Military organization

Finland was governed by its own laws, and a suggestive distinction between Russian administration and Finnish was illustrated by the fact that whereas Russia had employed 217 officials of various degrees to rule this little province, the number was at once reduced by Finland to 89.

The military organization of the Grand Duchy was also called for settlement.

On this matter the Emperor, as we have seen, demanded the avis mur of the estates, and two manifestos were devoted to it, bearing the date March 15th, 27th, and July 20th, August 1st, 1810.

The arrangements then decided upon have in themselves no present importance, but in view of the recently invented doctrine of the general interests of the Empire, which are supposed to justify the Russian war office in deciding Finnish military questions without regard to the opinions of the Diet, it is necessary to observe the principle upon which, in accordance with his constitutional pledges, Alexander acted.

The principle of universal liability to serve was recognized by the Estates by substantial majorities; but, on the other hand, provisos were inserted for maintaining the right of Finlanders to serve in Finnish regiments only and under Finnish officers, thus safeguarding the position guaranteed by Alexander I at Borgo.

And in order still further to ensure Finland's rights from attack, when the scheme thus amended was promulgated by the Tsar, certain sections of the law were expressly declared to be included among the fundamental laws of the Grand Duchy.

The whole question of military organization was thus recognized as a matter whose alteration required the assent of three estates of the Diet, whilst the particular clauses declared fundamental can only be altered with the assent of all four estates.

The military party in St. Petersburg were naturally very angry at the alterations made and, worst of all, accepted by the Tsar in the army scheme, especially as in the interval the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 to '78 had begun to show that Count Milyutin's scheme, when put to the test across the Danube, broke down almost as badly as did that of Nicholas in the Crimea.