People's Liberation Army Rocket Force

So the first one, as many of your listeners know, there's been a series of purges going on in the PLA.

It's affected kind of all the services, but in particular, the political work department and the rocket force, which oversees their nuclear weapons.

And there's two kind of camps that I can decipher.

One camp of academics say it doesn't really matter who's in charge.

Then of course in the command and control side, their whole organization is not very clear to us.

So you have the PLA Rocket Force, you have the PLA Navy, you have their Central Military Commission.

We don't know with all these firings going on, especially on the PLA Rocket Force, does the leadership have the confidence to handle nuclear warheads to a person whom you're firing every third day.

So command and control to me itself is a big question on that sense.

The range of the missile which they've got, I mean, so they can reach possibly, you know, if they go mid-Pacific, they can reach mainland USA or whatever it is.

As China improves its nuclear weapons capabilities, especially its second-strike nuclear option, Xi's already damaging geopolitical confidence will grow.

Xi has developed a strong personal interest in his nuclear weapons capabilities by visiting, for example, a ballistic missile submarine commissioning in twenty twenty-one and the PLA Rocket Force on October seventeenth in Anhui Province.

As noted by the DIA, Beijing's pursuit of enhanced nuclear deterrence over the next decade probably will increase leadership confidence and the risk of miscalculation as the PLA makes gradual improvements in its ability to signal and counter the US.

This overconfidence from a strengthened nuclear backstop is likely contributing to Xi's willingness to push China's boundaries, not only in Taiwan and the South China Sea against non-nuclear powers, but also against what he sees as the weakness of even nuclear-armed democracies like the United States and India.

Third, the cost is no longer confined to a single procurement lane.

The removal span equipment, political work, the rocket force, theater leadership, the joint staff department, and now the senior vice chair.

That breadth points to a systemic trust problem.

It does not prove a single conspiracy or single motive.

but they don't erase the watch bill.

The second is campaign integration.

A Taiwan operation would require the services, Dieter Command, Rocket Force, cyberspace, logistics, Coast Guard, and civilian support to agree on timing and escalation.

Liu's joint staff role and Zhang's experience mattered here.

This asymmetrical battle in Iran has changed the whole balance, including considerations for a future war with China.

If it can't deal with some hypersonic missiles in the Persian Gulf, it can't deal with the PLARF, which is substantially bigger and will present a lot more problems in the Chinese neck of the woods.

So this is just folly now.

And I want to ask you a little bit about who's propping this up in Australia, but also in America.

Among the most prominent figures stripped of their NPC positions are several CMC members and commanders of major military services.

The group of twenty-two full generals includes Zhang and Liu, as well as former commission member Miao Hua, former defense minister Li Shangfu, former Rocket Force commander Li Yuchao, former Air Force commander Ding Laihang, former Navy commander Shen Jinke, former Navy political commissar Qin Shengxiang, former Army commander Li Qiaoming, and former Western Theater Command political commissar Li Fengbiao.

The removals span the PLA's major services and theater commands, showing that the disciplinary campaign has not been confined to a single branch or isolated group of commanders.

Many of the generals caught up in the purge rose through the ranks in the years since Xi Jinping became the CCP's top leader in two thousand twelve.

Then Xi Jinping starts targeting a very specific group of officers who are responsible for China's most strategically important military unit, its ballistic missile force.

The top five generals of China's rocket force are removed.

Commander Li is sacked.

At the same time, Chinese officials call this part of an anti-corruption campaign.

Last question.

Tell me about the elite rocket force in China.

They are seeking public tips on procurement violations.

I don't even know what the rocket force is, so break it down.

Tell me what's happening.

Okay,

so rocket force.

This is actually a Soviet invention.

This asymmetrical battle in Iran has changed the whole balance, including considerations for a future war with China.

If it can't deal with some hypersonic missiles in the Persian Gulf, it can't deal with the PLARF, which is substantially bigger and will present a lot more problems in the Chinese neck of the woods.

So this is just folly now.

And I want to ask you a little bit about who's propping this up in Australia, but also in America.

If she installs a new vice chair of the Central Military Commission and gives him time to grow into the role, this commander could become a key figure in shaping military strategy related to Taiwan, he told the Epoch Times.

Deepening Purges The purge in China's defense establishment shows no signs of abating.

In an August 24 notice, China's military said it's seeking information from the public on potential procurement violations in the rocket forces, a secretive PLA unit that commands the country's conventional and nuclear missiles.

This notice echoed a 2023 announcement by the PLA's Equipment Development Department that encouraged citizens to report potential corruption and misconduct related to hardware procurement going back to October 2017.

Since then, China has expelled two defense ministers and all four generals who had commanded the rocket forces.

Earlier this week, Beijing revealed that Zhao Zongqi, the former commander of the Western Theater Command, had been dismissed from the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the country's top political advisory body.

Zhao is among the handful of PLA officials who fought in China's 1979 conflict with Vietnam.