Resource Public Key Infrastructure

Wow.

And you ran the RPKI program for the NRO coordinating programs.

routing security infrastructure across all five regional internet registries.

Most of our audience don't even understand what keeps the internet infrastructure working and trust and all those kinds of things.

The thing is, no one anticipated that once the Internet was open to the commercial sector and it started the exponential growth, it would end up what it is today, where anyone can be in the Internet and you don't know everyone else running on the Internet.

So there was a need for a lot of the protocols used on the Internet to have an additional layer of security.

And RPKI was one of those.

So RPKI is a public key infrastructure.

This is Job Schneider's imported RTRD and its associated control program.

The RTRD program is intended as a scalable distributed layer to deliver data produced by RPKI clients to clients such as BGPD in multi-node, multi-vector IXP and ISP deployments.

A single RTRD instance can concurrently serve many BGP routers and route servers.

And many thanks to Ralph Covelli from Hurricane Electric.

This release includes the following changes to the previous release, according to the post that's been reposted on undeadly.org. Add shorthand for well-known, quote, downgrade BGP community.

Remove support for the ASPA set table format that included per provider AFI.

RPKI clients stopped issuing those with the 8.5 release in July 2023.

Use get exec path in the fork and execute privilege separation setup and implement portable shims for various other OSs and some various minor fixes.

[chime] Then internet routing security.

IPinfo reports that about seventy point three percent of routed prefixes were RPKI valid as of September 28th, up from fifty-four percent a year earlier after years of three or four points of growth.

RPKI lets address holders publish signed records saying which network may announce their addresses so routers can drop forged routes.

China drove most of the jump, rising from under four percent to eighty-three percent of its IPv4 addresses.

Invalid routes now reach only about two route collectors versus roughly five hundred ninety-five for valid ones.