Petitioner

The court will simply provide an abbreviated summary of the party's arguments, given that the briefs are available on the public docket.

Petitioners initially requested the following remedies.

1.

Resend the provisions in the NPA between the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of Florida and Mr. Epstein that barred his prosecution and the prosecution of his named and unnamed alleged co-conspirators.

Prior to his death, Mr. Epstein addressed the rescission remedies proposed by petitioners, asserting that they were unauthorized by the CVRA, precluded by contract law, the doctrines of judicial and equitable estoppel, substantive due process, separation of powers, and ripeness.

Mr. Epstein also opposed the government's proposed remedy of a proceeding in which unadjudicated victims make impact statements about a person who has not been convicted of or facing sentencing for a federal crime.

Petitioners provided the court with a reply memoranda addressing both the government's arguments as well as those of Mr. Epstein.

On August 12, 2019, petitioners filed a statement noting Mr. Epstein's death.

In his order vacating the firearms conviction, the judge speculated that the government had offered Rivera such a lenient plea deal because it knew something inconsistent with Darge's testimony.

And if Darge was lying, the judge wondered, perhaps there is something to Petitioner's argument that not he, but Patrick Darge's brother, was the second shooter, and that Patrick Darge testified to cover that up.

Notably, the Second Circuit had already rejected this argument twice, and Fernandez had not briefed it again before the district court.

But the judge brought it up anyway, pointedly noting that if Fernandez's life sentence on the murder-for-hire charge were to be commuted or held unlawful, Fernandez would be released immediately.

Such authority would seriously diminish the finality of sentences required by Section 3582 .

The District Court's grant of relief here ran afoul of this principle.

Petitioner Joe Fernandez has been litigating the issues at the core of his Section 3582 motions since his trial.

From the start, Fernandez has contended that the evidence against him was weak and that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he, and not someone else, committed the murders for which he was convicted.

But that doesn't stop courts from playing follow the leader.

In light of Colorado II, the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected petitioners' First Amendment challenge.

This court granted certiorari.

So which is it? Does FECA violate the First Amendment or not? At least this case is about the First Amendment, since it's a law made by Congress.

Generally, they allege that the respondent government violated their rights under the CVRA by failing to consult them before negotiating a non-prosecution agreement with Jeffrey Epstein, who subjected them to various sexual crimes while they were minors.

Petitioners initiated this action in July of 2008.

On December 30, 2014, two other unnamed victims, Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4, moved to join petitioners in this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure No. 21.

DE 280.

Petitioners Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 support the Rule 21 motion.

Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4 argue that they have suffered the same violations of their rights under the CVRA as the petitioners, and they desire to join in this action to vindicate their rights as well.

ID at 1.

Of course, Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4 can participate in this litigated effort to vindicate the rights of similarly situated victims.

Number two, moving on.

Petitioner was convinced that the, their It's really hard to read that they're actually guilt was not an important, that actually guilt was not important in considering plea acceptance.

Colon death row was imminent comma and comma advised to lie comma petitioner to get a legal quote unquote victory.

in entering a false plea.

All right.

Number two, petitioner, meaning Brian Koberger was convinced that actually guilt was not, I mean, it's just terrible grammar.

Petitioner was convinced that actually guilt was not an important in considering the plea acceptance.

Okay.

The guidelines shall apply to all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use, such as, okay, na paragraph 3.4, conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGU or by way of a presidential proclamation to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act Number 6657 on June 15, 1988.

Petitioner holds that under Republic Act Number 6657 and Republic Act Number 8435, the term agricultural land refers to lands devoted to or suitable for the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry, or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products and/or other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by a person, whether natural or juridical, and not classified by the law as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land.

When the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, however, issued its order, he included in the definition of agricultural lands, lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses before fif- before 15 June 1988.

In effect, lands reclassified from agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for purposes of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise.

According to petitioner, there is nothing in Section 5 of the said law or in any other provision of law that confers to the Department of Agrarian Reform the jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion authority.

Thus, in issuing and enforcing the administrative order, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Petitioner further asseverates, uh, that Section 2.19, Article 1 of DAR Administrative Order 01-02 as amended, making reclassification of agricultural lands subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion violates Section 20 of Republic Act Number 7160 because it was not provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or requirements, or that the DAR's approval or clearance must be secured to effect reclassification.

The said, uh, provision as amended-- the said provision, Section 2.19 of DAR Administrative Order 01-02 as amended also contravenes the constitutional mandate on local autonomy under Section 25, Article 2, and Section 2, Article 10 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

In the instant case, petitioner filed an application for admission to the University of Texas Law School for the February nineteen forty-six term.

His application was rejected solely because he is a Negro.

Petitioner thereupon brought this suit for mandamus against the appropriate school officials, respondents here, to compel his admission.

At that time, there was no law school in Texas which admitted Negroes.

The state trial court recognized that the action of the state in denying petitioner the opportunity to gain a legal education while granting it to others deprived him of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Finding that the new school offered petitioners privileges, advantages, and opportunities for the study of law substantially equivalent to those offered by the state to white students at the University of Texas, the trial court denied mandamus.

The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.

Petitioner's application for a writ of error was denied by the Texas Supreme Court.

And he claimed that he apparently was coerced into the plea agreement by his attorneys, who he says did not adequately represent him.

And one of the things that he said in his petition, which I thought was interesting, is that he said that, "During attorney-client discussions, most of which included all members of Bryan Kohberger's immediate family, Petitioner was convinced to falsely confess to capital murder and felony burglary by coercion, disinformation, false promises, and the withholding of exculpatory discovery." So that tells me that his family was probably there for some of these plea negotiations, which can happen.

It's rare, but sometimes, especially when you have a client who has mental illness or they were particularly young, which he's not young, but he did have some mental illness, you know, sometimes you'll want a family member there to, to help, you know, answer questions.

Sometimes the, the defendant wants that.