Nelson Goodman

I don't know, we could say...

Nelson Goodman, for instance, in the languages of art or some other contemporary analytic philosophers thinking about art, but also, again, ongoingly the way in which Heidegger thinks about art.

These are systems of discourse that have rules, that have mechanisms for breaking those rules and and for expanding the rule-giving mechanisms of the discourse, or the ways in which we understand the rules of the discourse.

So, I mean, I'm not going to define art as a set of practices or a collection of artifacts.

I mean, philosophers who have their own theories of beauty.

The very idea of there being an aesthetic emotion, for example, was famously dismissed by the philosopher Nelson Goodman as aesthetic phlogiston.

Phlogiston being-

[chuckles] Yeah

Which sort of sums that up.

And then we're gonna go into some Nelson Goodman.

Gru.

[laughs]

But gru isn't the right fit for emeralds, and he thinks this is sort of like an analytic type of relationship, actually.

And in the same way, that's, that mental predicates aren't fit at a nomological level for the physical.

So, so Nelson Goodman's point was just that there are some predicates that are simply not set for law-like behavior at all, and that you shouldn't say something is gru.

But, so Davidson's response to that is, "No, you just have to have subjects that fit those predicates." So yes, gru is a very weird predicate, but if you had a very weird subject like emerires, then that would go with that.