Phenomenology

And of course, we should say, and I'll stop here, that Hegel says very little about the concept of Weltanschauung.

He only mentions it in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

And here it is sort of represented as a, I think he calls it like the moral Weltanschauung, which is something that only emerges as like a momentary stage of consciousness, but ultimately a kind of inadequate one.

So for Hegel, the Weltanschauung is not something which is sort of like this homogenous or teleological construct as it is for the Kantians.

which is to say that the subjective is experience filtered through the personal the solipsistic is more a kind of claim about the world that the only thing you can be sure of is your own is yourself your own mind and you know the external world may or may not exist but and I feel like that's very interesting that to me the film is more about the kind of solipsism right like you were talking about the movie watching in itself of course most people talk about the subjectivity of the experience right how do you interpret it what is your experience of it what is what we call the phenomenological experience of cinema But I think Lynch is engaging it in on a slightly different...

Wait a second.

Phenomenological...

What is it? Say it again.

Similar.

Phenomenological is similar.

Subjective experience.

That momentary subjective experientiality.

So I think the main thing is that despite presenting some complications for European ways of thinking, for Weidorn, Glissant still remains, in some sense, phenomenological.

The second reason why I want to reflect on this relation is because while Glissant's work is certainly aligned with what might be defined as the general aims of critical phenomenology, to on the one hand trace the contingent historical emergence of structures of lived experience, such as coloniality and anti-blackness, and on the other hand to ask whether and how these structures could be made otherwise, It also seems to me that his centering of transatlantic slavery perhaps complicates the general aims of this approach in some crucial ways.

And today I want to articulate this relation by means of Lisa Gunther's article, Six Senses of Critique for Critical Phenomenology, which was published in Punta in 2021.

Now, although Gunther's definition of critical phenomenology is perhaps not one that every critical phenomenologist would accept, I think In some ways, it does resonate with the work that's being carried out in the field today.

And so for that reason, I think it is a definition that deserves some critical attention.

So it's very interesting.

I just come from the Central Eastern European Society Phenomenology Annual Conference, and they have two venues, not like us, and then nobody kind of, I think it's implicitly agree, one room is Heideggerian, another room is Husserlian, and people just somehow separate themselves very neatly in that revenue.

For a more detailed comparison between Husserl and Heidegger, I recommend Louis Sass's brilliant article, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Paradox of Subjectivity.

as you can see the reference here.

It is.

And then finally, we are diving into this highly dense, just absolutely brilliant paper from the Journal of Analytic Theology on the Phenomenology of Faith.

Which I know sounds like a completely chaotic syllabus to throw at you.

It does sound a little all over the place.

Precisely.

And this is where our final source comes in.

Kate Kirkpatrick's paper is, Analytic Theology and the Phenomenology of Faith, which was published in the Journal of Analytic Theology.

Okay, so this paper is incredibly dense, but the core argument is explosive.

... that's, these are, again, such fantastic questions.

So just I'll, I'll talk very specifically about that, and then maybe I'll pause and we can come back and talk about where these different dimensions of experience come from phenomenologically.

In other words, what is happening that brings about these different experiences? This, to me, is critically important.

Mm.

So, Sharpe's philosophy can be divided into three periods.

The first period, which could be defined as strictly phenomenological, concerns the defense under Husserl of his dissertation in Göttingen in 1909, published in 1910 with the title of Contributions to the Phenomenology of Perception.

The second period, which could be defined as the Phenomenology of Values, consists of the two volumes of the New Science of Law, and a book titled On the Metaphysics of Morsehood, that was published posthumously in 1965, but it was already written in 1937.

Finally, the third period is the so-called Philosopher of Histories, a trilogy of words in which Sharp develops a radical critique of Ustaz's phenomenology through the concept of the entanglement of humans in histories.

A brief linguistical remark.

I'm joined today by Professor Jack Caputo, who is the Thomas J. Watson Professor of Religion Emeritus at Syracuse University, and the David R. Cook Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus Villanova University in the United States.

For today's conversation, we hope to discuss Jack's work in Theopoetics, Phenomenology and the Future of Religion, In particular, we plan on discussing your most recent book, Jack, A Radical God, published by Columbia University Press, which in many senses is a culmination and systematization of several decades of philosophical and theological development, right from your infamous religion without religion, in the prayers and tears of Jack Jarrett, to the development of the event in The Weakness of God, right up to your explicit identification of postmodern radical theology with theopoetics and theopoetic reduction.

So thank you for joining me today, Jack.

And as I mentioned, many of our listeners will be familiar with your work.

You get to know what he means by certain things.

Then the Phenomenology, which, you know, I've read.

There's marks everywhere and stuff like that.

It, it, it...

It's really fucking goofy

...

but I have a, I have an article, um, that I sent that should be posted, uh, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: The Rational Structure of Experience, Logos, and the Nation, and I try to undo some of that.

Uh, I've been doing it for so-- I've been doing this for so long, I figured I'd have more publications on it.