is just whereas it is paradoxical to the many that a king should not be happy to lead a man into paradoxes of this sort is the same as to lead him into the opposition of the standards of nature and law.

For the law represents the opinion of the majority, whereas philosophers speak according to the standard of nature, and the truth.

CHAPTER XIII.

Cicero, in Lucullo, dialecticam inventam esse, veri et falsi quasi disceptatricum, Topica, chapter two, Stoici enim judicandi vias diligenter persecuti sunt, eius scientia quam dialecticam appellant.

Quintilian, book two, twelve, Itaque haec pars dialecticae sive illam disputatricum dicere malimus.

And with him this latter word appears to be the Latin equivalent for dialectic.

So far according to Petri Rami Dialectica, Audemari Taliae Praelectionibus Illustra, fifteen sixty-nine.

These three last properly belong to the art of controversial dialectic, as they have no objective truth in view, but only the appearance of it, and pay no regard to truth itself.

That is to say, they aim at victory.

Aristotle's book on sophistic conclusions was edited apart from the others, and at a later date.

It was the last book of his dialectic.

This is why the contentious reasoner does not stand in the same condition in all respects as the drawer of a false diagram, for the contentious reasoner will not be given to misreasoning from any definite class of principles, but will deal with every class.

These then are the types of sophistical refutations, and that it belongs to the dialectician to study these, and to be able to affect them, is not difficult to see, for the investigation of premises comprises the whole of this study.

Chapter 12 So much then for apparent refutations.

As for showing that the answerer is committing some fallacy, and drawing his argument into paradox, for this was the second item of the sophist's program.