Quetta

That is what the, uh, idea was, that we sh- and cannot miss the Pakistani elections.

A night before, I was in Islamabad, and then there was a bombing in Quetta in Balochistan, so I was covering that.

I got to Lahore literally four hours prior to the voting, 4:00 AM.

I had my first live shot at 6:00 AM Pakistan time, and the voting was supposed to begin at 8:00 AM.

It was fairly extraordinary, but you realized how close everybody lived to one another And it was, it was obvious and, well, it was explicit that they had simply gone away, and even then in January 2002, I learned from people who worked in the governor's palace, you know, where Mullah Omar had...

That they had just moved across the border into Quetta, and there they remained for the next, you know, X number of years, the Quetta Shura, you know, the Taliban leadership, and they were allowed to be there.

Um, uh, I...

You know, the Americans were f- apparently fully cognizant of this, but had that schizophrenic relationship with Pakistan, this allied country which, part of which was ad- absolutely adversarial and had hosted and was hosting the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda and was working against them, and when it could, would periodically attack or murder them, even in Pakistan, and blow up hotels and things.

Or setting up a fake radio station with a six-hundred-foot tower so we could intercept everything in the entire region.

To make a long story short, we found Kansi initially in a, in a fleabag hotel in Quetta, Pakistan.

Uh, we were able to recruit an agent who then lured him out.

The CIA is not a law enforcement organization, it's an intelligence organization, so we had to tell the FBI, "Listen, we found Kansi.

Taliban su- Yeah.

They knew he was in Quetta.

They knew.

They knew the whole time.

But the Taliban's leadership wasn't dead, and they didn't surrender.

Instead, they and many of their fighters were treated to Quetta, across the border in Pakistan.

After laying low for a brief span of time, they began to launch what was at first a low-level insurgency in the rural south of Afghanistan.

And instead of really responding to this, the American government maintained low troop levels in the country and undertook a major invasion of Iraq.

The nations who struggled and worked hard to save those nations are being destroyed.

Our friends from Quetta told us that 6 children go to school in vans from the whole village.

8 children go to school, 6 of whom are mine alone.

Now you know that when I go to an area, their speed is a little different.

you think? I will

increase the volume a little.

Just like you, InshaAllah, when you hear such statements, what do you think? So I said, you have six, InshaAllah, next year, from this village, at least 12 of the people of Quetta should be there.

Anyway, now this...

And that rings through all your work, Lise, because all of your work is about relating to people, whoever they are, which is what comes through in this book.

From Cote d'Ivoire, you went to Quetta in northern Pakistan.

And from there, to come back to, as you referred, your first trip to Kabul, you arrived in Kabul on Christmas Day in 1988, a day after your 30th birthday.

You all know when Lisa's birthday is now, so you remember that.

Basically, if you go on gov.uk website, you see that.

there is many parts of Balochistan actually is the no-go area government advised you not to travel in those areas I have I know people who actually been living in Balochistan and they've told me that they can't actually go from Quetta which is the capital of Balochistan to any of the cities in Balochistan they don't feel safe so they will they'd rather just stay inside Quetta so if If you hear stories like that, if I go to Pakistan, I would not dare driving to or flying to Balochistan because my life would be at risk.

I would not let my family go there.

If the situation is that bad on the ground, then the government must take actions.

Kay's War in Afghanistan.

The army then advanced through the Bolam and reached Quetta on March the 26th.

But here again, obstacles similar in character to those just described occurred, and Sir Alexander Burns visited the ruler of Baluchistan, the Khan of Kelat, demanding assistance, especially as to supplies of food.

The prince, with prophetic truth, pointed out that though we might restore Shah Suja, we would not carry the Afghans with us and would fail in the end.

Although the constitution, as above described, secured to the confederated tribes nearly a century of prosperity and peaceful government, it so happened that for some years before 1876, owing to the weakness of the then ruler, and partly to turbulence of the chiefs, the government of the country fell into disorder, and the commerce through the Bolam Pass altogether ceased.

From 1872 to 1876, Lord Northbrook was Viceroy of India, and one of his last acts before leaving was the appointment of Colonel Sandeman as our envoy, with a view to mediate between the Khan and his subordinates, and which proved successful.

The principal terms which were finally accepted by the Khan and his tribal chiefs were that their foreign policy was to be under our guidance, and we were also to be the referee in case of internal disputes, that the commerce of the Bolam was to be opened and protected, the annual subsidy hitherto granted to the Khan of £5,000 being doubled to cover the necessary expenditure, and finally that a British agent with a suitable contingent should be established at Quetta.

It is important to observe that the negotiations were conducted throughout in a spirit of cooperation, and that their beneficial results remain in force to the present day.

Ten days later, Cotton, leading the advance, was in Dador, at the foot of the Bolan Pass, having suffered heavily in transport animals almost from the start.

Supplies were scarce in a region so barren, but with a month's partial food on his beast of burden, he quitted Dador March 10th, got safely, if toilsomely, through the Bolan, and on 26th reached Quetta, where he was to halt for orders.

Sharsuja and Keen followed, their troops suffering not a little from scarcity of supplies and loss of animals.

Keen's error in detaining Cotton at Quetta until he should arrive proved itself in the semi-starvation to which the troops of the Bengal column were reduced.

the khan of kilat whether from disaffection or inability left unfulfilled his promise to supply grain and the result of the quarrel which burns picked with him was that he shunned coming in and paying homage to shah soojah for which default he was to suffer cruel and unjustifiable ruin The sepoys were put on half, the camp followers on quarter rations, and the force for eleven days had been idly consuming the waning supplies, when at length on April 6th Keane came into camp, having already formally assumed the command of the whole army, and made certain alterations in its organisation and subsidiary commands.

there still remained to be traversed one hundred and forty-seven miles before Kandahar should be reached, and the dreaded Khojuk Pass had still to be penetrated.

Keen was a soldier who had gained a reputation for courage in Egypt and the peninsula.

He was indebted to the acuteness of his engineer, and the valour of his troops, for the peerage conferred on him for Gunzee, and it cannot be said that during his command in Afghanistan he disclosed any marked military aptitude.