Mohsen Fakhrizadeh

to reinforce their conventional deterrence, right? So we didn't do anything besides, you know, make a deal that was a bad deal for us and allowed them the time and space to get stronger in the region, conventionally and unconventionally, and continue their nuclear program.

Aspects of it, right? It wasn't until Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was killed that their nuclear program, you know, their Oppenheimer was taken off the battlefield.

It wasn't until we struck Natanz, until we struck Qom, until we've physically disabled their ability to pursue a program.

And so, like I said, I just feel like I have lived in the same story over and over and it's been deja vu all over again.

In Target Tehran, my book from a few years ago, we see again the Mossad penetrates Iran with dozens of agents all in one operation when They take away the secret Iranian nuclear files.

There's one operation we described where there's one truck using one remote gun killing Iran's nuclear chief and founder, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.

And there's one operation where one drone hits one nuclear facility.

And for us, all of that was amazing.

Khamenei had to maneuver from that moment.

So he was criticized a lot by his own base for not responding enough to United States first, and then later to Israel, who was constantly agitating Iran by assassination of Fakhrizadeh in 2021, by killing Iranian IRGC commanders in Syria from 2021, all the way to killing of Zahedi in April 2024.

Later, Israel direct assassination.

So how many had to like exactly so he had to like constantly, in a sense, speed up their the urge for entering into war with America and Israel, and also dragging the the reformists and the those who were after appeasement.

We absolutely knew it happened, one.

Two, Fakhrizadeh, to the extent that Fakhrizadeh was alive, he was gonna continue to work on the weapons program.

Now, they were working under the weapons program in ways that made it look like they weren't.

Three, when the Israelis went in and took the Iranian nuclear archive, that should've been turned over to the IAEA, should've been put under safeguards, but instead they hid it.

And now, when w- when the facts didn't tell the whole story and we're asking the analyst, "What's the whole story?"

Yeah.

I wish we'd have done a better job, but I don't know if there's anyone in the Iranian government that knew all these pieces and parts with the exception of Fakhrizadeh and maybe Shamkhani, right? And a couple of the people that were involved in these programs, keeping these programs going.

That was sort of the tacit agreement on their side.

That had, the p- key people had been identified, and the leadership, according to these intelligence, the documents gathered by intelligence, internal documents, was that they were scared of the IEs and questioning.

You know, they'd question the head of the program, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, and he would say something.

Then they'd question the previous head, a guy named Shamiradi, and he would say something.

And they would differ, and then the IE would pile in on those contradictions, and it- just like a journalist would do.