Sentencing Reform Act

First, the proper rule for deference to guideline commentary is no deference.

Nothing in the text of the Sentencing Reform Act suggests that courts must ever defer to commentary when interpreting a guideline, let alone defer on the, un- according to the extreme rule of Stinson.

That alone should resolve the question presented, given the baseline expectation that courts independently determine the meaning of legal provisions.

That expectation dates back to Marbury, and it should be especially hard to displace in the criminal setting, where respect for liberty demands that we turn square corners.

In fact, the Sentencing Reform Act is affirmatively incompatible with any deference regime.

Section, section thirty-five fifty-three A four requires that the commission set forth the range of imprisonment in the guidelines, not elsewhere.

And Sections nine ninety-four and nine ninety-five of Title twenty-eight attach detailed procedural requirements to the amendment of guidelines, which requirements do not apply to guideline commentary.

Why would Congress bother to require detailed notice, public comment, one hundred and eighty days of congressional review, and the approval of four voting commissioners every time the co- the commission amends a guideline if the commission could simply bind the courts to a new interpretation of the guideline without going through all of this, simply by amending the commentary? The second reason the courts below erred in affording Stinson deference is that if the Sentencing Reform Act leaves room for deference, the proper predicate is genuine ambiguity of the kind that survives every tool of construction, not the mere absence of plain or flat inconsistency, as Stinson suggests.

First, the proper rule for deference to guideline commentary is no deference.

Nothing in the text of the Sentencing Reform Act suggests that courts must ever defer to commentary when interpreting a guideline, let alone defer on the, un- according to the extreme rule of Stinson.

That alone should resolve the question presented, given the baseline expectation that courts independently determine the meaning of legal provisions.

That expectation dates back to Marbury, and it should be especially hard to displace in the criminal setting, where respect for liberty demands that we turn square corners.

In fact, the Sentencing Reform Act is affirmatively incompatible with any deference regime.

Section, section thirty-five fifty-three A four requires that the commission set forth the range of imprisonment in the guidelines, not elsewhere.

And Sections nine ninety-four and nine ninety-five of Title twenty-eight attach detailed procedural requirements to the amendment of guidelines, which requirements do not apply to guideline commentary.

Why would Congress bother to require detailed notice, public comment, one hundred and eighty days of congressional review, and the approval of four voting commissioners every time the co- the commission amends a guideline, if the commission could simply bind the courts to a new interpretation of the guideline without going through all of this, simply by amending the commentary? The second reason the courts below erred in affording Stinson deference is that if the Sentencing Reform Act leaves room for deference, the proper predicate is genuine ambiguity of the kind that survives every tool of construction, not the mere absence of plain or flat inconsistency, as Stinson suggests.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, for two reasons, the courts below erred in deferring to the commentary when interpreting guideline 2K2.1. First, the proper rule for deference to guideline commentary is no deference.

Nothing in the text of the Sentencing Reform Act suggests that courts must ever defer to commentary when interpreting a guideline, let alone defer on the, un- according to the extreme rule of Stinson.

That alone should resolve the question presented, given the baseline expectation that courts independently determine the meaning of legal provisions.

That expectation dates back to Marbury, and it should be especially hard to displace in the criminal setting, where respect for liberty demands that we turn square corners.

In fact, the Sentencing Reform Act is affirmatively incompatible with any deference regime.

Section, section 3553A4 requires that the Commission set forth the range of imprisonment in the guidelines, not elsewhere.

And Sections 994 and 995 of Title 28 attach detailed procedural requirements to the amendment of guidelines, which requirements do not apply to guideline commentary.

Why would Congress bother to require detailed notice, public comment, 180 days of congressional review, and the approval of four voting commissioners every time the co- the Commission amends a guideline if the Commission could simply bind the courts to a new interpretation of the guideline without going through all of this, simply by amending the commentary? The second reason the courts below erred in affording Stinson deference is that if the Sentencing Reform Act leaves room for deference, the proper predicate is genuine ambiguity of the kind that survives every tool of construction, not the mere absence of plain or flat inconsistency, as Stinson suggests.