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Remote procedure call

Remote procedure call

Search complete. 90 mentions across 34 episodes found for "Remote procedure call".

Sep 22, 2026

speaker_1HOST
4:38
Yeah.
speaker_1HOST
4:38
And to understand why this is so dangerous, you really have to look at the mechanics of Web3 RPC calls.
speaker_1HOST
4:44
The malware isn't connecting to some sketchy, newly registered domain.
speaker_1HOST
4:48
It as making a perfectly standard HTTPS request to a public Ethereum node provider like Infura or Alchemy, asking to read the state variables of a specific smart contract on the Sepolia network.
speaker_1HOST
6:26
True, but you don't block Slack globally.
speaker_1HOST
6:28
You implement zero trust egress policies at the server level.
speaker_1HOST
6:32
I mean, a production database server or a backend application container has zero legitimate business communicating with Slack's API or Telegram's API or public Web3 RPC endpoints, if your Node.js application server suddenly queries the Sopolia testnet, your alerting should just be screaming at you.
speaker_0HOST
6:50
Absolutely.
Sec GuyHOST
0:42
This is the process of extracting low-hanging fruit from the target, usernames, machine names, and shared details.
Sec GuyHOST
0:50
We use SNMP enumeration to pull network data, RPC enumeration to find service info, and SMB enumeration with tools like enum4linux to map out user accounts and group memberships.
Sec GuyHOST
1:04
Remember, scanning finds the door, but enumeration tells you who lives inside and what they have in their pockets.
Sec GuyHOST
1:12
Once we have our target list, we move to system hacking.
Scott TolinskiHOST
11:13
I often find myself in a situation where I want to compare approaches, tools, and libraries.
Scott TolinskiHOST
11:17
For example, I'm trying to find alternatives to TRPC and figure out what to choose.
Scott TolinskiHOST
11:23
I'm honestly interested in other people's opinions on that.
Scott TolinskiHOST
11:27
I'm a bit old-fashioned, so I don't prompt everything." What a, what a sentence that is.

6 MINS LATER

Wes BosHOST
17:27
You know? Last thing I'll say here is being able to just test it yourself.
Wes BosHOST
17:33
Um, like AI can scaffold out the examples super quickly.
Wes BosHOST
17:37
You could come up with an example, like your example here is TRPC.
Wes BosHOST
17:41
You could say, "Give me TRPC, give me better R- RPC, give me like, like six or seven different possible RPC libraries, and I want to be able to update, pull data, refresh data.
speaker_4CORRESPONDENT
17:00
The first checkpoint is network data.
speaker_4CORRESPONDENT
17:02
Ark runs on chain ID five thousand and forty-two with the RPC endpoint at rpc.mainnet.ark.io. Wallets may still display the gas balance as, quote, "ETH eighth" unless they've added custom support for USDC as gas.
speaker_4CORRESPONDENT
17:21
Advisors need to confirm these parameters in their custody systems before initiating any transfers.
Matthew AIHOST
17:27
And what about the fee structure? How does pricing work when USDC is the gas token?
speaker_5CORRESPONDENT
20:26
If you clear an address to zero, you can't send any further outbound transactions.
speaker_5CORRESPONDENT
20:32
Also, at measurement time, on September sixteenth at zero three fifty-seven UTC, the public block explorer at explorer.arc.io redirected to a Cloudflare access sign-in.
speaker_5CORRESPONDENT
20:46
If the explorer is unavailable, advisors should query the RPC directly for transaction verification.
speaker_5CORRESPONDENT
20:53
Don't rely solely on web interfaces.
Ilan GitterHOST
14:58
... maybe aren't familiar with that term?
Kyle KloepperGUEST
15:00
When you're, when you connect with a server, when you type in, um, like something on a, uh, a browser, or you make an RPC call, you talk to some physical server.
Kyle KloepperGUEST
15:13
And, um, actually, you probably talk through 20 to 50 different physical machines all in that, uh, short amount of time, switches and...
Kyle KloepperGUEST
15:22
But something terminates that connection, and what you end up talking to, what you authenticate to, that would be, that would, you'd say that's the edge of a network.
Kyle KloepperGUEST
15:48
And then the origin server, whatever is actually providing the content, may be anywhere in the world, but Cloudflare makes that, um, safe for the origin server, but fast and performant for you as a user.
Kyle KloepperGUEST
16:02
Um, I really appreciate the business model because you're selling a actual service, and it's beneficial for the customers and, like, your customers and the people who are using, um, the service.
Kyle KloepperGUEST
16:13
And so at, at Helius, we have a very similar, um, model where it's really beneficial for the people who are using us, and it's beneficial for Solana and, and the network to have this access layer being an RPC provider, but also, um, helping participate in the network itself through validator operations.
Kyle KloepperGUEST
16:34
So edge, edge network is all of the infrastructure that people would connect to, um, that then decides how to respond to requests.
Steve GibsonHOST
34:38
ALPC, they write, is the foundational interprocess communication mechanism in Windows.
Steve GibsonHOST
34:46
It underpins RPC, COM, and a broad set of system services and is present and active on every supported Windows version from workstation to server core.
Steve GibsonHOST
34:58
Because ALPC operates at such a low level in the kernel's IPC, interprocess communication path, vulnerabilities here tend to be reliable privilege escalation primitives once an attacker has any local code execution.
Steve GibsonHOST
35:18
This class of flaw has historically appeared, s- and they're, they're repeating themselves, in post-compromise tooling used by both commodity malware and targeted intrusion operators as a reliable final step from user mode to kernel mode control.
Steve GibsonHOST
34:38
ALPC, they write, is the foundational interprocess communication mechanism in Windows.
Steve GibsonHOST
34:46
It underpins RPC, COM, and a broad set of system services, and is present and active on every supported Windows version from workstation to server core.
Steve GibsonHOST
34:58
Because ALPC operates at such a low level in the kernel's IPC, interprocess communication path, vulnerabilities here tend to be reliable privilege escalation primitives once an attacker has any local code execution.
Steve GibsonHOST
35:18
This class of flaw has historically appeared, s- and they're, they're repeating themselves, in post-compromise tooling used by both commodity malware and targeted intrusion operators as a reliable final step from user mode to kernel mode control.
Mark ErhardtHOST
79:46
You could do little Bobby tables.
Mark ErhardtHOST
79:50
If you have RPC access to a server that's running wallets already.
Mark ErhardtHOST
79:54
So I guess if you're running an Uncle Joe setup where people can create their own Bitcoin Core wallets on your Bitcoin Core node that you have given them VPN access to or something, they could break out of it.
Adam GibsonGUEST
80:07
I think Uncle Joe is usually Stalin.

8 MINS LATER

Mike SchmidtHOST
88:36
LND, this is a change so that LND will now always say explicitly which channel type it wants when opening a channel, which is actually what the spec requires.
Mike SchmidtHOST
88:49
It puts the channel type in the open channel and then spits it back out in accept channel, and then it also rejects incoming opens that leave out that field.
Mike SchmidtHOST
89:01
So maybe one thing to note here is that if you're using LND and you open a channel through the RPC without picking a type, LND picks one based on what it thinks both sides, well, what it knows both sides support.
Mike SchmidtHOST
89:15
And this is sort of tied into the fix that we talked about back in newsletter 4.7 where LND was picking a taproot channel implicitly and then failing on it.
Thomas ThierryGUEST
44:44
I'm, I'm using, like, a privacy protocol, so I- I'm private now." And it's like, well, no, um, because, uh, you didn't use a VPN or Tor or anything, and, um, it's very public.
Thomas ThierryGUEST
44:56
Um, or, like, you, your wallet had, like, RPC codes, uh, to ask for some states you needed to build a transaction, and that actually reveals, uh, the state you, you needed to build the s- the transaction, so it leaks your privacy as well.
Thomas ThierryGUEST
45:10
So yeah, for me, it's really about, like, trying to, to think comprehensively of like what a full privacy experience looks like.
Thomas ThierryGUEST
45:18
Um, and then the next step is to make it completely invisible to the user.
Thomas ThierryGUEST
48:02
The, the, the first is, um, uh, network metadata or IP addresses and everything that are just, uh, completely transparent if you don't, uh, yourself use Tor or VPN or sort of, like, custom way, so...
Thomas ThierryGUEST
48:17
And we want this to be embedded in the wallet so, like, users don't have to think about it.
Thomas ThierryGUEST
48:22
Um, and then there is an- another thing where your wallet calls RPC, uh, providers to ask for state to build transactions, and that also leaks what exactly, what piece of state you need to build your transaction, which reveals your intent and, and sort of like what, what you want to do, uh, about the, the transaction And then, you know, the, the other important part, so I talked a lot about the protocol, but, like, the, the less important part is, like, the privacy app itself, right? Um, also it, it, it can't leak.
Thomas ThierryGUEST
48:55
Um, I think there are some properties I really like, uh, that not all privacy apps, uh, have.
Steve GibsonHOST
34:38
ALPC, they write, is the foundational inter-process communication mechanism in Windows.
Steve GibsonHOST
34:46
It underpins RPC, COM, and a broad set of system services and is present and active on every supported Windows version from workstation to server core.
Steve GibsonHOST
34:58
Because ALPC operates at such a low level in the kernel's IPC, inter-process communication path, vulnerabilities here tend to be reliable privilege escalation primitives once an attacker has any local code execution.
Steve GibsonHOST
35:18
This class of flaw has historically appeared, and they're repeating themselves, in post-compromise tooling used by both commodity malware and targeted intrusion operators as a reliable final step from user mode to kernel mode control it's amazing there's a term called commodity malware commodity yes off the shelf yeah you know just your regular off the shelf that's right would you like this one

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