Rationality

Supposing, however, that there were something whose existence has in itself an absolute worth, something which, being an end in itself, could be a source of definite laws, then in this and this alone would lie the source of a possible categorical imperative, i.e., a practical law.

Now I say, man, and generally any rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end.

all objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not exist then their object would be without value but the inclinations themselves being sources of want are so far from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired that on the contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them thus the worth of any object for which it is to be acquired by our action is always conditional beings whose existence depends not only on our will but on nature's have nevertheless if they are irrational beings only a relative value as means and are therefore called things Rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is, as something which must not be used merely as means, and so far, therefore, restricts freedom of actions, and is an object of respect.

These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action, but objective ends, that is, things whose existence is an end in itself.

An end, moreover, for which no other can be substituted, which they should subserve merely as means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess absolute worth.

Act on maxims which can at the same time have for their object themselves as universal laws of nature.

Such, then, is the formula of an absolutely good will.

Rational nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this, that it sets before itself an end.

a very old tribe that was in Australia many, many thousands of years ago, one of the early tribes.

And what the fourth khalif explains in his book, Revelation and Rationality, he said that there were so many different tribes and they spoke Everyone spoke their own different language.

They communicated in their own different way.

So they weren't mingling as such.

There are a couple of writers who I think of who use a rationalistic model to show the limits of a rationalistic model.

One would be John Kay and another would be John Elster, the Norwegian philosopher, who wrote a fabulous book called Sour Grapes, subtitled Essays in the Subversion of Rationality.

in which he showed how the problem is that the things that we should rationally pursue are not subject to rational pursuit in that way.

you try very hard to go to sleep but the harder you try you don't achieve it as a simple example but many of the desirable things in life can't be achieved by striving for them directly they have to come as a byproduct of something else so this highly linear what i mean the another typical thing about the left hemisphere things linearly like i target Whereas the right habit is that there are loops that are recursive and it sees complexity.