But do Chinese strategists actually see this contradiction? Is there any way to be at the same time the champion of the global majority and the world's unchallenged manufacturing juggernaut?

I think that this is sort of like a fundamental question that we will find the answer to in the next five to 10 years, because the proposition that the Chinese are making is that, look, the American style of leadership over the past 75 years has sort of a spent force.

It's created all this chaos and conflict around the world.

as you were saying earlier, let's get back to the fundamentals of the United Nations founding charter.

Let's replace what China refers to as hegemonism and power politics with sovereign equality.

Let's commit to not interfering inside the internal affairs of other countries.

Let's dial back on this emphasis on liberalism and human rights and democracy and universal freedoms.

We don't have a house view on

Do we have any sense about how a leader who seems to be moving incrementally and quite carefully may actually use force and invade? I mean, does, does the Iran conflict affect China's calculations in this in any way?

You know, Gavin, there's a ongoing debate on this question.

Um, there are some people who are increasingly alarmed, uh, by the fact that American missile inventories are being depleted at a rapid rate in ways that, uh, anyone who's following this can count, uh, at home, it's not a state secret, and that the United States' capabilities are being drawn from the Pacific theater to deal with the contingency in the Gulf.

And so, uh, you know, I think that there is a real concern among some that, uh, that this could present a window of opportunity, uh, for China to try to use force or dial up coercion to try to accelerate the timeline of, uh, unification with, with Taiwan.

I am, uh, a bit more skeptical of this simply because the Chinese are aware of Taiwan's political calendar.

They recognize that Taiwan will have a election in 2028.

It is a distinct possibility that the current incumbent, Lai Ching-te, will not, uh, win reelection.

Just as a final thought, I just wondered, uh, maybe this won't happen with the Trump administration, but is there any kind of thinking in Washington about how to handle the rise of China, how to save face in Iran and undercut China's plans to become the number one superpower within 20 years or so?

How do you make sense or not of the second term Trump China policy? Where do you think this all is going? Ryan, you can take that.

Well, so I think the hard thing to judge about what's going on with President Trump's approach to China is that the range of possibilities is so much wider for President Trump than it has been for any leader dating back to Nixon.

You know, you can imagine a scenario in which the US/China relationship experiences a breakthrough, where there's new understanding around, you know, synchronizing overall tariff rates to bring them into rough compliance with each other.

There's progress on risk reduction between United States and China.

Neither Xi nor Trump has a lot of confidence in their military or any desire to wage a war.

There could be a sidelining of friction points.

President Trump, for example, is unique in his disregard for human rights.

Do you have a different end state that you would articulate, and do you see this debate progressing at all in US policy circles?